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The present study analyzed the fiscal illusion and the flypaper effect phenomena in the scope 
of Brazilian states and municipalities. According to the theory of fiscal illusion, the government 
manages to hide from the median voter the real value received by transfers, leading the 
electorate to underestimate the real production cost of public goods. The flypaper effect 
phenomenon is one of the types of fiscal illusion and it is an empirical anomaly that receiving 
authorities convert intergovernmental transfers into public expenditures at a significantly higher 
rate than the increase of local private income. Therefore, three distinct and complementary 
studies aligned with the central subject were carried out. The first verified the occurrence of the 
flypaper effect in 476 Brazilian municipalities from 2005 to 2012, considering new variables 
as instruments of grants. Political alignment, party alignment, and the coalition of the mayor 
with the federal president and of the state governor were considered instruments. A municipal 
tax autonomy index was considered as a control variable, representing the percentage of local 
taxes in the municipal total revenues. The results lead to the conclusion that the flypaper effect 
exists in Brazilian municipalities and is intensified by the alignment of the representatives, as 
presented in theoretical (Hamilton, 1983; Hines & Thaler, 1995; Inman, 2008) and past 
empirical studies in Brazil. The second analyzed 5,568 Brazilian municipalities from 2006 to 
2013 and found substantial evidence of the flypaper effect. Using the elasticity of the tax base 
regarding the municipalities’ tax rates as a proxy of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF), 
we found evidence supporting the Dahlby (2011) hypothesis of a role of the distortionary nature 
of local taxation in the emergence of the flypaper effect. Finally, the third analyzed 27 Brazilian 
states from 1985 to 2010 and 5,568 Brazilian municipalities from 2000 to 2018 and verified the 
existence of the phenomenon. Concerning state data, an autonomous index was used as a proxy 
of the MCF, because it represents how much the municipality can survive by itself, representing 
the municipalities’ independence from federal grants. Afterward, the MCF was calculated by 
the derivation of Proper Tax Revenue to the Total Revenues. The results show that the 
stimulative effect of grants on public spending increases with the MCF in both proxies, but it 
was stronger in the autonomous index proxy, in convergence to results of Dahlby and Ferede 
(2016) to Canadian provincial data. Concerning municipality data, a flypaper time series index 
was created to verify the municipalities most impacted by this phenomenon. The flypaper effect 
was evident in Brazilian states and municipalities, with the Southeast, Central-west, and South 
regions presenting the highest rates of flypaper effect. 
 




O presente estudo analisou os fenômenos ilusão fiscal e efeito flypaper no âmbito dos entes 
estaduais e municipais brasileiros. De acordo com a teoria da ilusão fiscal, o governante 
consegue esconder do eleitor mediano o real valor recebido em transferências, induzindo o 
eleitorado a subestimar o real custo de produção de bens públicos. O fenômeno do efeito 
flypaper é um dos tipos de ilusão fiscal e consiste em anomalia empírica em que as 
transferências intergovernamentais são transformadas pelas autoridades receptoras em gastos 
públicos a uma taxa significativamente mais alta do que com o aumento da renda privada local. 
Nesse contexto, realizaram-se três estudos distintos e complementares alinhados ao tema 
central. O primeiro objetivou verificar o efeito flypaper em 476 municípios brasileiros com 
mais de 50 mil habitantes de 2005 a 2012, considerando novas variáveis como instrumentos às 
transferências. Alinhamento político, alinhamento partidário e de coligações do prefeito com o 
presidente da república e com o governador estadual foram considerados como instrumentos às 
transferências. Índice de autonomia tributária municipal foi considerado como variável de 
controle, que representa a porcentagem dos tributos municipais na arrecadação municipal total. 
Os resultados permitem concluir que o fenômeno existe nos municípios brasileiros e é 
intensificado pelo alinhamento dos representantes na mesma linha da teoria da ilusão fiscal e 
da escolha pública e dos estudos empíricos no Brasil. O segundo analisou 5,568 municípios 
brasileiros de 2006 a 2013 e encontrou evidências substanciais de efeito flypaper. Utilizando a 
elasticidade da base tributária em relação às alíquotas dos municípios como proxy do custo 
marginal de financiamento público (MCF), as evidências encontradas suportam a hipótese de 
Dahlby (2011) do papel da natureza disforme da tributação local no surgimento do efeito 
flypaper.  Por fim, o terceiro analisou 27 estados brasileiros de 1985 a 2010 e 5,568 municípios 
brasileiros de 2000 a 2018 e também verificou a existência do fenômeno. Quanto dados 
estaduais, um índice de autonomia tributária foi utilizado inicialmente como proxy do MCF, 
porque representa quanto o município pode sobreviver por si só e sua independência em relação 
às transferências federais. Em seguida, o MCF foi calculado pela derivação da receita tributária 
própria em relação à receita total. Os resultados mostram que o efeito estimulante das 
transferências sobre os gastos públicos aumenta com o MCF em ambas as proxies, com efeito 
mais forte no índice de autonomia, em convergência com os resultados de Dahlby e Ferede 
(2016) para dados provinciais canadenses. Quanto dados municipais, foi elaborado um índice 
de flypaper em série temporal para verificar os municípios mais impactados por esse fenômeno. 
Restou evidente o efeito flypaper em estados e municípios brasileiros, sendo as de maiores 
índices de efeito flypaper as regiões sudeste, centro-oeste e sul. 
 
Palavras-chave: Federalismo Fiscal. Brasil. Custo marginal de financiamento público. 
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The state has the power to impose and collect taxes, which is explained and justified by 
taxation theory, considering there are general interests of the population, such as national 
defense and the maintenance of welfare institutions (Smith, 2003). Hence, taxation capacity is 
the ability to tax, which only exists because of the supremacy of the state, with no other entity 
or private person being allowed the execution of the same functions of the state. Thus, taxation 
is at the top of the entire chain. 
Following the layers, there are three different forms of state organization: federation, 
confederation, or unitary state. Federalism is the method of dividing powers so that the general 
and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent (Wheare, 
1946). On the other hand of political science, economists are concerned about the allocation of 
resources and the distribution of income within an economic system, which is why Oates (1972) 
defines federalism as a public sector with both centralized and decentralized levels of decision-
making, in which choices made at each level concerning the provision of public services are 
determined largely by the demands of the residents of each jurisdiction. 
The author also considers to be always more efficient (or at least just as efficient) for 
local governments to provide Pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective jurisdictions 
rather than having the central government provide any specified and uniform level of output 
across all jurisdictions if the costs of providing each level of output of good in each jurisdiction 
are the same for the central or the respective local government. 
The basic characteristic of a federalist regime is the preference for a more decentralized 
government structure, capable of internalizing all economic externalities existing in the 
production of public goods and services. In Brazil, fiscal federalism represents the transfer of 
responsibilities from the Federal (central government) to the states and municipalities (local 
governments), both main responsibilities of collecting certain taxes and providing goods and 
services, according to Oates (1972), Ahmad, Hewitt and Ruggiero (1997), Hemming and Spahn 
(1997), and Gramlich (1993). 
Thus, public goods should be provided by the level of government that is closest to the 
geographic area benefiting from them, as is the case of public lighting and pavement services 
that should be municipal (local government) responsibilities. Moreover, services with a national 
scope, such as defense, monetary stability, unemployment insurance, and international 
relations, should be left to the central government (Oates, 1972). According to Oates (2005), 
first-generation fiscal federalism theories established the government allocative function as the 
sphere of action that should be done by the subnational governments (municipalities), while the 
distribution and stabilization functions should be done by the central government. 
Local governments may better reflect individual preferences, given that they are closer 
to the people (Gordon, 1983).  An important virtue of decentralization is that it makes it easier 
to specify the demand for public goods from the final consumers or voters, revealing more 
precisely the preferences of a given community through voting, and allowing greater 
accountability to those who benefit from public goods. For Aghón (1993), decentralization 
promotes economic efficiency, a dominant view in the theory of public choice. Additionally, 
decentralization is more convenient to bring politicians and citizens closer together, allowing 
better information and better supervision by the electorate. 
Olson’s fiscal equivalence principle, which establishes the need for a link between fiscal 
responsibility and the balance between public spending and taxation at each level of 
government, complements this view (Affonso, 2003). Some authors oppose decentralization, 
such as Prud’homme (1995) and Tanzi (1995). 
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States around the world are structured by three types: federation, confederation, and 
unitary state. The federal state form is organized into subnational autonomous entities, 
characterized by their indissolubility, meaning they cannot secede from the federation. In the 
same manner, fiscal federalism means decentralization of attributions from the federal state to 
these subnational entities. They are given autonomy, as well as tax competence, to create and 
regulate certain types of tax, while the federal state holds sovereignty. 
Mainly due to the gains in the scale of collection and inspection tax, the federal state 
usually centralizes the competence and collection of federal taxes. Meanwhile, subnational 
entities do not collect enough taxes to provide all goods and services to local communities. 
Therefore, the federal state transfers part of its tax revenue to subnational entities as 
compensation to supply goods and services to local entities. 
Intergovernmental transfers produce consequences for both the federal state and 
subnational entities. The first of them is related to the theory of fiscal illusion, which establishes 
that the government manages to hide from the median voter the real value received by transfers, 
inducing the electorate to underestimate the real cost of production of public goods (Buchanan, 
1967; Puviani, 1903). Through their ability to manipulate the fiscal structure, governors create 
illusions to the median voter (also called governed or taxpayers), who tend to believe that taxes 
are less onerous and that the benefits provided by the government are worth more than they do 
(Buchanan, 1967). 
This attitude relieves some accountability from the policymakers, who act this way 
when they are not serving the interests of the general population, but those of a group of 
individuals, according to the theory of public choice (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Downs, 1957; 
Olson, 1965). By managing to “deceive” the median voter, the government can have more 
resources at its disposal, seeking to maximize its utility function (rather than the utility function 
of the median voter) with manipulations turning the transfers received public expenditure, and 
not leading to a reduction in tax collection (Nikanen, 1971). 
The policymakers, representing the dominant class, design public tax and expenditure 
policies to minimize the resistance of the general population, using their power to promote their 
political projects. When the median voter is not aware of how much tax was paid or how many 
funds were transferred from the state, fiscal illusion happens. It is easy for the government to 
hide information from the taxpayer, who has no incentive to invest in obtaining information, as 
its vote does not have a significant impact on the results of public choices. Accordingly, the 
median voter rationally remains ill-informed (Buchanan & Wagner, 1977), resulting in an 
underestimation of the tax burden by voters, resulting in demand for government spending 
above the level that would be verified in the absence of fiscal illusion and excessive public 
spending. 
The second consequence is another type of fiscal illusion, a phenomenon called the 
flypaper effect, which establishes that the receipt of unconditional and nonmatching grants 
(lump sum) increases local public expenditure proportionally greater than an equivalent 
increase in personal income (Hamilton, 1986; Hines & Thaler, 1995). This effect is based on 
empirical evidence regarding transfers from one government level to another tending to 
“remain” with the recipient, being used to provide services and not passed on to taxpayers 
through tax reductions (Ahmad & Craig, 1997). Consequently, transfers result in a higher level 
of public service delivered than would be if payment were made directly to individuals. 
In Brazil, the decentralization process was consolidated with the Federal Constitution 
of 1988, which extended the powers and other characteristics of fiscal federalism to states and 
municipalities (subnational entities or local governments). The federal state (called Union in 
Brazil) centralizes taxes at the national collection level, transferring them to states and 
municipalities in the form of tax transfers or grants. 
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Although there is evidence of the flypaper effect in Brazil, its proof is not unanimous 
(Appendix 7). Furthermore, there is a gap in the known causes for this phenomenon. Without 
this knowledge, revising the tax distribution structure itself cannot reduce social and regional 
inequalities, one of the fundamental objectives established in the Federal Constitution. 
1.1 Research Problem 
The Brazilian federal government grants several unconditional and nonmatching 
transfers (lump sum) to the states and municipalities. The transfers to municipalities as 
established in the 1988 Federal Constitution are as follows: the Municipal Participation Fund 
(FPM), the Rural Property Tax (ITR), the Financial Transactions Tax (IOF), the Tax on 
Circulation of Goods and Services (ICMS), the Motor Vehicle Tax (IPVA) and the Federal 
Value-Added Tax or Excise Tax on Manufactured Goods (IPI). Likewise, the transfers to the 
states are as follows: the State Participation Fund (FPE), the Financial Transactions Tax (IOF), 
the residuals taxes (RES), the Contribution of Intervention in the Economic Domain on fuels 
(CIDE), and the Federal Value-Added Tax or Excise Tax on Manufactured Goods destined to 
exportation (IPIEx). 
Fiscal decentralization through transfers to subnational entities promotes economic 
efficiency based on the theory of public choice (Aghón, 1993; Gordon, 1983; Oates, 1972), 
improves social welfare (Oates, 1972; Tiebout, 1956), allows local governments to better 
manage resources based on the greater knowledge of their citizens’ preferences (utilities) 
(Ahmad et al., 1997; Gramlich, 1993; Hemming & Spahn, 1997; Oates, 1972), promotes better 
public decision-making (Oates, 1972) and allows for “checks and balances” between powers 
(Buchanan, 1995). However, some of their repercussions are not evident in Brazil, such as the 
impact on local taxation, local income, government programs, and voter satisfaction. This 
situation is intensified because these transfers are not linked to expenditures, as they are 
unconditional and nonmatching, which allows the receiving entity to spend them 
indiscriminately. 
According to the economic theory (Wilde, 1971) and the median voter theory (Oates, 
1988), the first consequence of transfers (lump sum) should be a reduction in the tax collection, 
as municipalities are already at the limit of tax expansion. Considering this context, the 
following research problem arises: what are the reasons for the flypaper effect in subnational 
entities in Brazil? Therefore, this research aims to verify the flypaper effect, as well as to 
understand the reasons that cause this phenomenon. 
1.2 General and Specific Objectives 
To answer the research problem, the general objective is to investigate the possibility of 
flypaper effect occurrence in subnational entities in Brazil, to identify the reasons causing this 
phenomenon. In consequence, to achieve the general objective, three surveys were developed 
with the following specific objectives: 
i. To verify the flypaper effect of 476 Brazilian municipalities with more than 50 thousand 
inhabitants from 2005 to 2012. It considers as instruments of grants political alignment, 
party alignment, and coalition1. 
ii. To detect the existence and investigate the causes of the flypaper effect in 5,568 
Brazilian municipalities from 2006 to 2013, using the elasticity of the tax base 
concerning the municipalities’ tax rates as a proxy of the marginal cost of public funds 
(MCF)2. 
 
1 Data available online: https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.12153483.v1 
2 Data available online: https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.12054138.v2 
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iii. To detect the existence and investigate the causes of the flypaper effect in 27 Brazilian 
states from 1985 to 2010 and 5,568 Brazilian municipalities from 2000 to 20183. 
The studies address different perspectives of different Brazilian subnational entities 
(states and municipalities) based on international literature on the subject, to verify the flypaper 
effect and identify the reasons for this phenomenon. Therefore, this thesis is structured 
throughout this introductory chapter, followed by three chapters aligned with the central subject 
and composed of three distinct and complementary studies. 
The first study, entitled “Effects of federal constitutional grants in Brazilian 
municipalities”, was presented in the 2019 European Group for Public Administration XII 
Permanent Study Group Spring Workshop in Romania and published in the Review of Urban 
& Regional Development Studies (RURDS). A municipal tax autonomy index was also 
considered as a control variable, which represents the percentage of local taxes in the municipal 
total revenues.  
The results show the flypaper effect exists in Brazilian municipalities, is intensified by 
the alignment of the representatives and there is evidence of a higher flypaper effect in 
municipalities with low tax autonomy. In these cases, money “sticks are where it hits” because 
municipalities do not have the possibility to expand taxes. Therefore, the theory that lump sum 
grants should represent a reduction in the tax collection of citizens is not applicable, as 
municipalities are already constrained and at the limit of tax expansion. 
The second study, entitled “The marginal cost of public funds and the flypaper effect: 
evidence from Brazilian municipalities”, is being analyzed by an international journal. Using 
tax base elasticity regarding the municipalities’ tax rates as a proxy of the marginal cost of 
public funds (MCF), the study found evidence supporting the Dahlby (2011) hypothesis of the 
distortionary nature of local taxation in the emergence of the flypaper effect. The results point 
out that the tax structure and the assignment of revenue sources across levels of government 
can have significant consequences on local decision-making processes in fiscal matters, 
regarding the high sensitivity of local public spending to grants known as the flypaper effect, 
and that any proposal of fiscal decentralization reform should carefully consider the 
distortionary nature of the revenue sources to be assigned to local governments. 
The third, entitled “The effects of grants and the marginal cost of public funds: Evidence 
from Brazilian states”, is also under analysis in an international journal and it concluded the 
stimulative effect of grants on public spending increases with the MCF in both proxies: the 
autonomous index and the derivation of Proper Tax Revenue to the Total Revenues. However, 
the autonomous index proxy presented stronger evidence. Even with the consistency limitations 
of municipal granularity databases, the municipal analysis showed that the capitals are cities 
that actually benefitted from grants, with statistical significance in the flypaper effect test. 
Each chapter has a theoretical foundation, a method used, results found, and 
conclusions. Then, the final considerations are presented, in which the answer to the research 
question is addressed. Finally, the bibliographical references are compiled. 
1.3 Research Justification 
Federalism is the state form of organization the federated entities have administrative, 
political, tax, and financial autonomy, joined together by the creation of a central government 
through a federative pact. In the case of Brazil, the Union (national entity) has sovereignty, 
while member states and municipalities (subnational entities) have merely autonomy. 
Federalism arose from the need to decentralize power, mainly in countries with large territorial 
extensions. 
 
3 Data available online: https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.14905689.v1 
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Some examples of federalism advantages are an efficient allocation of national 
resources (Inman & Rubinfeld, 1997), more efficient levels of public output (Ahmad et al., 
1997; Gramlich, 1993; Hemming & Spahn, 1997; Oates, 1972), local governments being closer 
to the people may better reflect individual preference (Gordon, 1983). However, there are some 
disadvantages, such as tax base competition and fiscal war (Gordon, 1983), as well as the central 
government’s inability to create a transfer system in accordance with the normative theory 
(Inman & Rubinfeld, 1996, 1997). 
The transfers are naturally included in the fiscal federalism scope, which is essential to 
reduce social and regional inequalities in Brazil and need to be distributed based on reasonable 
criteria. Currently, the distribution of the Brazilian transfers is essentially based on two aspects: 
population (directly proportional) and income per capita (inversely proportional). However, 
this methodology does not seem to contribute to the goal of reducing inequalities, because the 
Brazilian reality is increasingly showing worse indicators of inequalities. 
Therefore, the research relevance is the verification of the flypaper effect and the reasons 
it exists in Brazilian subnational entities, being essential the criteria tax revenues are shared. 
The research opportunity is based on scientific research to develop the study’s problem. The 
classical theory states that when resources are transferred between entities, recipients should 
reduce the incidence of local taxes balancing the consumption equation (Dollery & 
Worthington, 1996; Inman, 2008; Oates, 1988). 
However, several empirical studies have verified the flypaper effect occurs, contrary to 
the economic theory, while there are evidence of flypaper effect all over the world (Acar, 2019 
– Turkey; Amusa, Mabunda & Mabugu, 2008 – South Africa; Baekgaard & Kjaergaard, 2016 
– Denmark; Bhanot, Han & Jang, 2018 – Kenya; Baskaran, 2016 – German; Bastida, Benito & 
Guillamón, 2009 – Spain; Cantarero & Perez, 2012 – Spain; Cárdenas & Sharma, 2011 – 
Mexico; Clark & Whitford, 2011; Cohen, 2001 – US; Colburn, 1992 – US; Dahlby & Ferede, 
2016 – Canada; Deller & Maher, 2005, 2006 – US; Denzau & Grier, 1984 – US; De Widt, 2016 
– England & Germany; Dewortor & Chui, 2019 – African countries; Dickson & Yu, 2000 – 
Canada; Dollery & Worthington, 1995a, 1995b – Australia; Downes, 2000 – US; Lim, Lee & 
Kim, 2017 – Korea; Masiero & Santarossa, 2019 – Italy; Panao, 2020 – Philippines; Silva & 
Sumarto, 2015 – Indonesia; Vegh & Vuletin, 2016 – Argentina and Brazil), even in private 
sector firms (Aragón, 2013 – Peru; Choi, Laibson & Madrian, 2009 – US firms; Vallés-
Giménez & Zárate-Marco, 2017 – Spain). 
This context is also due to public choice theory, according to which states are governed 
by rulers solely and exclusively to serve their own needs (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Downs, 
1957; Olson, 1965). Then, the fiscal illusion theory also supports the research, as the rulers 
choose procedures that blind taxpayer’s perception (Buchanan, 1967). 
In Brazil, evidence of the existence of the flypaper effect was found (Araújo & Siqueira, 
2016; Castro & Mattos, 2021; Cossio, 2002; Cossio & Carvalho, 2001; Cruz & Silva, 2020; 
Diniz, Lima & Martins, 2017; Gadelha et al., 2017; Ferreira, Serrano & Revelli, 2019b, 2020; 
Freitas, Pereira, Lúcio & Gomes, 2019; Gonçalves, 2013; Guedes & Gasparini, 2007; Linhares 
et al., 2012; Litschig & Morrison, 2013; Mattos, Cardim & Politi, 2018; Mattos, Rocha & 
Arvate, 2011; Mendes, 2002; Nascimento, 2010; Pansani, 2018; Pansani, Serrano & Ferreira, 
2020; Parmagnani & Rocha, 2013; Sakurai, 2013; Salomão Neto, 2020; Schettini , 2012, Severo 
Filho, 2012; Vegh & Vuletin, 2016). Some studies, however, did not verify the flypaper effect 
(Cardoso, Nascimento & Paixão, 2012; Correia, Diniz & Costa, 2014; Cossio, 1998; Costa, 
2013; Costa & Castelar, 2015; Macedo & Corbari, 2009), but the majority of them pointed its 
existence. 
Given these points, the phenomenon in Brazil and its reasons should be explored, as 
they can be essential for establishing the structure for sharing tax revenues between entities, 
helping Brazil to achieve the objective of reducing social and regional inequalities. Concerning 
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the data the papers applied, it was not possible to use the same number of municipalities and 
the same years in all the studies due to the availability of data, mainly the control variables. 
This is the reason why the first paper (Chapter 2) is about 476 Brazilian municipalities from 
2005 to 2012, while the second (Chapter 3) is about 5,568 municipalities from 2006 to 2013 
and the third (Chapter 4) deals with 27 states from 1985 to 2010 and 5,568 Brazilian 
municipalities from 2000 to 2018. 
1.4 Research Contributions 
The study deepened the analysis of intergovernmental transfers in Brazil, with the 
flypaper effect being empirically tested with the available databases, considering the limitations 
of Brazilian data (see topic 4.3.6). New analyzes were implemented with the addition of 
variables, such as political alignment, indexes of development, the election years, and also the 
MCF. A broad time series of Brazilian states and municipalities not previously analyzed by 
other surveys were tested. 
Evidence from previous studies of the flypaper effect still came up against the real 
reason for its cause. Thus, reasons for the occurrence of the phenomenon were presented, which 
were statistically confirmed. Among the reasons are electoral alignment, the MCF, and the 
transfer’s dysfunctions. 
The study contributes to scientific advancement, enabling the potential construction of 
a theory based on the evidence of the flypaper effect, which itself does not represent a theory 
because it is based only on empirical evidence from previous scientific studies. In the world, 
the empirical evidence of flypaper is secular, according to a survey carried out by Gramlich 
(1977), although the expression “flypaper effect” has been dubbed only in Courant et al. (1979) 
by Arthur Okun (Hines & Thaler, 1995). 
In the field of education, the academy can propose alternatives to share tax revenues 
with the legislative authorities, as the distribution criteria in Brazil are based solely and 
exclusively on population and income per capita. State and regional perspectives were 
considered, as along with several characteristics based on economic, social, and development 
indexes that represent evidence of the consequences played by the way transfers are calculated 
and distributed in the country. 
It is also possible to verify the contribution to accounting practice from a professional 
aspect. Several professionals are involved in this context, for example, the federal public 
manager responsible for tax collection, and the external control auditors. In this context, the 
Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) is responsible for calculating the distribution percentages of 
the State Participation Fund (FPE) and the Municipal Participation Fund (FPM). The 
accounting professional responsible for recording transfers and public accounts in each state 
and municipality is also relevant in the process. 
Finally, social control can be best exercised based on recognizing the existence of the 
effect and other forms of fiscal illusion. If aware of these discrepancies in public accounts, 
society can require legislative changes that allow greater transparency of transfers by 
government agencies and authorities. 
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The objective of the present study is to verify the flypaper effect of 476 Brazilian municipalities 
from 2005 to 2012, considering the new variables as instruments of grants. Political alignment, 
alignment of the party and coalition of the mayor with the federal president and of the state 
governor were considered as instruments of grants. A municipal tax autonomy index was 
considered as a control variable, which represents the percentage of local taxes in the municipal 
total revenues. The results allow concluding the flypaper effect exists in Brazilian 
municipalities and is intensified by the alignment of the representatives in the same way of 
theoretical literature (Hamilton, 1983; Hines & Thaler, 1995; Inman, 2008) and previous 
empirical studies in Brazil. Moreover, evidence of a higher flypaper effect was found in 
municipalities with low tax autonomy. 
Keywords: Brazilian municipalities; panel data; fiscal federalism, grants; flypaper effect. 
JEL: C33; H77; H72. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Fiscal federalism is the decentralization of competencies to subnational entities which 
have the tax jurisdiction of certain taxes and also competencies to provide goods and services 
to local communities with autonomy and non-sovereignty. In Brazil, this process was 
consolidated with the Federal Constitution of 1988. However, this type of state organization 
can create two phenomena: fiscal illusion and flypaper effect. 
The illusion created by the rulers can be based on tax income and on government 
management expenses and these aspects connect voters to citizens to decision-makers in terms 
of the fiscal illusion (Gérard & Ngangué, 2015). For Puviani (1903), rulers create illusions using 
their capacity to manipulate the fiscal structure. Taxpayers tend to believe that taxes are less 
costly, and they are government-provided benefits, through public goods and services, are 
worth more than they are (Buchanan, 1967). 
Recent studies on analytic fiscal illusion (Baekgaard, Serritzlew & Blom-Hansen, 2016) 
examined their influence on the government expenditure cycle (Abbott & Jones, 2016), their 
relationship with budget (Gérard & Ngangué, 2015), transparency (Afonso, 2014), and a 
possibility of raising fees or taxes due to illusion (Ross & Yan, 2013). 
Furthermore, there is another phenomenon called the flypaper effect, which establishes 
the receipt of unconditional and nonmatching (lump sum) grants results in an increase of local 
public expenditure proportionally higher than an equivalent increase in personal income 
(Hamilton, 1986; Hines & Thaler 1995). The effect is based on empirical evidence that grants 
transferred from one government level to another tend to “stick” with the recipient being used 
for service provision and are not passed on to taxpayers in the form of lower taxes (Ahmad & 
Craig, 1997). Consequently, the grant leads to a higher level of service provision than would 
be the case if the payment was made directly to individuals. 
There are many unconditional and nonmatching grants (lump sum) in Brazil: the 
Municipal Participation Fund (FPM), the Rural Property Tax (ITR), the Financial Transactions 
Tax (IOF), the Tax on Circulation of Goods and Services (ICMS), the Motor Vehicle Tax 
(IPVA) and the Federal Value-Added Tax or Excise Tax on Manufactured Goods (IPI). 
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However, there are three basic problems concerned with grants. The first one is that 
there are no sufficient studies to conclude that grants cause fiscal illusion and flypaper effect in 
Brazil, although there are studies that analyzed the topic (Araújo & Siqueira, 2016; Cardoso et 
al., 2012; Correia et al., 2014; Cossio, 1998; Cossio, 2002; Cossio & Carvalho, 2001; Costa, 
2013; Costa & Castelar, 2015;  Diniz et al., 2017; Gadelha et al., 2017; Gonçalves, 2013; 
Guedes & Gasparini, 2007; Linhares et al., 2012; Macedo & Corbari, 2009; Mattos & Rocha; 
Arvate, 2011; Mendes, 2002; Nascimento, 2010; Parmagnani & Rocha, 2013; Sakurai, 2013; 
Schettini, 2012; Severo Filho, 2012). Second, the reasons for these anomalies are not 
consensual. Third, it is unclear the role accounting plays in making decisions of these transfer’s 
allocation and whether it is properly performed. 
Considering this context, the following research problem arises: Do unconditional and 
nonmatching (lump sum) grants, structured according to constitutional fiscal decentralization, 
cause flypaper effect in Brazil? 
In an attempt to answer the proposed problem, the central objective of the research is to 
verify if grants derived from fiscal decentralization in public resources cause fiscal illusion and 
flypaper effect in Brazilian municipalities and to verify whether federal financial statements 
and systems exercise an important role in decision-making on resource allocations. If the 
phenomena observed are not according to the analyzed theories, the present study will propose 
solutions. 
The present research is relevant, considering fiscal federalism is experiencing 
difficulties in the 21st century. Due to the macroeconomic instability experienced by Brazil, as 
a result of the fall in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a decrease in tax revenues, and the various 
economic and political crises, this research will provide further analysis in such scenarios and 
the feasibility of fiscal federalism in mitigating such panorama. The present work is composed 
of the present introduction, followed by theoretical reference, methodology, results, and 
conclusions. 
2.2 Theoretical Reference 
2.2.1 The Flypaper Effect 
The expression “the money that the government sends out sticks where it hits” was first 
used in Courant et al. (1979) by Arthur Okun, who was a professor at Yale University and the 
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and dubbed the “flypaper effect” (Hines & 
Thaler, 1995). Since then, the name is always used to describe the phenomenon that 
“nonmatching grants stimulate much more local spending per dollar of grant than does income 
going to private citizens within the community” (Courant et al., 1979). 
The flypaper effect goes against the theory4 that establishes that nonmatching grants are 
assumed “to have an effect on local spending similar to that of any other change in private 
income in the community”, whereas matching grants cause relative prices to change and are 
found to stimulate more spending per dollar of grant than nonmatching grants (Courant et al., 
1979). Therefore, when the expected equivalence between the effects of an increase in grants 
and private income on the public goods expenditure does not occur, it is called the flypaper 
effect (Hamilton, 1983; Oates, 1972; Hines & Thaler, 1995). Instead of such grants result in a 
decrease in local taxes, they truthfully cause a disproportionate increase in spending, which is 
contrary to the median voter model. Hence, there is a significantly higher propensity for 
recipients to increase public expenditure in response to lump-sum intergovernmental grants 
than in response to equivalent increases in private income (Oates, 1988). 
One of the reasons of this phenomenon is because “bureaucrats and politicians find it 
easier to avoid cutting taxes when the government receives revenue-sharing monies than they 
 
4 Wide explained by Wilde (1971). 
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do to raise taxes when some exogenous event raises the income of the community” (Courant et 
al., 1979).  The normative theory of fiscal decentralization is based on the assumption that rulers 
meet the preferences of the median voter (Oates, 1972). Although the flypaper effect may occur 
due to inadequate econometric procedures in measuring elasticities (Chernick, 1979; Fisher, 
1982; Hines & Thaler, 1995; Megdal, 1987; Moffitt, 1984), it is more probable that governors 
do not respond to the median voter (rejection of the hypothesis that governors respond to the 
median voter). Several models emerged based on the concept of budget-maximizing bureaucrat 
model (Niskanen, 1971), or based on politicians who seek to maximize their own utility (rather 
than the median voter utility function); where there are maneuvers to transform received grants 
into public expenditures and not into taxes reduction. 
Besides the flypaper effect (the empirical observation that unrestricted grants to 
localities from higher levels of government stick where they hit), as an anomaly in the local 
public finance literature, Hamilton (1983) points out also that dead weight loss of taxation may 
be a possible cause of the flypaper effect. In other words, the grants of the Federal level make 
the municipalities inefficient in their own collection, which has already been verified also by 
other studies (Cossio, 1998; Costa, 2013; Dahlberg, Mörk, Rattso & Hanna, 2008; Heller, 1975; 
Iqbal, 1997; Khan & Hoshino, 1992; Ribeiro, 2005; Ribeiro & Schwengber 2000; Ribeiro & 
Shikida, 2000; Schettini, 2012; Veloso, 2008; White, 1994; Zhang & Wu, 2009). 
According to Fisher (1982) and Ingberman & Inman (1987), if the coefficient of lump 
sum grant is greater than the GDP (or income), it is the flypaper effect, which represents the 
expansive effect of transfers on public expenditure. In summary, according to Saruc & Sagbas 
(2008), the possible conclusions from the econometric results are: 
Table  1: Outcomes Interpretations 
Condition Result Implication Relation to 
local tax effort 
Author 
basis 
If β2> β1 Flypaper effect The parameter of lump-sum transfer 
exceeds the parameter of income 




If β2> 1 Stimulation effect  A unit intergovernmental transfer 
induces more than a unit increase in 
local spending 




If β2< 1 Substitution effect 
(Grant displacement 
effect) 
Intergovernmental transfers have 
substitution effect with varying 
degrees according to the value of β2. 
Transfers substitute local revenues. 






If β2< 1 and 
If β2> β1 










If β2> 1 and 
If β2> β1 
Flypaper effect and 
Stimulation effect 
together 
- uncertain Inman 
(1979) 
If β2 = 0 Substitution effect 
(Grant displacement 
effect) 






If β2 = 1 Neutral effect Neither substitution nor stimulation 
effect is determined 
Lesser local tax 
effort subject to 




Source: Adapted from Sagbas & Saruc (2004), which model is: PCEXP = β0 + β1PCGDPi + β2PCRESi + β3POPi 
+ ui, where PCEXPi: expenditure per capita of municipality I; PCGDPi: local GDP per capita of municipality I; 
PCRESi: revenue per capita sharing of municipality I; POPi: population of municipality I; ui: random disturbance 
terms. 
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At the international level, many studies have empirically verified nonmatching grants 
stimulate much more local spending per dollar than income does going to private citizens within 
the community (Gramlich, 1977; Gramlich & Galper, 1973; Fisher, 1982; Karnik & Lalvani, 
2008; Strumpf, 1998). 
At the national level, Cossio & Carvalho (2001) verified that the federal constitutional 
grants destined to the municipalities provoked an increase of municipal public expenditures 
significantly higher than increases in income per capita of taxpayers in a sample of more than 
3,500 Brazilian municipalities in 1996. Souza (2003) found that small municipalities and 
receivers of royalties are the least efficient, with a worse relation between total revenue and 
public services offered. 
Cossio (2002) verified the existence of flypaper effect in the Brazilian municipalities, 
which means that the public sector is increasing in the economy, since the resource transferred 
to states and municipalities becomes an additional local expense in each entity instead of 
resulting in a local tax cut. 
Mendes (2002) identified that the capture of resources by Brazilian municipalities is 
more intense in cities benefited from the grants sharing criteria, especially small cities and those 
receiving a high amount of oil royalties. High available resources with no efficient spending 
option generate surplus available resources to be captured by high wages, unnecessary buildings 
and other inefficient expenditures. Mendes (2005) analyzed the capture of transfers received by 
local interest groups and results showed it increased with the raising of fiscal illusion, low 
bargaining power of the voter, over-financing of some local governments and the raising of 
degree of poverty, as established in the literature. 
Mattos, Rocha & Arvate (2011) verified that transfers to Brazilian municipalities 
negatively affect the collection efficiency and positively the private income, opposite of what 
the flypaper effect establishes. In a more recent study, Diniz et al. (2017) verified that the 
municipalities in the state of Paraíba that have higher own revenues are the most efficient, while 
those that receive more resources than they send to the Maintenance Fund for the Maintenance 
and Development of Basic Education and for the Appreciation of Education Professionals 
(Fundeb) are less efficient. 
2.2.2 Fiscal Federalism in Brazil 
Brazil is a federation, which means impossibility dissociation of any subnational levels 
(any state or any municipality). Hence, the subnational levels have only autonomy to exercise 
certain activities, not sovereignty, and are subordinated to the supreme of the Constitution of 
the Federative Republic of Brazil, but all the states have their own constitution, while all the 
municipalities have their own organic law. 
The president is elected by vote for a 4 years tenure (republic) and represents the Union 
and also the government (presidentialism), without a different person as a prime minister. His 
accountability refers to the society about his actions and expenditures and his accounts are 
annually judged by the National Congress based on the prior opinion of the Brazilian Court of 
Audit. Brazil’s democracy is classified as semi-direct because the representatives can legislate, 
but also the population initiates the legislative process by their own ways, as through a popular 
action5. 
Geographically Brazil has 26 states, 1 Federal District and 5,568 municipalities, and in 
2018 it had approximately 208 million inhabitants. In the legislative scope, Brazil has the 
National Congress, which is divided into two parliamentary houses: the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Federal Senate. The first is formed by federal deputies who are representatives of the 
 
5 Brazil, 1988, art. 61, Paragraph 2: The initiative of the people may be exercised by means of the presentation to the 
Chamber of Deputies of a bill of law subscribed by at least one percent of the national electorate, distributed throughout at 
least five states, with not less than three-tenths of one percent of the voters in each of them. 
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citizens, elected by proportional vote, while the second (Senate) is made up of senators, who 
are representatives of the states. Each of the 26 states and the federal district have a governor 
and each of the municipalities have a mayor and also a number of councillors proportional to 
the amount of inhabitants. Thus, Brazil has the following number of parliamentarians: 
 Table  2: Number of parliamentarians  
Politicians n. 
President 1 
State Governators 27 
Senators 81 
Federal Deputies 513 
Mayors 5,568 
Councilmen (Councillor) 56,810 
Source: authors. 
Therefore, Brazil is organized by the fiscal federalism, where the Federal level collects 
most of the taxes while the states and municipalities collect the taxes of their tax jurisdiction. 
The Constitution establishes the tax competency and jurisdiction by levels: 
Table  3: Taxes in Brazil by levels 
Federal (CF art. 153/154) States (CF art. 155) Municipalities (CF art. 156) 
1. Import Tax (II) 1. Tax on Circulation of 
Goods and Services (ICMS) 
1. Tax on Services (ISS) 
2. Export Tax (IE) 2. Motor Vehicle Tax (IPVA) 2. Real Estate Tax (IPTU) 
3. Federal Value-Added Tax or Excise 
Tax on Manufactured Goods (IPI) 
3. Tax on inheritances and 
donations (ITCMD) 
3. Tax on transfers of urban 
real estate (ITBI) 
4. Financial Transactions Tax (IOF)   
5. Income Tax (IR)   
6. Rural Property Tax (ITR)   
7. Great Fortunes Tax (IGF)   
8. Extraordinary War Tax (IEG)   
9. Residuals Tax (Ires)   
Source: Federal Constitution of 1988. 
The Brazilian tax framework is congruent with Oates’s decentralization theorem and the 
optimal-sized jurisdiction, which is developed also by other authors (Ahmad et al.; Gramlich, 
1993; Hemming & Spahn, 1997; Oates, 1972), that the consumption of a public good will 
always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local governments to provide the Pareto-
efficient levels of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the central government to 
provide any specified and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions (Oates, 1972). This 
fact is proven by the quantity and amount of taxes that the Brazilian federal level accumulates 
(Figure 1).  
According to the decentralization theorem (Ahmad et al., 1997), municipalities are 
responsible for local services such as street lighting, paving, urban zoning, transportation, and 
regulation of local commercial activities. On the other hand, the federal government would 
provide national services such as defense, monetary stability, unemployment insurance, 
international relations. 
In addition to the tax competence, the distribution of tax revenues in Brazil is also set 
prescribed by the Federal Constitution. The amount of resource transferred by the federal and 
state level to municipalities (local level) is representative, about 65.9% (IBGE, 2018), and many 
municipalities survive only with the mandatory and unconditional grants. The tax distribution 
flow chart is shown following: 
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Figure 1: Constitutional Grants in Brazil 
 
Source: authors. States Participation Fund (FPE), Municipal Participation Fund (FPM), Rural Property Tax (ITR), Financial 
Transactions Tax (IOF), Tax on Circulation of Goods and Services (ICMS), Motor Vehicle Tax (IPVA), Federal Value-Added 
Tax or Excise Tax on Manufactured Goods (IPI), Residuals Taxes (RES), Contribution of Intervention in the Economic Domain 
on fuels (CIDE FUELS), Federal Value-Added Tax or Excise Tax on Manufactured Goods destined to exportation (IPI-Exp). 
The FPM percentage is 24.5% since 2016, according to the Constitutional Amendment nº. 84/2014, while the previous 
percentage was 23.5%. The FPE percentage is 21.5% since 1993, according to the Federal Constitution of 1988. 
Consequently, the present study considered as unconditional and nonmatching (lump 
sum) grants the FPM, the ITR, the IOF (federal grants to municipalities) and the ICMS, the 
IPVA and the IPI (state grants to municipalities) as shown below: 
Table  4: Constitutional Grants 
Financial 
Source 
Regulation Typology Unrestricted 
lump sum? 
% 
Federal to Municipalities 
FPM CF art. 159, I b, d, 
e 
Unconditional, mandatory, nonmatching 
and redistributive. 
Yes 23,5% 
ITR CF art. 153, VI 
and art. 158, II 
Unconditional, mandatory and 
nonmatching. 
Yes 50% or 
100% 
IOF CF art. 153, V and 
§5° 
Unconditional, mandatory and 
nonmatching 
Yes 70% 
States to Municipalities 
ICMS CF art. 158, IV Unconditional, mandatory and 
nonmatching, disconnected from the tax 
location. 
Yes 25% 
IPVA CF art. 158, III Unconditional, mandatory and 
nonmatching 
Yes 50% 
IPI-exp CF art. 159, III, § 
4º 




From the total net revenue of IR and IPI, the Federal level transfers 21.5% to the 27 
states constituting the FPE and 24.5% to the 5,568 municipalities constituting the FPM, 
according to the following equation: 
𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑡 = 24.5% (𝐼𝑅 + 𝐼𝑃𝐼)𝑡 − 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑡 − 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡   (1) 
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Where IR is the federal income tax revenue in the year t; IPI is the Federal Value-Added 
Tax revenue in the year t; PASEP is a fund to stimulate savings, correct distortions in income 
distribution and other objectives6; and Fundeb is a fund to help the basic education7.  
After the calculation of the FPM, it is segmented into three parts: 10% is delivered to 
the capitals of the states (FPM-Capitals), 3.6% to the most populous municipalities (more than 
142,633 inhabitants) (FPM-Reserve), and 86.4% to other municipalities (FPM-Interior). Based 
on equation (1), the first part regards to the capitals of the states and the calculation is 
represented by the following equation:  






  (2) 
FPMCap is the FPM amount to be distributed to the capital I in the year t. CIFPMCap 
is the individual participation coefficient of the capital I in the year t and expresses the product 
of two factors (population factor and income factor per capita), according to the National Tax 
Code8; PopCapFactor is the population factor, calculated by the relationship between the 
corresponding factor and the total of factors that are extracted from the National Tax Code (art. 
91, §1, a), based on the population of each capital I and the sum of the population factor of the 
capitals in the year t-1; IncomeFactor is the income factor per capita, calculated by the 
relationship between the corresponding factor and the total of factors that are extracted from 
the National Tax Code (art. 90), based on the inverse of the relationship between the income 
per capita of each state the capital I belongs to and the national income per capita in the year 
t-2. 
The second coefficient regards to the most populous municipalities (more than 142,633 
inhabitants), as equation (3): 






  (3) 
FPMRes is the FPM amount to be distributed to the reserve municipality I in the year t. 
CIFPMRes is the individual participation coefficient of the reserve municipality I in the year t 
and expresses the product of the two factors (population factor and income factor per capita), 
according to the National Tax Code; PopResFactor is the population factor, calculated by the 
relationship between the corresponding factor and the total of factors that are extracted from 
the National Tax Code (art. 91, §1, a), based on the population of each reserve municipality I 
and the sum of the population factor of the reserve municipalities in the year t-1; IncomeFactor 
is the income factor per capita, calculated by the relationship between the corresponding factor 
and the total of factors that are extracted from the National Tax Code (art. 90), based on the 
inverse of the relationship between the income per capita of each state the reserve municipality 
I belongs to and the national income per capita in the year t-2. 
Finally, the municipalities smaller than 142,633 inhabitants are called interior 
municipalities and all the municipalities, except the capitals, receive the FPMInt. Accordingly, 
the reserve municipalities receive the FPMInt, besides the quote calculated by the FPMRes, 
which is calculated as equation (4): 
𝐹𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 86.4%𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑡 ×
𝐶𝐼𝐹𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
∑ 𝐶𝐼𝐹𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
=  86.4%𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑡 ×
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖(𝑡−1)
∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖(𝑡−1)
       (4) 
FPMInt is the FPM amount to be distributed to the interior municipality I in the year t. 
CIFPMInt is the individual participation coefficient of the interior municipality I in the year t 
and expresses the corresponding factor that is extracted from the National Tax Code (art. 91, 
 
6 Complementary Law 26/1975. 
7 Law 11.494/2007. 
8 Law 5.172/1966. 
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§2), based on the population of each reserve municipality I in the year t-1; PopIntFactor is the 
population factor, extracted from the National Tax Code (art. 91, §2), based on the population 
of each interior municipality I in the year t-1. 
Shah (1994) highlights that the principal merits of the FMP are the consistency of its 
design with objectives of transparency, predictability, and local autonomy. Although it 
addresses some fiscal equalization objectives, it also has design flaws that inhibit achievement 
of its objectives, because state income per capita is an imperfect guide to the ability of a state 
or municipality government to raise taxes, considering a significant proportion of income can 
accrue to non-resident owners of factors of production. In addition, only a small portion of total 
state revenues is raised from income taxes and estimates of state income per capita are subject 
to significant errors, besides the available data only after a long delay. To sum up, these 
problems diminish the usefulness of income per capita as a determinant to such an important 
fund there is FPM to Brazilian fiscal federalism. 
The ITR collection is distributed to the municipalities in the proportion of 50% of the 
total if the municipality does not have agreement with the Federal Revenue of Brazil (RFB) 
regarding the delegation of inspection and supervision the collection activity. Otherwise, if the 
municipality has the agreement, it takes 100% of the ITR tax of the properties located in its 
boundaries. In consultation to the RFB, 2117 municipalities have the agreement, which 
represents 38% (2,117/5,568) of all Brazilian municipalities, and in the sample of the present 
study it represents 59% of the 476 municipalities. 
From the total collection of IOF, 30% is destined to the states and 70% to the 
Municipalities. This transfer was determined by the Federal Constitution (article 153), 
according to the origin of the gold financial asset, so only the municipality or state the asset 
came from receive the transfer. The identification is made by the tax documentation of the 
operation, whose compilation and sending of information to the competent institutions is 
responsibility of the RFB. 
The distribution criterion of ICMS tax collection by states is based on fixed percentages 
stablished by Complementary Law 87/1996, which defined that 25% is destined to the 
municipalities according to the percentages defined by each state. As for IPVA tax, 50% of its 
total collection is destined to municipalities based on the criterion of vehicles licensed in each 
municipality. 
Finally, 10% of IPI exportation total collection is destined to the states in proportion to 
the value of the respective exports of industrialized products (LC 61/1989, art. 1, caput). As 
established by LC 65/1991, art. 4, it is considered only the value of industrialized products 
exported in the proportion of ICMS that is no longer required due to the non-impact arising 
from the export of goods and services (CF, art. 155, § 2, X, a) concerning tax credits arising 
from the transit of goods and services between states before being exported (CF, article 155, § 
2, XII, f). The participation of each state is limited to 20% of the amount to be distributed and 
the eventual excess redistributed among the other participants in proportion to the respective 
participations (CF, article 159, and LC nº 61/1989, art. 1, § 4). 
There are various researches about Brazilian fiscal federalism and grants transferred 
from federal level to local levels. Sakurai & Menezes Filho (2011) analyzed data from more 
than 2,500 municipalities from 1989 to 2005 and verified a decrease in the fiscal surplus during 
election years, which occurs because current local expenditures increase and local tax revenues 
decline. Brollo & Nannicini (2012) used capital transfers as proxy to analyse political reasons 
in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federal state, considering those transfers 
are discretionary and actually subject to greater volatility. Nascimento (2010) also carried out 
a study considering political alignment to identify flypaper effect in the Brazilian 
municipalities. 
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Hence, the present study approaches political alignment as an instrument variable to 
verify the flypaper effect, but does not consider left, right and center parties, as done by 
Nascimento (2010) and Sakurai & Menezes-Filho (2008), since there is evidence that Brazilian 
political parties are ideologically inconsistent, they do not clearly represent different public 
administration profiles (Ames, 1995; Sakurai & Menezes Filho, 2011; Mainwaring & Scully, 
1995) and there are 35 parties in Brazil, which is too spready. The alignment variable explained 
in the methodology considers only if president, governors, or mayors are aligned by the same 
party or coalition, which reduces problems concerning so many parties. 
Vegh and Vuletin (2015) provides many possible reasons for the emergence of the 
flypaper effect, but they also provide an additional explanation for the flypaper effect based on 
precautionary savings. An increase in grants raises the variance of total income by less than an 
increase in private income. Then, the amount of additional precautionary savings on the part of 
local governments is lower in response to the increase in grants and the increase in public 
spending is correspondingly higher. 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Data 
The sample consists in a panel of 476 municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants 
from 2005 to 2012. The number of municipalities and the period were based on the availability 
of the control variables, as not all the Brazilian municipalities have continuous data available 
to build a consistent panel data. The selection excluded those municipalities that did not declare 
information to the National Treasury Secretariat (STN) or that didn’t have basic informations 
as current expenditure, income, population, GDP and grants. In addition, the DF was excluded 
because it represents a hybrid entity accumulating state and municipality functions and would 
certainly be considered as an outlier. Current expenditure and grants data were obtained from 
Finbra’s Finance System, while GDP and population data were obtained from the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) database. 
The timeline is not more than 10 and therefore it was not possible to use the traditional 
GMM estimator. Otherwise, robust inference and clusters were used for the 5 Brazilian regions 
according to the IBGE (North, Northeast, Central-West, South and Southeast), allowing 
heteroscedasticity and error correlations over time for municipalities. 
The municipalities above 50 thousand inhabitants were used because the data of the 
municipalities below this size are not reliable and can bias the results. Moreover, the National 
Treasury uses municipality samples of more than 100 thousand inhabitants to analyse the 
scenarios and also the score of the payment ability of municipalities. 
2.3.2 Variables Expenditure and Income 
Many authors consider expenditure as dependent variable in the econometric model 
(Cossio, 2002; Cossio & Carvalho, 2001; Costa, 2013; Mendes, 2002, 2005; Ribeiro, 2015; 
Rios & Costa, 2005; Severo Filho, 2012). For this reason and based on the concept of flypaper 
effect, the dependent variable considered in the present study was current expenditure, since it 
is the best representation of expenditure for the present study’s purpose. However, there are 
studies that used other spending variables, such as Wyckoff (1988), who used capital 
expenditure, and Brollo & Nannicini (2012), who used capital transfers. It is true that not all 
expenditures serve to capture electoral strategy (Drazen & Eslava, 2005). True is this assertion 
that Strumpf (1998) used the residual of an equation as a proxy for wasteful expenditure. For 
the income variable, the GDP of the municipalities was used as a proxy. 
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2.3.3 Grant Variable 
The nonmatching and unconditional (lump sum) grants considered were the state grants 
FPM, IOF and ITR; and the state grants ICMS, IPVA and IPIexp. Flypaper effect studies in 
Brazil consider different types of grants, such as others current transfers (Costa, 2013) and 
capital transfers (Brollo & Nannicini, 2012; Sakurai & Menezes-Filho, 2008, 2011). The 
authors who used grant proxies similar to the present study are Cossio (2002) and Mendes 
(2005). In general, the studies consider only FPM, IOF, ICMS and IPVA (Cossio, 2002). The 
present study is therefore a pioneer in using ITR and IPIexp grants in the econometric model, 
and also the grant created by LC 87/96, which is not constitutional, but legal because it comes 
from infraconstitutional legislation and was tested separately to the main model. 
Although the topic 2.2 explains the three individual participation coefficients to 
calculate the FPM (Capital, Reserve and Interior), the sample of 476 municipalities is composed 
by municipalities based on all of the kinds of coefficients. The amount of 25 capitals is based 
on equation (2), while 142 reserve municipalities are based on equation (3) and 451 interior 
municipalities are based on equation (4). 
The grants FPM, IOF, ICMS and IPVA are clearly unconditional and nonmatching 
(lump sum) grants. The IPI exportation grant was also considered lump sum, since 25% of the 
total received from these grants by the states are redistributed to the municipalities according 
to the CF without any conditions or matching. The same rules do not apply to CIDE fuels grants, 
because they are classified as conditional. 
The ITR tax was also considered in the present study, in convergence with previous 
studies (Costa, 2013). Transfers to the Fundeb (called Fundef until 2006), SUS, FNAS and 
FNDE are not considered lump sum because they are clearly linked to a specific activity, health 
or education services in these cases. For this reason, they were deducted from the grants, except 
IOF, because it is not basis for Fundeb deduction. 
Finally, the present study does not consider “non-fiscal” transfers derived from the 
exploitation of petroleum as nonmatching and unconditional (lump sum) grants, because they 
are considered as exploratory nature grants, different from tax grants (Mendes, Miranda & 
Cossio, 2008). 
2.3.4 Alingment Variable 
Elections in Brazil are held every 4 years and the mayor elections in municipalities do 
not coincide with the the president federal elections. 
Table  5: Election Years and Presidents 
Scope   Year Candidates President Party 
Brazil 2002 President, State Governors, Senators and Federal Deputies Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva PT 
Brazil 2004 Mayors and City Councilmen   
Brazil 2006 President, State Governors, Senators and Federal Deputies Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva PT 
Brazil 2008 Mayors and City Councilmen   
Brazil 2010 President, State Governors, Senators and Federal Deputies Dilma Rousseff PT 
Brazil 2012 Mayors and City Councilmen   
Brazil 2014 President, State Governors, Senators and Federal Deputies Dilma Rousseff PT 
Brazil 2016 Mayors and City Councilmen   
Brazil 2016 Dilma’s impeachment (31/8/2016) Michel Temer MDB9 
Brazil 2018 President, State Governors, Senators and Federal Deputies Jair Bolsonaro PSL 
Source: authors and Superior Electoral Court (TSE). PT: Worker’s Party. MDB: Brazilian Democratic 
Movement. PSL: Liberal Social Party. 
According to some previous studies (Brollo & Nannicini, 2012; Grossman, 1994; 
Laband, 1986), there is a predisposition for greater resource allocation in municipal election 
 
9 Called before as PMDB: Brazilian Democratic Movement Party. 
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years, since it is the last year of the mayor’s tenure. Brollo & Nannicini (2012) found that in 
preelection years municipalities in which the mayor is affiliated with the coalition (and 
especially with the political party) of the Brazilian president receive approximately one-third 
larger discretionary grants for infrastructures. Although this paper considers the spam team 
from 2005 to 2012, Table 5 allows to expand future research in this area. 
Grossman (1994) and Laband (1986) developed models that political variables 
significantly explain the volume of federal grants per capita to states, such as alignment 
between parties in federal and state power, (Mendes, 2004). Arulampalam et al. (2009) verified 
the Indian central government favors areas with greater political support through grants. For 
Rogoff (1990), the attempt to maintain political power generates expenditures towards 
economic growth that is meaningful close to election dates in order to gain more votes 
(Schneider, 2012). Rios & Costa (2013) also use alignment variables in Portuguese 
municipalities and identify statistical significance of them. 
Thereupon, the present study used alignment of the party and the coalition of the 
president with the mayor, as well as the alignment of the party and the coalition of the governor 
with the major. In this way, the alignment and the election year were used as the instrumental 
variables, as some other studies (Brollo & Nannicini 2012; Sakurai & Menezes-Filho, 2008, 
2011; Simão & Orellano, 2015). 
2.3.5 Control Variables 
Several authors use some variables to control population size, social characteristics such 
as wealth, literacy, years of schooling, garbage collection service, demographic variables, age 
of population, education level. However, for the timeline of the sample selected in the present 
study there are not many social data feasible. Therefore, the following variables were used as 
control variables: the proportions of woman (gender), over 60 years old (elderly) and under 14 
years old (youth), and also a score attributed to each municipality according to its characteristics 
from the perspective of the employment and income, called Firjan Municipal Development 
Index (IFDM), and the demographic density. 
The paper contributes to the current state-of-the-art of flypaper effect because it is 
pioneer in some aspects, although the database is from 2005 to 2012. Initially, we performed a 
detailed analysis of the classification of nonmatching unconditional (lump sum) grants in Brazil 
and considered only grants in congruence to the theory of flypaper effect. In addition, the grant 
variables were deducted from the amount that does not fit the concept of lump sum grants, as 
Fundeb. Then, there were analysis and incorporation of alignment variable as instrument in the 
econometric model and also inclusion of control variables that were not approached in previous 
studies, such as IFDM. 
The defense for using database from 2005 to 2012 is because the control variables are 
available only until 2012, which turns it infeasible to work with a balanced panel since 2013. 
In addition, the IFDM data are only available from 2005 to 2013 (Appendix 1). The data were 
only until 2012 to allow the use of control variables (gender, youth, elderly), since they are 
frequently discontinued in Brazil, and this was the longest observable time series of these 
variables. The data availability of these control variables was questioned in the Federal 
Government Transparency Portal, but it was informed the data and research were indeed 
discontinued and there is no prospect of further updates. Another limitation refers to municipal 
GDP data, which are available only two years after the end of the year it refers to (IBGE 2018). 
Even though there are more current state data available, it is more appropriate to conduct 
municipality level studies because local governments are closer to the local population and have 
more accurate information about local preferences, by this way making probably better 
decisions (Hayek, 1945). Greater knowledge of local preferences may increase the demand for 
municipal government supply and this increase in local spending is likely to occur 
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simultaneously to the drop of federal government spending (Guedes & Gasparini, 2007). 
Moreover, citizens have more control over public decisions at local level than at state or federal 
levels and, consequently, would seek for more government accountability. Therefore, the local 
level tends to be as larger as more decentralized is the decision-making (Guedes & Gasparini, 
2007; Wallis & Oates, 1988).  
2.4 Econometric Model 
The model to identify the flypaper effect is: 
EXPit = β0 + β1GDPit + β2GRANTit + β3CONTROLSit + ϵit     (5) 
EXPit is the current expenditure of the municipality I in the year t. GDPit is the Gross 
Domestic Product of the municipality I in the year t. GRANTit is the sum of the nonmatching 
and unconditional (lump sum) transfers of the municipality I in the year t, which in the present 
study are the federal transfers FPM, ITR and IOF; and the state transfers ICMS, IPVA and 
IPIexp, considering they are constitutional and clearly exogenous according to Cossio (2002) 
& Mendes et al. (2008). CONTROLS are percentages of woman, youth and elderly people above 
60 years, as well as populational density and the employment and income Municipal 
Development Firjan Index (IFDM), and ϵit represents the residuos; (I = 476 municipalities and 
t = 2005 to 2012). 
All the variables and the expected results according to previous literature are following 
presented: 
Table  6: Variables 
Variable Previous Literature Expected 
Results 
EXP (Bae & Feiock, 2004; Cardoso et al., 2012; Fisher, 1982; Gamkhar & Oates, 1996; 
Gramlich, 1977; Heyndels, 2001; Hines & Thaler, 1995; Inman, 1979; Lago-Penãs, 
2008; Levaggi & Zanola, 2003; Mendes & Sousa, 2006; Saruc & Sagbas, 2008; 
Strumpf, 1998; Wyckoff, 1988). 
Dependent 
Variable 
GDP (Courant et al., 1979; Gramlich, 1977; Heyndels, 2001; Inman, 1979; Saruc & Sagbas, 
2008). 
+ < GRANT 
coefficient 
GRANT (Brollo & Nannicini, 2012; Courant et al., 1979; Costa, 2013; Gramlich, 1977; 
Heyndels, 2001; Inman, 1979; Islam, 1990; Marconi, Arvate, Moura Neto & Palombo, 
2009; Saruc & Sagbas, 2008). 
+ > GDP 
coefficient 
ALIG (Arulampalam et al., 2009; Bracco et al., 2015; Brollo & Nannicini, 2012; Dollery & 
Worthington, 1996; Drazen & Eslava, 2010; Grossman, 1994; Knight, 2002; Laband, 
1986; Lago-Penãs, 2008; Mendes & Sousa, 2006; Rios & Costa, 2005; Rogoff, 1990; 
Schneider, 2012; Simão & Orellano, 2015; Soares & Neiva, 2011; Veiga & Veiga, 
2007). 
+ 
Controls (Cruz & Mereb, 2018; Hamilton, 1983; Heyndels, 2001; Nascimento, 2010). Not aplicable 
Source: authors. 
 
The monetary variables (EXP, GDP and GRANT) were considered as per capita, with 
neperian logarithm (ln) and also deflated by the General Market Price Index – Internal 
Availability (IGP-DI), an index which is composed by the arithmetic weighted average of the 
Broad Producer Price Index (IPA), the Consumer Price Index (IPC) and the National 
Construction Cost Index (INCC). The variables levels were checked in function of the possible 
specification errors highlighted by Oates (1972), and also to disclosure the possible analyzing 
differences arisen by these errors. The logarithmic form was applied to enhance the analysis 
specification and fairness (Bailey & Connoly, 1998; Becker, 1996; Dollery & Worthington, 
1999). There is a limitation concerned to the population to calculate the per capita level because 
it is extrapoled considering the number of people checked each 10 years by the census. 
These procedures were adopted considering the flypaper effect’s sensibility and the 
different results relying on the equation functional form (Bailey & Connoly, 1998), as it was 
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identified by Parmagnani & Rocha (2013). In addition, diminishing the errors specification 
risks is necessary (Hines & Thaler, 1995; Moffitt, 1984), as well it is necessary to avoid the 
other error especifications considered by the previous literature (Hines & Thaler, 1995; 
Chernick, 1979; Fisher, 1982; Megdal, 1987; Moffitt, 1984).  
There are also evidences of improper functional form (Becker, 1996, Dollery & 
Worthington, 1999), influence of local expenditures on the grants (Islam, 1998; Islam & 
Choudhury, 1990; Marshall, 1991; Oulasvirta, 1997) and risks of interdependency between the 
variables (Bailey & Connolly, 1998). 
As stated by the vast flypaper literature, authors found evidences on international level 
and on Brazilian level, as with relevant statistic evidence (Ladd, 1993) and non relevants 
(Marshall, 1991). Thus, flypaper is found not only in the public sector, but also in the private 
one (Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1994). Anyway, cautious is encouraged 
concerned to the specification errors. Contributions by the present paper are the deep analysis 
of lump sum grants in Brazil and differ from others by approaching alignment variable as 
instrument to identify and confirm flypaper effect through grants, as already done in Portuguese 
municipalities by Rios & Costa (2005). 
2.4.1 Unit Root Test 
Unit root tests are necessary because the model contains municipal variables. 
Accordingly, the following tests were catched on: 
Table  7: Unit Root Tests 
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N(0,1) 





















independence CD ~ 
N(0,1) 
At least one 
panel is not 
stationary 
Source: Baltagi (2013) and Gadelha et al. (2017). 
The tests described above are the Levin, Lin & Chu (2002), which is a generalized test of the 
unit root ADF test for panels with correlated errors serially heterogenic, fixed effects and 
individual deterministic trend. The IPS, ADF Fisher and PP-Fisher are the traditional tests to 
test unit roots in the data. Pesaran (2004) and Pesaran (2015) tests are an investigation of the 
mean correlation between panel units and consider a transformation of the sum of pairwise 
correlations between panel units is standard normally distributed. Finally, the last test is the 
Hadri (2000) Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests, which check if the panels are trend stationary. 
2.4.2 Fixed or Random Effects 
According to the data disposal and also with the economic theory of the flypaper effect, 
what is intended with the present study is justified by the heterogeneity existing between each 
of the 476 Brazilian municipalities during the period from 2005 to 2012. Thus, it was preferred 
application of fixed effect instead of pooled. In addition, no random effects were used because 
the sample was selected based on municipalities with more than 50 thousand inhabitants, and it 
was directed in this aspect and duly justified by the Brazilian National Treasury itself. In any 
case, the necessary tests were carried out for the panel types: 
Table  8: Fixed or Random Effects – Panel tests 
Test Chow test (generalized) Breusch-Pagan LM Hausman 
H0 Use Pools Use Pools Use Random effects 
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H1 Use Fixed Effects Use Random effects Use Fixed Effects 
Source: authors. 
2.4.3 Instrumental Variables Tests and Remedies 
To verify if the validity of instrumental variables the following tests were used: 
Table  9: Instrumental Variables Tests 
Test Null Hyphothesis Description 
Sanderson-Windmeijer 
Endogenous 
33 fficient 33 is 
unidentified 
The Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage chi-
squared and F statistics are tests of under 
identification and weak identification (Sanderson & 
Windmeijer, 2016) 
Ideal: p-value of test F close to zero to reject H0 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 




Ha: matrix has rank=K1 
(identified) 
Underidentification test 




Equation is weakly 
identified 
 
Weak identification arises when the excluded 
instruments are correlated with the endogenous 
regressors, but only weakly (Stock, Wright & Yogo, 
2005; Stock & Yogo, 2005). 
Ideal: Cragg-Donald > Stock & Yogo 
Anderson-Rubin  
 
B1=0 and orthogonality 
conditions are valid 
 
Test checks if the coefficients of the endogenous 
regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal 
to zero, and, in addition, that the overidentifying 
restrictions are valid. Both tests are robust to the 
presence of weak instruments. 
Ideal: p-value being high to not reject H0 
Underidentification test 
(Anderson canon. Corr. 
LM statistic):            
The model is not 
identified. 
Ideal: p-value of ch-sq close to zero to reject H0 
Hansen J statistic 
The instruments are 
valid. 
Overidentification test of all instruments (Hayashi, 
2000). 
Source: authors. 
To test the validity of the instruments, the F test of Sanderson & Windmeijer (2016) 
verifies if the model is valid with the used instruments. Sargan’s statistic is consistent if the 
disturbance is homoscedastic and (for AC-consistent estimation) if it is also autocorrelated.  
With cluster option, Hansen’s J statistic allows observations to be correlated within groups 
(Hayashi, 2000). 
Concerning exogeneity, however, previous literature has identified that grants are not 
exogenous (weak, strong, and super) with respect to local expenditure and there is also 
simultaneity among them (Islam & Choudhury, 1990). Deriving and testing a model of fiscal 
response to endogenously determined grants on a sample of 49 upper-tier municipalities in 
Ontario, Islam & Choudhury (1990) identified simultaneity between grants and expenditures, 
because the Ols and 2SLs estimates of reduced-form coefficients differed significantly. 
Deriving and testing a model of fiscal response to endogenously determined grants on a pooled 
time-series and cross-section sample of 49 upper-tier municipalities in Ontario, Islam & 
Choudhury (1990) identified simultaneity between grants and expenditures, because the Ols 
and 2SLs estimates of reduced-form coefficients differed significantly. In addition, the Cragg-
Donald and Anderson-Rubin tests were also used to verify exogeneity. 
In Brazil, endogenously problem may be even more evident because grant’s formula is 
directly proportional to the size of the population and inversely proportional to the per capita 
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income (represented by the GDP). Another problem could be the population estimation, which 
is calculated by interpolation, considering the census is done only every 10 years. 
Ultimate, to check over and under identification the Hansen J statistic and Kleibergen-
Paap statistic tests were done. The null hypothesis of the Hansen J statistic is if the instruments 
are valid instruments. The test also indicates the instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
term and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.  Under 
the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of (L-K) overidentifying 
restrictions. For the 2SLS estimator, the test statistic is Sargan’s statistic, typically calculated 
as N*R-squared from a regression of the IV residuals on the full set of instruments. 
The political alignment can indeed be an instrument, and this is one of the innovations 
of present the study, because if the municipality has social security debts, it cannot receive 
FPM. In addition, there are several juridical discussions to suspend the penalties established by 
the Fiscal Responsibility Law and also the courts setting fixed percentages for municipalities 
that have decreased population, which means mainly political decisions. The security of the 
method must exist, and it does not be distorted by the judicial protection; otherwise, the method 
is not valid. Moreover, the present study considers the exact financial cash flow transferred to 
the municipality and not only the amount calculated, because it is more consistent to consider 
the exactly amount given to the municipality. 
2.4.4 Econometric assumptions 
Using the alignment variable as instrument influencing GRANT and consequently the 
dependent variable EXP does not allow checking other tests, since it is not possible to perform 
such tests by the form xtivreg2 in Stata, but only if they are treated as a panel or traditional 
pooled. The data have a large cross-section (476 municipalities), but limited time series of 8 
years. According to the literature (Baltagi, 2013; Baum, 2006), the tests make sense only for 
large and extensive panels and problems as cointegration, normality (Williams, Allison & 
Moral-Benito, 2018), serial correlation (Bhargava, Franzini & Narendranathan, 1982) and 
multicollinearity (Goldberger, 1991) are not serious problems in short panels. 
Specifically regarding to collinearity, Cossio & Carvalho (2001) warned that ICMS state 
grants of ICMS in their model may have generated collinearity, since the collection of ICMS is 
determined by municipal GDP. However, the authors argued that the importance of this type of 
transference is low in relation to the total grants, a causation that can also be applied to the 
present study. Another problem is the high correlation between EXP, GDP and GRANT 
variables. Future studies can deepen the theme and verify the interrelationship between these 
variables. Finally, with regard to heteroscedasticity, it was not even possible to calculate 
according to the extent of the panel. Therefore, the econometric assumptions were followed and 
adopted based on the previous literature and according to the panel length. 
2.5 Empirical Results 
The descriptive statistic of the variables used in the model is presented below. Also, the 
mean difference statistics between the municipalities (mayors) that are aligned and unaligned 
to the president’s coalition or party, respectively, are showed following. 
Table  10: Descriptive Statistics 
 Coalition Party 
Variable Aligned  Unaligned t p Value Aligned  Unaligned t p Value 
Model I         
EXP 6.771 6.715 -3.796 0.000 6.786 6.724 -3.278 0.001 
GDP 9.376 9.266 -4.930 0.000 9.466 9.273 -6.663 0.000 
GRANT 5.870 5.826 -2.930 0.003 5.900 5.829 -3.641 0.000 
Gender 0.510 0.509 -3.323 0.000 0.511 0.509 -4.777 0.000 
Youth 0.259 0.260 0.849 0.395 0.253 0.261 4.035 0.000 
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Elderly 0.093 0.096 2.357 0.018 0.094 0.095 0.962 0.336 
Dens 0.004 0.003 -5.924 0.000 0.005 0.003 -6.219 0.000 
IFDM 0.672 0.661 -2.792 0.005 0.688 0.660 -5.171 0.000 
Obs 1,306 2,502 - - 608 3,200 - - 
Source: authors. Variables per capita, with neperian logarithm (ln) and also deflated by the General Market Price 
Index – Internal Availability (IGP-DI). 
In the total of 3,808 municipalities, 1,306 (34%) of them are aligned to the same 
coalition of the president, while 2,502 (66%) are not. Concerned to parties alignment, from the 
total of 3,808 municipalities, 3,200 (84%) are aligned, whilst 608 (16%) are not. In both types 
of alignment, only the variables elderly (party) and youth (coalition) do not have means 
differences statistically significant. All the other variables have means differences statistically 
significant between parties and coalition alignments, disclosing there is difference being 
aligned or unaligned to the same coalition or party of the republic president, in the same sense 
of previous literature (Brollo & Nannicini, 2012). 
The mean of GRANT received by aligned and unaligned municipalities concerning the 
coalition of the president are respectively 5.870 and 5.826, whilst the alignment/unalignment 
by parties is 5.900 and 5.829. Both cases show the means of aligned municipalities are greater 
than the unaligned, what means it matters being aligned and the municipalities alignment 
receives in mean more lump sum grants than the unaligned ones. 
A correlation matrix was also calculated and a potential reason for a high correlation 
between the variables EXP and GDP (0.748), EXP and GRANT (0.782) and GDP and GRANT 
(0.780) is that the share of GRANT in Brazil is calculated directly proportional to the population 
and inversely to the income per capita, as formula showed in methodology chapter. 
Consequently, it also should have engendered correlation and also multicollinearity of the 
independent variables. Other reason is that municipalities with high GDP receives more 
GRANT and have more expenditures. 
2.5.1 Unit Root Test Results 
Concerning the existence of spurious regressions, the results of the unit root tests do not 
indicate first order unit root, neither second order, which allows using of the variables without 
any need of taking the first diference of the variables to correct this problem. 
Table  11: Unit Root Tests Results 
Tests LLC IPS 
ADF 
Fisher 



























































Source: authors, adapted from Levin, Lin & Chu (2002).   
2.5.2 Fixed or Random Effects 
Following, it was analyzed the best panel model to be used and the results indicated 
fixed effects, as shown in the table below: 
Table  12: Random x Fixed Effect Tests 
Tests Chow test (generalized) Breusch-Pagan LM Hausman 
H0 Use Pooled Use Pooled Use Random effects 
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H1 Use Fixed Effects Use Random effects Use Fixed Effects 
Results 
F(  4,  2372) = 58.54 
p value = 0.0000 
chibar2(01) = 1593.27 
p value = 0.000 
χ2(10) = 66.47 
p value = 0.0000 
Source: authors. Breusch & Pagan (1980); Chow (1960); Baltagi (2013).  
The Hausman test (χ² = 66.47; prob = 0,000) disclosed the fixed effect panel should be 
used because the parameters on the test were nulls. The Lagrange test (x² = 6,331.95; prob = 
0,000) restate this conclusion. The fixed effect model solves possible omission of variables in 
the model (Baum, 2006; Baltagi, 2013). In addition, the present study considers the fixed effect 
model is the best fitted because the panel has short time series (8 years) and length cross-section 
(476 municipalities). Thereupon, by fixed effect is possible to pick up the heterogeneity among 
the various municipalities during the years. 
2.5.3 Instrumental Variables Tests Results 
Following, some tests were performed to verify the alignment (ALIG) instrumental 
variables of the president with the mayor (FM), the governor with the mayor (SM), and all of 
them, the president with the governor and with the mayor (FMSM). Both the alignment of the 
coalitions and the alignment of the parties of each of politicians were tested. In this same 
analysis, the alignment effect was evaluated whether an election year influence the amount of 
grants transferred to the municipalities, by the interaction of the alignment variable with the 
electoral year (ALIG2). 
Table  13: Identified flypaper effect constitutional grants (robust) with all kinds of alignment 
 Coalition Party 
GRANT Coef. St t P>t Coef. St t P>t 
GRANT_1 0.037 0.025 1.500 0.133 0.039 0.025 1.570 0.117 
GRANT_2 -0.061 0.015 -4.140 0.000 -0.060 0.015 -4.100 0.000 
ALIG_FM -0.019 0.007 -2.560 0.011 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.998 
ALIG2FM 0.008 0.011 0.730 0.463 0.010 0.012 0.800 0.426 
ALIG_SM -0.011 0.008 -1.330 0.183 -0.018 0.013 -1.450 0.148 
ALIG2SM 0.006 0.011 0.580 0.561 -0.002 0.012 -0.180 0.856 
ALIGFSM 0.014 0.012 1.190 0.234 -0.025 0.020 -1.230 0.220 
ALIG2FMSM -0.012 0.019 -0.640 0.520 0.017 0.026 0.640 0.523 
GDP 0.160 0.024 6.810 0.000 0.157 0.023 6.750 0.000 
Gender 1.729 1.220 1.420 0.157 1.726 1.223 1.410 0.158 
Youth -0.119 0.345 -0.340 0.730 -0.058 0.343 -0.170 0.866 
Elderly -0.060 0.497 -0.120 0.904 0.037 0.494 0.070 0.941 
IFDM -0.033 0.042 -0.780 0.434 -0.025 0.042 -0.600 0.546 
year2 0.064 0.010 6.680 0.000 0.064 0.010 6.710 0.000 
year3 0.062 0.021 3.030 0.002 0.069 0.021 3.250 0.001 
year4 0.127 0.017 7.460 0.000 0.135 0.017 7.950 0.000 
year5 0.112 0.018 6.280 0.000 0.118 0.018 6.560 0.000 
year6 0.120 0.024 5.040 0.000 0.127 0.024 5.280 0.000 
year7 0.207 0.024 8.510 0.000 0.209 0.024 8.580 0.000 
year8 0.182 0.026 7.010 0.000 0.186 0.025 7.430 0.000 
Source: authors. 
Considering that only the president-mayor alignment was significant, a new regression 
was rerun only with these variables in the model and the other kinds of alignment were 
disconsidered. 
Table  14: 1st stage -Identified flypaper effect constitutional grants (robust) of only president and 
mayor alignment 
 Coalition Party 
GRANT Coef. St t P>t Coef. St t P>t 
GRANT_1 0.037 0.025 1.500 0.134 0.038 0.025 1.530 0.125 
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GRANT_2 -0.062 0.015 -4.140 0.000 -0.062 0.015 -4.120 0.000 
ALIG_FM -0.014 0.007 -2.090 0.037 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.998 
ALIG2FM 0.004 0.009 0.430 0.666 0.011 0.011 0.980 0.326 
GDP 0.159 0.023 6.800 0.000 0.158 0.023 6.760 0.000 
Gender 1.737 1.225 1.420 0.156 1.728 1.228 1.410 0.159 
Youth -0.107 0.345 -0.310 0.756 -0.090 0.345 -0.260 0.795 
Elderly -0.108 0.497 -0.220 0.828 -0.067 0.495 -0.140 0.892 
IFDM -0.031 0.042 -0.730 0.465 -0.029 0.042 -0.680 0.497 
year2 0.064 0.010 6.680 0.000 0.064 0.010 6.680 0.000 
year3 0.064 0.021 3.120 0.002 0.068 0.021 3.290 0.001 
year4 0.132 0.016 8.250 0.000 0.134 0.016 8.240 0.000 
year5 0.115 0.017 6.560 0.000 0.118 0.018 6.660 0.000 
year6 0.123 0.023 5.260 0.000 0.127 0.024 5.360 0.000 
year7 0.210 0.024 8.640 0.000 0.208 0.024 8.680 0.000 
year8 0.188 0.025 7.430 0.000 0.186 0.025 7.590 0.000 
Source: authors. The dependent variable is real GRANT per capita. Fixed municipality and year effects are 
included. The overidentification test is x2(2). Standard errors are in parentheses. N = from 2005 to 2012. 
The validation test of the instrument variables indicated regressions not unidentified, 
strong and valid instruments, as results shown below: 
Table  15: Instrumental Variables tests on president-mayor alignment variable and lags of Grant 
variable 
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With the alignment variable, its election year influence on the amount of grants 
transferred to the municipalities and also 2 lags of GRANT variable (instrumentalized variable), 
the Sanderson-Windmeijer F test rejected the null that endogenous regressor is unidentified. 
The Cragg-Donald test rejected the null that the equation is weakly identified at 20% maximal 
IV size of Stock-Yogo test, while the Anderson-Rubin did not reject the null the orthogonality 
conditions are valid. In conclusion, the Hansen J test did not reject the null the instruments are 
valid at 1% and 5% concerning coalition alignment and at more than 25% in the party alignment 
(p value 0.287).  
Bracco et al. (2015) used alignment as an instrument to estimate the flypaper effect 
considering it is necessary to identify truly exogenous changes in intergovernmental grants as 
in Dahlberg et al. (2008). Based on the instrument variables tests results, the instruments are 
valid in the model. Finally, the second stage of the final regression with the valid instrumental 
variables generated the following results: 
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Table  16: 2nd stage – Identified flypaper effect constitutional grants (robust) of only president-mayor 
alignment 
2 stage Coalition Party 
EXPCUR Coef. St z P>z Coef. St z P>z 
GRANT 0.669 0.214 3.120 0.002 0.762 0.225 3.390 0.001 
GDP 0.085 0.042 2.030 0.042 0.070 0.043 1.600 0.109 
Gender 2.835 1.243 2.280 0.023 2.663 1.268 2.100 0.036 
Youth -0.786 0.440 -1.790 0.074 -0.780 0.446 -1.750 0.080 
Elderly -1.734 0.486 -3.570 0.000 -1.732 0.501 -3.460 0.001 
IFDM 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.999 0.003 0.079 0.040 0.968 
year2 0.054 0.013 4.220 0.000 0.049 0.013 3.670 0.000 
year3 0.083 0.024 3.480 0.001 0.076 0.025 3.090 0.002 
year4 0.100 0.033 2.980 0.003 0.086 0.035 2.470 0.014 
year5 0.214 0.031 6.910 0.000 0.203 0.032 6.240 0.000 
year6 0.229 0.037 6.110 0.000 0.217 0.039 5.570 0.000 
year7 0.242 0.049 4.880 0.000 0.222 0.052 4.290 0.000 
year8 0.290 0.047 6.200 0.000 0.272 0.049 5.550 0.000 
Source: authors. The dependent variable is real current expenditure per capita. Fixed municipality and year effects 
are included. The overidentification test is x2(2). Standard errors are in parentheses. N = from 2005 to 2012. 
The GRANT variable is statistically significant at 1% and the coefficient is 0.668, while 
the GDP variable is significant at 5% and the coefficient is 0.086, which means the impact of 
GRANT increase on the expenditure is 8.5 times greater than the increase of GDP, evidence of 
a strong flypaper effect in the case of alignment of the same coalition. Concerned to party 
alignment, GRANT is statistically significant at 1% and the coefficient is 0.763, while GDP is 
not significant at 10% and coefficient is 0.070. According to the literature (Saruc & Sagbas, 
2008, Courant et at. 1979), these results indicate flypaper effect (β2> β1) and substitution effect 
or GRANT displacement effect (β2 <1). The results allow concluding that the flypaper effect 
exists in Brazilian municipalities and is intensified or justified by the alignment of the 
representatives in the same way of theoretical literature (Hamilton, 1983; Inman, 2008) and 
previous empirical studies in Brazil (Rios & Costa, 2013). 
Finally, considering the same analysis of the previous tables, but considering not only 
constitutional grants (FPM, ITR, IOF, ICMS, IPVA and IPIexp), but also the legal grants 
resulted from the Complementary Law 87/96. Therefore, the results were similar. 
One of the reasons of the huge flypaper effect observed is the fact that mandatory 
constitutional grants are well tied to the tax share formula that is directly proportional to the 
population and inversely proportional to income per capita. The present study analyzed the 
mandatory lump sum grants, which are already previously defined in the shared calculations. 
Some studies identified the flypaper effect by analyzing discretionary grants as a dependent 
variable, which are actually more volatile and susceptible to variations over the year (Brollo & 
Nannicini, 2012). If these transfers were analyzed in the present model, the results could be 
even stronger.  
Another reason is that municipalities maybe do not have margin to manage tax’s 
matters, because they have already reached the limit of the tax constraint and cannot expand 
tax base or tax rate of their taxes (ISS, IPTU and ITBI). Although the municipalities have tax 
autonomy of some taxes, the Union establishes maximum and minimum rates and other rules, 
which tight municipalities’ hands to expand taxation. In conclusion, everything they receive of 
lump sum grants is simply spent, without any possibility of tax reduction as stated by the theory, 
and that is why flypaper is so representative.  
The main contribution of the study was the use of the alignment variables as instruments 
to identify and measure flypaper effect. Evaluating the reasons of so huge flypaper effect is also 
an innovation, as there is a need for fundamental restructuring of Brazilian taxation and its 
sharing. This fact is much discussed in Brazil, especially in the various attempts at tax reform 
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in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Federal Senate (PEC 293/04). However, it is noticed that 
fundamental aspects are not being discussed in depth, as they are by papers as Mendes et al. 
(2008). Therefore, reform is necessary, but it must be carried out deeply since the basis of 
taxation theory. 
Possible alternatives may adopt other forms of distribution rather than being simply 
directly proportional to population and inversely proportional to GDP. An efficiency tax index 
could be created and drive the distribution proportionally to it, or also an autonomy tax index 
which measure the effort of municipalities’ taxation, in a sense that stimulates those 
municipalities that they can act more autonomously according to the tax base they have 
available. Finally, it is possible to allocate resources in proportion to a social efficiency index, 
if it is possible to establish reliable indexes for this purpose. 
Unfortunately, Brazil cannot answer whether resources are being transferred to the 
places that admittedly need them or optimize their application. What happens is a mere sharing 
of resources and a simple mathematical logic, without considering clear economic or social 
purposes. Is it true that the most populated municipalities do need more grants? Do those who 
generate less income (GDP) need fewer grants? It is a generalized calculation, without 
considering deeper economic and social aspects in detail. 
In this way, is accountability really happening? There are many problems, as the data 
availability, why the sample had to be restricted due to the lack of reliability of the data provided 
by the National Treasury. Although significant advances have occurred since the 
implementation of the Integrated System of the Federal Government Financial Administration 
(Siafi) in 1987, like Finbra and Accounting and Tax Information System of the Brazilian Public 
Sector (Siconfi), there is a lack of data available and mainly lack of analyses of how the grants 
are being spread and what exactly the outcomes they are causing. 
2.6 Conclusions 
Fiscal federalism is the decentralization of competencies to subnational entities which 
have the tax jurisdiction of certain taxes and also competencies to provide goods and services 
to local communities with autonomy and non-sovereignty. Recent studies on analytic fiscal 
illusion (Baekgaard et al., 2016) examined their influence on the government expenditure cycle 
(Abbott & Jones, 2016), their relationship with budget (Gérard & Ngangué, 2015), transparency 
(Afonso 2014) and a possibility of raising fees or taxes due to illusion (Ross & Yan, 2013). 
Furthermore, the flypaper effect concept is based on empirical evidence that grants transferred 
from one government level to another tend to “stick” with the recipient being used for service 
provision and is not passed on to taxpayers in the form of lower taxes (Ahmad & Craig, 1997). 
Consequently, the grant leads to a higher level of service provision than would be the case if 
the payment was made directly to individuals. 
In Brazil, this process was consolidated with the Federal Constitution of 1988. However, 
this type of state organization can create two phenomena: fiscal illusion and flypaper effect. 
Considering there are many unconditional and nonmatching grants (lump sum) in Brazil, the 
research problem of the present study was if unconditional and nonmatching (lump sum) grants, 
structured according to constitutional fiscal decentralization, cause fiscal illusion and flypaper 
effect in Brazil. 
To answer the proposed problem, the main objective of the research was to verify if 
grants derived from fiscal decentralization in public resource cause fiscal illusion and flypaper 
effect in the Brazilian municipalities and to verify whether federal financial statements and 
systems exercise an important role in decision-making on resource allocations. 
Based on the data and analyzes carried out, the GRANT variable is statistically 
significant at 1% and the coefficient is 0.668, while the GDP variable is significant at 5% and 
the coefficient is 0.086, what means the impact of Grant increase on the expenditure is 8.5 times 
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greater than the increase of GDP, evidence of a strong flypaper effect in the case of alignment 
of the same coalition. Concerned to party alignment, Grant is statistically significant at 1% and 
the coefficient is 0.763, while GDP is not significant at 10% and coefficient is 0.070. According 
to the literature (Saruc & Sagbas, 2008; Courant et al., 1979), these results indicate flypaper 
effect (β2> β1) and substitution effect or Grant displacement effect (β2 <1). The results allow 
concluding the flypaper effect exists in Brazilian municipalities and is intensified or justified 
by the alignment of the representatives in the same way of theoretical literature (Hamilton, 
1983; Inman, 2008) and previous empirical studies in Brazil (Rios & Costa, 2013). 
In this sense, the high flypaper (more than 8 times: 0.668 / 0.08) is an economic problem 
that has relation to the financial decision making. The money sticks where it hits because 
municipalities do not have margin to expand taxes. Therefore, the theory that lump sum grants 
should represent a reduction in the tax collection of citizens is not applicable, since 
municipalities are already constrained and at the limit of tax expansion. 
The current criteria for transfer distribution generate a group of overfunded 
municipalities (Mendes, 2002), which is confirmed by Firjan (2018) survey against the increase 
of the number of municipalities in Brazil. In addition, the flypaper effect can lead to a trend of 
excessive spending, deteriorating more the fiscal situation of municipalities (Giuberti, 2005; 
Macedo & Corbari, 2009). 
The main contribution of the study is to show that political alignment continues to be an 
important characteristic in the Brazilian fiscal federalism, even with strict formulas to distribute 
grants from the federal level to the local levels. Furthermore, the dependency level of the 
municipalities on the grants sent by the Federal and State levels continues to be high and present 
in Brazilian municipalities. 
It is necessary to rethink the grant distribution system in Brazil, which was detailed done 
by Mendes et al. (2008). According to the authors, the first thing is to reduce the total amount 
transferred by the FPM grant, because unconditional transfers, even under the best distribution 
criteria, induce the flypaper effect and adversely impact accountability, fiscal responsibility, 
and efficient management. An alternative could be the piggyback in state and federal taxes, 
added to discounting payment agreements of state and federal taxes of an amount of what was 
already paid to the municipality. This cooperative action would stimulate consumers to claim 
receipts, creating an automatic inspection, increasing local revenue, and reducing the need for 
unconditional and nonmatching grants. 
The lack of continuous data over time of socioeconomic characteristics of society, such 
as private income, education level, employment, family economic stability and propensity to 
spend on public goods can be a substantial cause of the flypaper effect (Parmagnani & Rocha, 
2013). Future studies may try to address this issue, deepen the IBGE and Institute for Applied 
Economic Research (IPEA) databases and enable balanced panel analysis. Another thing that 
may have to be done with this aspect is the debt of the municipalities, as it continuously 
increases every day. 
Future studies may consider public security spending as a proxy for the most violent 
municipalities, given that some authors use the municipality level of violence as a control 
variable because the most violent ones must spend more on public safety. In addition, other 
control variables can be considered, as high spending municipalities (Hines & Thaler, 1995; 
Megdal, 1987), socioeconomic characteristics of society, such as private income, education 
level, employment, family stability (Hamilton, 1983) and dummy if there was a cut in the grants 
for the period previous or not (Heyndels, 2001). Finally, the Brazilian states one can be 
analyzed, because if they have more tax margin to act (ICMS, IPVA and ITCMD), it means 
more autonomy and consequently the flypaper effect should be smaller than in the 
municipalities, considering they do not depend so much on Federal grants. 
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3. THE MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS AND THE FLYPAPER EFFECT: 
EVIDENCE FROM BRAZILIAN MUNICIPALITIES 
 
Abstract 
The flypaper effect is the empirical anomaly that intergovernmental grants are transformed by 
recipient authorities into public expenditures at a significantly higher rate than the local private 
resources. The objective of this research is to detect the existence and investigate the causes of 
the flypaper effect in the Brazilian federation. Panel data evidence of 5,568 Brazilian 
municipalities from 2006 to 2013 indicates the presence of a substantial flypaper effect, with 
an estimated impact of federal grants on municipal public expenditures that is far greater than 
the impact of private resources. Using the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the 
municipalities’ tax rates as a proxy of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF), we find 
evidence in support to the Dahlby (2011) hypothesis of a role of the distortionary nature of local 
taxation in the emergence of the flypaper effect. 
Keywords: Brazilian municipalities; grants; flypaper effect; marginal cost of public funds. 
JEL: C33; H77; H72. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The flypaper effect is the empirical phenomenon by which the receipt of unconditional 
lump-sum grants results in a stronger response of local public expenditure than an equivalent 
increase in personal income would provoke (Hines & Thaler, 1995). In a sense, grants stick 
with the recipient government and fuel service provider instead of being passed on to taxpayers 
in the form of lower taxes (Ahmad & Craig, 1997). Consequently, grant increases lead to a 
higher level of service provision than would be the case if the payment was made directly to 
taxpayers through lower federal income taxes. 
This paper first investigates whether there is evidence of a flypaper effect in the 
Brazilian federation. To do so, we study the impact on municipal expenditures of several 
unconditional and nonmatching grants that should, in principle, be perceived as analogous to 
private income increases and compare their impact to changes in private resources proxied by 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Indeed, we are not the first to study the flypaper effect in the 
Brazilian context. However, in spite of a large literature on this topic ( Mattos, Cardim & Politi, 
2018; Mattos, Rocha & Arvate, 2011; Mendes, 2005; Parmagnani & Rocha, 2013; Sakurai & 
Menezes-Filho, 2011), there is still no conclusive evidence on the size of the flypaper effect in 
Brazil, and especially on its causes. 
This paper aims to add to that literature and shed light on the issue by exploring the 
possible causes of the high response of municipal spending to grants. Addressing those issues 
is of high policy relevance, considering that Brazilian fiscal federalism is facing increasing 
difficulties in the twenty-first century. Due to the instability experienced by Brazil as a result 
of the economic recession, the fall in tax revenues, and frequent political crises, this research 
aims to contribute to the design of fiscal federalism reforms that can mitigate those problems. 
In particular, we first test the hypothesis that the flypaper effect is due to grant 
endogeneity, and, following the existing literature, we build instrumental variables for grants 
based on the Firjan index and the lag of the grants received by the municipalities (Hayashi & 
Boadway, 2001; Avelino, Bressan & Cunha, 2013; Postali, 2015; Caetano, Avila & Tavares, 
2017; Mendes et al., 2018). 
Next, after ruling out that grant endogeneity is the cause of the flypaper effect, we test 
the hypothesis that lump-sum grants generate in reality a price effect in addition to the income 
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effect when recipient governments use distortionary taxation to fund local public spending – an 
early intuition by Hamilton (1986) that has recently been formally deepened by Dahlby (2011). 
The underlying mechanism is that a lump-sum transfer to a subnational government allows it 
in principle to reduce the tax rates on the own distortionary sources of revenues and keep on 
providing the same level of services as it did before the transfer. This implies that, at the new 
equilibrium with lower own tax rates, and as long as those revenue sources are indeed 
distortionary, the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) is lower and so is the effective price of 
providing public services, so that even lump-sum grants will generate a substitution effect by 
changing the price of public services. In addition, the substitution effect of a lump-sum grant 
will be larger when the grant-recipient government’s MCF is higher. Empirically, we use the 
elasticity of the tax base as a proxy of a municipality’s MCF and find support to the hypothesis 
that the distortionary nature of local taxation contributes to explaining the flypaper effect. 
The rest of this work is structured as follows. Section two discusses the existing 
evidence on the flypaper effect. Section three presents Brazil’s institutional and fiscal structure. 
Section four develops the econometric model, Section five reports and discusses the estimation 
results, and Section six concludes. 
3.2 Grants, Local Expenditures, and the Flypaper Effect 
The flypaper effect arises when a dollar of exogenous grant-in-aid leads to significantly 
higher public spending than an equivalent dollar of citizen income, going against the theory that 
establishes that nonmatching grants should “have an effect on local spending similar to that of 
any other change in private income in the community” (Courant et al., 1979). Hence, “there is 
a significantly higher propensity for recipients to increase public expenditure in response to 
lump-sum grants than in response to equivalent increases in private income” (Oates, 1988).  
Considering the following baseline model in equation (6), where local expenditure (Exp) 
is the dependent variable and Grant and GDP are the independent variables (possibly along 
with a set of exogenous controls), the coefficient of lump-sum grants (β2) should be of the same 
size as the coefficient on private resources, measured by GDP or disposable income (β1): 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛿 + 𝜇                                 (6) 
 
where Exp is current expenditures, GDP is Gross Domestic Product, Grant is nonmatching and 
unconditional (lump-sum) transfers received, xit is a vector of control variables discussed below, 
and μ is the random disturbance term. If the two estimated coefficients turn out to be different, 
and in particular if β2> β1, grants have an excess expansionary effect on local public expenditure 
than own resources (Courant et al., 1979). In particular, the evidence from the estimation of 
equation (6) can be conveniently summarized in the following way (Sagbas & Saruc, 2004) 
according to Table 1. 
Several explanations have been offered for the emergence of the flypaper effect. Courant 
et al. (1979) argue that “bureaucrats and politicians find it easier to avoid cutting taxes when 
the government receives revenue-sharing monies than they do to raise taxes when some 
exogenous event raises the income of the community.” In addition, the flypaper effect may 
occur due to inadequate econometric procedures in measuring elasticities (Hines and Thaler 
1995), or it could be the case that governors do not respond to the median voter (rejection of 
the hypothesis that governors respond to the median voter). 
Vegh and Vuletin (2015) summarize the numerous possible reasons for the emergence 
of the flypaper effect into five groups. First, non-fungible conditional transfers are often 
misclassified as unconditional ones. Second, omitted variables in a model (for example, 
equation 6) could create the flypaper effect (Hamilton, 1983). Third, the citizen confuses the 
income effect generated by unconditional transfers with a price effect that reduces the average 
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effective cost of public spending (Courant et al., 1979), since he is not fully informed and fails 
to see the public budget (Filimon, Romer & Rosenthal, 1982) or he might not behave 
completely rationally (Hines & Thaler, 1995). Fourth, some authors have pointed to the role 
that inefficient political institutions have in revealing citizens’ preferences (Chernick, 1979; 
Knight, 2002; Roemer & Silvestre, 2002) or, as we discuss extensively in section four, to the 
deadweight loss from distortionary taxation (Hamilton, 1986; Dahlby, 2011). 
Besides these five reasons, Vegh and Vuletin (2015) provided an additional explanation 
for the flypaper effect based on precautionary savings. They argue that an increase in grants 
raises the variance of total income by less than an increase in private income. Consequently, 
the amount of additional precautionary savings on local governments is lower in response to 
the increase in grants, and the increase in public spending is correspondingly higher. Based on 
data from Argentinean provinces, Vegh and Vuletin (2015) found evidence that the flypaper 
effect was a decreasing function of the correlation between fiscal transfers and private income, 
and this relationship should become stronger the higher is the volatility of transfers and private 
income. 
Empirically, many studies on a diverse set of countries found that nonmatching grants 
stimulate local spending per dollar more than does income going to private citizens within the 
community (Gramlich & Galper, 1973; Gramlich, 1977; Wyckoff, 1991; Strumpf, 1998). As 
far as Brazil is concerned, the evidence on the size of the flypaper effect, and especially on its 
causes, is far from conclusive (Mattos, Rocha & Arvate 2011; Mendes 2005; Parmagnani & 
Rocha, 2013). Amongst the most recent studies, Vegh and Vuletin (2016) find the size of the 
flypaper effect to be larger, the lower is the elasticity of substitution between private and public 
spending. In contrast, Mattos, Rocha and Arvate (2011)  find that higher transfers from the 
federal government induce less efficiency in local tax collection as compared to increases in 
private income. Finally, Mattos, Cardim and Politi (2018) test the hypothesis that lump-sum 
intergovernmental grants have both an income effect and a price effect that arises from the fact 
that grants reduce the MCF. Using data on Brazilian municipalities from 2006 to 2012, they 
find only limited evidence that grants push down the MCF in a significant way, with the effect 
being more substantial in larger cities where the distortionary impact of taxation is higher. 
3.3 Fiscal Federalism in Brazil 
The Federal level collects most of the taxes, while the states and municipalities collect 
the taxes of their tax jurisdiction. From the total net revenue of Income Tax (IR) and Federal 
Value-Added Tax or Excise Tax on Manufactured Goods (IPI) taxes, the federal level transfers 
23.5 percent to the 5,568 municipalities constituting the Municipal Participation Fund (FPM). 
The FPM’s calculation is directly proportional to the population of the municipality and 
inversely proportional to its income per capita, according to the following equation: 
 
𝐹𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡  = 𝑓(POP𝑖(𝑡−1),
1
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖(𝑡−2)
)  (7) 
 
where POP is the population of the municipality I in the prior year (t-1) and income per capita 
is the income of the state of the municipality I two years before (t-2) because of the availability 
of data (IBGE 2018). Shah (1994) highlights the principal merit of the FPM is its consistent 
design with objectives of transparency, predictability and local autonomy. Although it 
addresses some fiscal equalization objectives, it also has design flaws. Therefore income per 
capita is an imperfect guide to the government’s ability in raising taxes, considering that a 
significant proportion of income can be related to nonresident owners of factors of production. 
The other nonmatching and unconditional (lump-sum) transfers and the percentages to 
municipalities are shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Federal and State Grants to States and Municipalities in Brazil 
1. IPI  
24,5 percent (called FPM) 
2. IR  
3. IOF  70 percent  
4. ITRª  50 percent (or 100 percent) 
5. IPI-Exp (federal) IPIEx (state) 25 percent 
 6. ICMS 25 percent  
 7. IPVA 50 percent  
Federal Level States Level Municipalities Level 
Source: Authors. Federal Value-Added Tax or Excise Tax on Manufactured Goods (IPI), Income Tax (IR), 
Financial Transactions Tax (IOF), Rural Property Tax (ITR), Federal Value-Added Tax or Excise Tax on 
Manufactured Goods destined to exportation (IPI-Exp), Tax on Circulation of Goods and Services (ICMS), Motor 
Vehicle Tax (IPVA), Municipal Participation Fund (FPM). a Municipalities that help tax collection and supervision 
receive 100 percent of the ITR collection. 
 
While there are six main lump-sum grants that municipalities receive from federal 
(FPM, IOF and ITR) and state (IPIEx, ICMS and IPVA) levels, FPM is the main one and 
represents the greatest part of total grants, almost sixty three percent of the total (Appendix 2), 
and is the most widely employed in the literature (Sakurai, 2013; Vegh & Vuletin, 2016; Araujo 
& Siqueira, 2016;  Mattos, Cardim & Politi, 2018). 
3.3.1 MCF 
It is important to analyze the MCF in the context of the flypaper because its isolated 
study can lead to erroneous conclusions. Several authors did this analysis by robust studies 
(Akai & Sakata, 2002; Dahlby & Ferede, 2016; Habibi et al., 2003; Martinez-Vazquez & 
Timofeev, 2009; Oates, 1972). Some author’s explanations of the flypaper effect are directly or 
indirectly based on the MCF (Aragón, 2013; Dahlby, 2011; Hamilton, 1986). 
Initially, the concept of marginal cost of fund (MCF) is broadly described by Dahlby 
(2008). In summary, it measures the loss incurred by society in raising additional revenues to 
finance government spending. The flypaper effect can be obtained when the MCF is greater 
than one and non-decreasing in the tax rate (Sepúlveda, 2017). 
There are many ways to calculate MCF (Dahlby, 2008). However, many estimates are 
not comparable, because there are many definitions of the same concept (Auriol & Warlters, 
2012) and those who review theoretically the works show the diversity of estimates (Ballard & 
Fullerton, 1992; Dahlby, 2008). Some MCF’s works are shown below: 
Table  17: Previous Studies 
Author MCF Proxy 
Hamilton 
(1986) 
Intergovernmental transfers can stimulate public expenditures more than income increases 
because they normally lead to a greater reduction in the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). 
Dahlby (2011) Grants can reduce the cost of taxation for local governments through a change in the MCF. 
Lump-sum grants allow the recipient government to reduce its tax rate, which in turn, 




MCF = -ΔW/ ΔR, where ΔW is a monetary measure of the change in social welfare and ΔR 
is the change in tax revenue arising from a marginal change in a tax instrument. The estimated 
MCF in Africa is 1.21. 
Aragón (2013) The flypaper effect is obtained when the marginal (administrative) cost of tax collections 
increases with the tax rate. 
Végh and 
Vuletin (2016) 
For Argentinean provinces and Brazilian states, there is a positive association between the 
size of the flypaper effect and the level of the tax rate. Moreover, the flypaper effect should 
be larger the lower the elasticity of substitution between private and public spending and, in 
fact, should vanish for very high degrees of substitution. 
Dahlby and 
Ferede (2016) 
MCFit = Sit/(Sit+τit.η), where Sit is the share of total tax revenue from personal income tax 
base for province I in year t, τit is the personal income tax rate for province I in year t and η 
is the uniquely estimated semi-elasticity of the personal income tax base with respect to 
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Fypaper effect can be explained as an optimal decision of a benevolent and 45fficient 
government constrained by taxpayers’ responses to taxation. The MCF does not need to 
change with transfers to produce the flypaper effect. It can be constant but needs to be greater 
than one. The simple underlying explanation for the flypaper effect is that public expenditures 




For Local Governments in Brazil, an increase in R$ 1.00 in per capita unconditional transfers 
reduces the local price effect (MCF) around 0.07%. 
Source: authors. According to Dahlby (2011), benevolent local governments financing its expenditures with a 
distortionary tax predict flypaper effects, because lump-sum intergovernmental transfer has a “price effect” and 
an “income effect. Thus, these grants allow recipient governments to reduce its tax rate, which lowers its marginal 
cost of public funds, while can provide the same level of public service. “The reduction in the effective price of 
providing the public service helps to explain the flypaper effect” (Dahlby, 2011). 
Sepúlveda (2017) support the flypaper effect can be obtained when the MCF is greater 
than one and non-decreasing in the tax rate. The reason is because an amount of income is lost 
before being made available to the government, while the same amount of transfers is readily 
available without costs. Hence, the flypaper effect does not require the MCF to be increasing in 
the tax rate (Dahlby, 2011; Dahlby & Ferede, 2016; Hamilton, 1986). Besides, the flypaper 
effect can be obtained with a constant greater than one MCF. 
Dahlby and Ferede (2016) tested the hypothesis that the stimulative effects of 
intergovernmental grants increase with the marginal cost of public funds of the recipient 
government in Canadian provinces. The results indicate that the stimulative effects of lump-
sum grants on spending increase with the provincial government’s marginal cost of public funds 
(MCF). Mattos, Cardim and Politi (2018) document empirical evidence on price-effect caused 
by lump sum grants for Brazilian municipalities from 2006 to 2010 and found that an increase 
in R$ 1.00 in per capita unconditional transfers reduces the local price effect (marginal cost of 
fund – MCF) around 0.07%. 
Considering the MCF is often calculated by the tax rate, in Brazil is very difficult to 
take a single tax rate or the median of them, because there are many types of taxes and many 
tax rates. To exemplify, Ferreira, Serrano and Revelli (2019b) show the States Participation 
Fund (FPE), which is a percentage of 48% of the total of two Federal taxes: Income tax (IR) 
and Federal value added tax or excise tax on manufactured goods (IPI). Moreover, the states 
receive four more grants from Federal level: Residual taxes, Financial Transactions tax (IOF), 
Contribution of Intervention in the Economic Domain on fuels (CIDE) and Federal value-added 
tax or excise tax on manufactured goods on exportation (IPI-Exp).  
Each of these taxes has different tax rates, considering the particular situations, the 
taxpayer conditions and particular exceptions (Lanzer, 2011). For example, companies can pay 
15% or 25% of Income tax (IR), depending on how much is the year earnings. The employees 
can pay four tax rates (7,5%; 15%; 22,5%; and 27,5%), depending on the tax base of each 
employee. Thereupon, it’s hard to stablish a tax rate to a Brazilian state, for example. 
 
3.4 Empirical Work 
3.4.1 Data 
We use panel data of 5,568 municipalities from 2006 to 2013. The dataset does not 
include those municipalities that did not declare information to the National Treasury or lack 
basic information about current expenditure, population, GDP or grants. Current expenditure 
and grant data were obtained from Finbra’s Finance System. GDP and population data were 
obtained from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) database (IBGE 2018) 
and the Firjan Index of Municipal Development (IFDM) from the Federation of Industries of 
the State of Rio de Janeiro (Firjan System). Unlike paper 1 (Chapter 2), this paper deals with 
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all Brazilian municipalities because data are available and there were not control variables 
limitations. 
3.4.2 Variables 
We use current expenditure as the dependent variable, and municipal GDP as a proxy 
for private disposable income. The Grant variable includes only the federal grant FPM, as 
discussed in section three. All monetary variables (Exp, GDP and Grant) are expressed in per 
capita terms, and are deflated by the General Market Price Index – Internal Availability (IGP-
DI), an index which is made of the arithmetic weighted average of the Broad Producer Price 
Index (IPA), the Consumer Price Index (IPC) and the National Construction Cost Index 
(INCC). The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 18. 
Table  18: Descriptive Statistics 















Treasury 44,560 262.229 190.622 0.000 2,415.940 
IFDM 




of Industries of 
the State of Rio 
de Janeiro 
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44,514 159mi  2.76bi  2,000  239 bi 
Firms 
Number of firms 




Empresas 44,524 876  8,089  1 578,990  
Tax rate 






Politi 2018) 43,522 0  0  - 41  
MCF 
Marginal Cost of 
Public Fund 
Authors 
44,560 1.739 2.186 -6.290 12.837 
Source: authors. Exp: Current Expenditure. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Grant: federal grant Municipal 
Participation Fund. IFDM: Firjan Index of Municipal Development. ISS is the municipal tax on general services, 
called Tax on Services (ISS). IPTU is the municipal tax on urban properties, called Urban Property Tax (IPTU). 
ITBI is the municipality tax transfer of real estate “inter vivos”. MCF is the marginal cost of public funds. All 
monetary variables are per capita, with neperian logarithm (ln) and deflated to 2005 by the General Market Price 
Index – Internal Availability (IGP-DI). Mi: millions in reais (R$). Bi: billions in reais (R$). 
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The IFDM index is available only up to the year 2013, so the final panel dataset is from 
2006 to 2013. The expected results on the signs of the variable’s coefficients, according to the 
existing literature, are illustrated in Table 19. 
Table  19: Variables 
Variable Previous Literature Expected Results 
Exp 
(Gramlich, 1977; Hamilton, 1983; Wyckoff, 1988; Hines & Thaler, 1995; 
Gamkhar & Oates, 1996; Strumpf, 1998; Heyndels, 2001; Levaggi & 
Zanola 2003; Bae & Feiock, 2004; Sagbas & Saruc, 2004; Mendes, 2005; 
Mendes & Sousa, 2006; Lago-Peñas, 2008; Inman, 2008; Parmagnani & 
Rocha, 2013; Vegh & Vuletin, 2016). 
Dependent Variable 
Grant 
(Gramlich, 1977; Courant et al., 1979; Islam & Choudhury, 1990; Heyndels, 
2001; Sagbas & Saruc, 2004; Inman, 2008; Marconi et al., 2009; Mattos, 
Rocha & Arvate, 2011; Brollo & Nannicini, 2012; Vegh & Vuletin, 2016). 
+ > GDP coefficient 
GDP 
(Gramlich, 1977; Courant et al., 1979; Heyndels, 2001; Sagbas & Saruc, 
2004). 
+ < Grant coefficient 
IFDM 
(Avelino, Bressan & Cunha, 2013; Cruz & Mereb, 2018; Mattos, Cardim & 
Politi, 2018) 
+ 
Source: authors. Exp: Current Expenditure. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Grant: federal grant Municipal 
Participation Fund. IFDM: Firjan Index of Municipal Development. 
3.4.3 Instrumental Variables 
To investigate the response of local expenditures to internal and external revenue 
sources specified in equation (6), we allow Grant to be an endogenous regressor on the panel 
dataset of Brazilian municipalities. For this reason, equation (8) provides the first-stage 
regression for an instrumental variable (IV) approach using the Firjan Index of Municipal 
Development and lags of grants as instruments: 
 
𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐼𝐹𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾2𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛾3𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖(𝑡−2) + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜃 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (8) 
 
where Grantit is nonmatching and unconditional (lump-sum) transfers to municipality I in year 
t (FPM federal transfers). IFDM is the Firjan Index of Municipal Development of the 
municipality I in year t, and ranges from zero to one. It is attributed to each municipality 
according to its characteristics in terms of employment, income, health, and education. The 
Federation of Industries of the State of Rio de Janeiro (Firjan System) created the IFDM based 
on a qualitative evaluation of structural municipal dimensions that can be considered exogenous 
with respect to local governments’ fiscal policies (Appendix 3).  
As one should expect, the IFDM index is negatively correlated with grants and 
positively correlated with GDP (Appendix 4). However, the index has substantial cross-
sectional variation, and some municipalities have low GDP per capita and receive relatively 
few grants, but are well ranked in the index, as seen by the top 10 best and worst IFDM in 2013 
(Appendix 5). The way it is constructed, and its sample distribution make the index a potentially 
valid and powerful instrument for grants. As shown in equation (3), we use one-year and two-
years lags of grants along with the IFDM index as instruments for current grants and test their 
joint performance as instrumental variables in the next section. 
3.4.4 MCF Specification 
If evidence of 𝛽1 < 𝛽2  from equation (6) might be compatible with several 
explanations, we test the hypothesis that lump-sum grants generate in reality a price effect in 
addition to the income effect when recipient governments use distortionary taxation to fund 
local public spending – an early intuition by Hamilton (1986) that has been later formalized by 
Dahlby (2011). 
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The underlying mechanism is that a lump-sum transfer to a subnational government 
allows it in principle to reduce the tax rates on the own distortionary sources of revenues and 
keep on providing the same level of services as it did before the transfer. At the new equilibrium 
with lower own tax rates, and as long as those revenue sources are indeed distortionary (for 
example, the elasticity of the tax base concerning tax rate is not equal to zero), the MCF is lower 
and so is the valid price of providing public services.  
Dahlby (2011) shows that the substitution effect of a lump-sum grant will be larger 
when the grant-recipient government’s MCF is higher. Numerical simulations based on 
plausible values of the key model parameters (marginal utility of income, MCF, share of 
subnational taxes on residents’ income, tax base elasticity) suggest that the effect of a lump-
sum grant on spending would be up to five times larger than the effect of a local private income 
increase. 
To test the hypothesis that the stimulative effect of lump-sum grants on spending 
increases with the provincial government’s MCF, we use as a proxy the elasticity of the tax 
base to the tax rate. Based on Dahlby (2011) and  Mattos, Cardim and Politi (2018), we assume 
that the tax base 𝐵𝑖𝑡 depends only on the local tax rate 𝜏𝑖𝑡 . Consequently, the MCF can be 
proxied by: 





   (9) 
Unfortunately, and similar to earlier studies (Hokonsen 1998), no data are available for the tax 
bases of each municipality from the period that we analyze. However, several proxies can be 
calculated for the MCF (Dahlby, 2008). In particular, we use the natural logarithm of the 
number of service sector firms as a proxy for the tax base (B) and the ratio between local tax 
revenues on services (ISS) and annual firms’ labor costs (payroll expenses) as a proxy for the 
tax rate (Hayashi & Boadway, 2001; Mattos, Cardim & Politi, 2018). 
Then, to test that hypothesis that the MCF has an impact on the effect of grants on 
expenditures (Dahlby & Ferede, 2016), we estimate equation (10): 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑀𝐶𝐹 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝒙𝑖𝑡′𝜹 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   (10) 
 
where MCFit is the marginal cost of public funds of municipality I in year t. If the MCF in a 
locality has an impact on the effect of grants on expenditures, we should expect the estimated 
coefficient 𝛽3 to be different from zero. In particular, β3 > 0 shows that a higher MCF makes 
local public expenditures more responsive to grants. 
3.5 Estimation Results 
3.5.1 Instrumental variables estimation results 
Table 20 reports the results of estimation of equations (6) and (8), where grants are 
instrumented by IFDM and lags of grants. The F tests do not reveal a problem of weak 
instruments. The results show that Grant is statistically significant at 1 percent level both in the 
pooled (column 1) and in the fixed effects specification (column 2), and with a coefficient that 
is greater than 1, while the GDP variable is close to zero, pointing to a far larger impact on local 
expenditures of a change in grants than of an increase in local resources. 
Table  20: Flypaper effect estimates from 2006 to 2013. Dependent variable: Current expenditure 
(Exp) 
Variable 

















Grant 1.180*** 1.201***  1.017** 1.256 0.992* 9.129* 
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(0.010) (0.077) (0.512) (0.850) (0.529) (4.188) 
Dummies years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





















    
Mun. FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust 
Obs 44,057 44,057 44,056 44,056 3,579 38,817 5,239 
Mun - 5,564 5563 5563 452 4,908 655 
R² 0.336 0.550 - 0.050 0.102 0.045 0.178 
F(12,44044) 2832.07***       
F(12,5563)  820.09***      
F(3,38482)    85.80***     
F(9,38484)    597.65***    
F(9,3118)     110.19***   
F(9,33900)      472.96***  
F(9,4575)        294.53*** 
J-test - - - 4.812* 0.350 4.129 0.029 
Source: authors. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Mun: Municipalities. FE: Fixed Effects. OLS: ordinary 
least squares. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Grant: federal grant Municipal Participation Fund. IFDM: Firjan 
Index of Municipal Development. N = from 2006 to 2013. ***p< .01; **p< .05; *p< .1. As IFDM is available only 
up to the year 2013, the reason why the data is up to this year. The OLS coefficient is similar to the results found in 
the relevant literature in Brazil. Sakurai (2013) found a Grant coefficient of 0.61*** and an income coefficient of 
0.01*** considering the same dependent variable of US – current expenditure. Parmagnani and Rocha (2013) found 
similar coefficients for only the FPM grant and also to other kinds of grants. Araújo and Siqueira (2016) also found 
grant coefficients of 0.7387 *** for municipalities with up to 50 thousand inhabitants and 0.5255 *** for 
municipalities with more than 50 thousand inhabitants. Gonçalves (2013) identified 0.5360* for grants lump-sum 
and 0.2637* for conditional grants. Vegh and Vuletin (2016) found grant coefficients from 0.872*** to 1,018*** 
depending on the control variables used. Around the world, these coefficients are not a surprise (Acosta, 2010; 
Gennari & Messina, 2014; Gramlich, 1977; Inman, 2008). 
 
Importantly, the evidence of a strong flypaper effect persists when grants are 
instrumented by the IFDM and lags of Grants, in line with the evidence from previous studies 
(Hayashi & Boadway, 2001; Avelino, Bressan & Cunha, 2013; Postali, 2015; Caetano, Avila 
& Tavares, 2017; Mendes et al.; 2018). The coefficient on Grants is estimated to be around 1, 
while the GDP coefficient is again close to zero, indicating the presence of a flypaper effect 
(β2> β1). The tests reported in table 20 (Hansen J test) suggest that the instruments are valid. 
The analysis was subsequently performed through smaller samples according to the size 
of the municipalities. The results do not show flypaper effect in municipalities under 3,000 
inhabitants (Grant was not significant), while the flypaper turns out to be considerable in the 
largest municipalities over 50,000 inhabitants. One possible reason why there is no evidence of 
the flypaper effect in smaller municipalities is the tax collection method known as Simples 
Nacional (Mattos, Cardim & Politi, 2018), which can interfere in the data and, consequently, 
affect the reliability of the information provided. Another reason may be the anomalies that 
emerge in the smaller municipalities, as there is evidence that there is no local tax on properties 
(IPTU) collection in election years, which can distort results (Sakurai, 2013). Finally, the 
informality in these smallest municipalities (Mattos, Cardim & Politi, 2018) and the quality of 
their data can influence the results, because there is no checking of the data itself, auditing or 
enforcement by the National Treasury, as it is responsible for consolidating the information. 
Larger municipalities are inevitably more supervised, both by private and public auditors and 
international organizations, in the case of international loans with conditional fiscal clauses. 
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3.5.2 Marginal Cost of Funds 
We turn to the estimation of equation (10) testing the MCF hypothesis. The results are 
reported in Table 21.  
Table  21: MCF tests. Dependent variable: Current expenditure (Exp) (2006 to 2013) 















































Controls No Yes No No No No 
Dummy Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mun. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Year FE No No No No No Yes 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 44,544 43,242 44,544 3,624 39,320 5,240 
n. Mun 5,568 5,561 5,568 453 4,915 655 
R² 0.540 0.585 0.537 0.517 0.557 0.656 
F(9,5569) 1049.36***      
F(10,5560)  1798.33***     
F(11,5569)   885.51***    
F(11,452)    176.41***  222.93*** 
F(11,4914)     759,70***  
Source: authors. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Mun: Municipalities. FE: Fixed Effects. OLS: ordinary 
least squares. Pop: population in 2015. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Grant: federal grant Municipal Participation 
Fund. IFDM: Firjan Index of Municipal Development. MCF is the marginal cost of public funds. N = from 2006 
to 2013. ***p< .01; **p< .05; *p< .1. 
 
The results show that the interaction term, coefficient β4 from equation (10), is positive 
and statistically significant in all models, as predicted by the MCF hypothesis. This suggests 
that the expansionary effect of grants on expenditures grows with the proxy of the elasticity of 
the tax base that we have employed. The above results are compatible with the hypothesis that 
the stimulative effect of grants on public spending increases with the MCF. Consequently, and 
while not excluding that other forces might be at work at the same time, we find evidence that 
the employment of distortionary sources of revenue plays an important role in explaining the 
phenomenon of the flypaper effect in the Brazilian municipalities. These results are similar to 
the ones obtained for the Canadian provinces by Dahlby and Ferede (2016). 
3.6 Conclusions 
The objective of the present research was to test the existence of the flypaper effect in 
the Brazilian municipalities and to investigate its causes, based on a panel of 5,568 
municipalities from 2006 to 2013. Estimation of an expenditure determination equation reveals 
that the grant variable has a large and statistically significant impact on local expenditures (an 
estimated coefficient of over one). In contrast, the GDP variable has a small and insignificant 
impact (coefficients close to zero), thus providing evidence of a strong flypaper effect.  
Using the IFDM index and lags of the grant variable as instruments, we have been able 
to rule out grant endogeneity as a possible cause of the flypaper effect. On the other hand, using 
indicators of elasticity of the tax base concerning the tax rate as a proxy to the MCF, we get 
strong support to the Dahlby’s (2011) hypothesis that the distortionary nature of local taxation 
is responsible for the flypaper effect. 
The results of the present study point out that the tax structure and the assignment of 
revenue sources across levels of government can have significant consequences on local 
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decision-making processes in fiscal matters, regarding the high sensitivity of local public 
spending to grants known as the flypaper effect, and that any proposal of fiscal decentralization 
reform should carefully consider the distortionary nature of the revenue sources to be assigned 
to local governments. 
Overall, while being conditional on the length (until year 2013), frequency (some 
variables available from the Census only), and quality (especially for small municipalities) of 
the data, the evidence we have provided seems largely compatible with an explanation of the 
flypaper effect based on the cost of collecting public revenues in Brazilian municipalities. 
Admittedly, though, other competing interpretations of the flypaper effect cannot be entirely 
ruled out. It would be valuable, in future research, to evaluate the robustness of the tests we 
have performed here against empirical models that explicitly include in the picture the political 
economy of grant distribution, the role and quality of local bureaucratic institutions, and the 
possibility of behavioural responses of grant recipients that cannot be fully understood within 
a stylized neoclassical model. Moreover, it would be extremely useful if future contributions 
could complement the evidence that we have presented here with what emerges from explicitly 




4. THE EFFECTS OF GRANTS IN BRAZILIAN STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES: A 
BRAZILIAN FLYPAPER INDEX 
 
Abstract 
The flypaper effect is the empirical anomaly by which intergovernmental grants tend to be 
transformed by recipient authorities into public expenditures at a considerably higher rate than 
local private resources. The objective of this research is to detect the existence and investigate 
the causes of the flypaper effect in the Brazilian states. Panel data evidence of 27 Brazilian 
states from 1985 to 2010 and 5,568 Brazilian municipalities from 2000 to 2018 indicates the 
existence of a large flypaper effect, with an estimated impact of grants on public expenditures. 
Considering there are some ways to calculate MCF proxies, first, an autonomous index was 
used as a proxy of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF), because it represents how much 
the municipality can survive by itself, representing the municipality’s independency to federal 
grants. Second, the MCF was calculated by the derivation of Proper Tax Revenue to the Total 
Revenues. The state results show that the stimulative effect of grants on public spending 
increases with the MCF in both proxies, but it was stronger in the autonomous index proxy, in 
convergence to results of Dahlby and Ferede (2016) to Canadian provincial data. The 
municipalities results show the municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants had a greater 
flypaper effect when compared to smaller municipalities. The flypaper index highlighted the 
group of municipalities in the Southeast region with the greatest flypaper effect, followed by 
Central-west and South regions. At the same time, there is evidence that the constitutional 
function of the FPM to reduce regional inequalities is not being achieved in some 
municipalities. 
 
Keywords: Brazilian states; marginal cost of fund, grants; flypaper effect. 
JEL: C33; H77; H72. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The present study aims to analyze the Brazilian states and to test the hypothesis that the 
stimulative effects of intergovernmental grants increase with the marginal cost of public funds 
(MCF) of the recipient government, based on the research of Dahlby and Ferede (2016) using 
Canadian provincial data. Tax autonomous was used as a proxy of the MCF, considering the 
rate of proper taxes in relation to the total revenues of the state. Dahlby and Ferede (2016) found 
stimulative effects of lump-sum grants on spending increase with the provincial government’s 
MCF. 
There are many unconditional and nonmatching grants in Brazil: the State Participation 
Fund (FPE), the Municipal Participation Fund (FPM) and percentages of the Rural Property 
Tax (ITR), the Financial Transactions Tax (IOF), the Tax on Circulation of Goods and Services 
(ICMS), the Motor Vehicle Tax (IPVA) and the Federal Value-Added Tax or Excise Tax on 
Manufactured Goods (IPI). However, the present study uses only the FPE as a proxy to 
unconditional and nonmatching grants (lump sum). 
Even though the large literature about flypaper effect in Brazil (Mattos, Cardim & Politi 
2018; Mattos; Rocha & Arvate, 2011; Parmagnani & Rocha, 2013), there is still no conclusive 
evidence on the size of the flypaper effect in Brazil, neither a study considering the MCF. 
There is an association of distortionary taxes with the flypaper effect, considering 
transfers has a “price effect,” as well as an “income effect, allowing the recipient government 
to reduce the tax rate and, consequently, lowering its marginal cost of public funds, maintaining 
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the public service level (Dahlby, 2011). Hence, the reduction of the effective price is the cause 
of boosting spending. By this way, receiving grants causes much larger effect on spending than 
an increase in personal income (Dahlby & Federe, 2016).  
Hence, the objective of the present paper is to analyze the existence of flypaper effect 
on the 27 Brazilian states from 1985 to 2010 and 5,568 municipalities from 2000 to 2018. 
Further, two ways to deal with Marginal Cost of Funds were developed to address the 
importance of it in the tranfers withing Brazil federalism. The first one was based on an 
autonomous index, which is how much autonomous with proper taxes are the states faced to all 
the taxes and grants they receive from the federal level. The second one is based on the residuals 
of proper revenues and total revenues as an equation. About this last one, Dahlby and Ferede 
(2016) did a similar analysis of the Canadian  
Moreover, other ways were done in the same topic. Ferede and Islam (2015) employed 
an empirical methodology that is very similar to Dahlby and Ferede (2016) and identified that 
block grants have stimulative effects on provincial education expenditure. 
The purpose of this chapter was to carry out an aggregated analysis at the state and 
municipal levels through the most updated data available considering the research period of the 
thesis, from 2017 to 2021. Even in 2021, GDP data at the municipal level is only available until 
2018, because IBGE publishes this information with a lag of 3 years, as shown in topic 4.3.6. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the state of the art of the 
evidence on the flypaper effect at the international and national level and presents Brazil’s 
institutional and fiscal structure details. Section 4.3 describes the methodology, while Section 
4.4 reports and discusses the estimation results, and Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 Theoretical Reference 
Dollery and Worthington (1996) did an extent analysis of the empirical fiscal illusion 
studies and one of the forms is called flypaper effect. The flypaper effect has been largely 
studied (Bailey & Connolly, 1998; Hines & Thaler, 1995) and is treated as an anomaly because 
it is inconsistent with the “equivalence theorem” (Bradford & Oates, 1971). The “flypaper 
effect” happens when an unconditional lump-sum grant to a local government increases 
spending in a greater proportion than an equivalent raise in local income (Acosta, 2010; Hines 
& Thaler, 1995). The phenomenon was first named by Arthur Okun because the money the 
government sends out “sticks where it hits”. Thus, taxation is at the top of the entire chain 
(Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Content Layers 
 
Source: author. 











education expenditures using panel data from Canadian provinces over the period 1982 to 2008 
and found that block grants have stimulative effects on provincial education expenditure. A one 
dollar increase in federal grants per capita was associated with an increase in education 
expenditure per capita of about Can$0.21, disclosing the flypaper effect in Canada. 
There are evidence of flypaper effect all over the world (Acar, 2019 – Turkey; Amusa, 
Mabunda & Mabugu, 2008 – South Africa; Baekgaard & Kjaergaard, 2016 – Denmark; Bhanot, 
Han & Jang, 2018 – Kenya; Baskaran, 2016 – German; Bastida, Benito & Guillamón, 2009 – 
Spain; Cantarero & Perez, 2012 – Spain; Cárdenas & Sharma, 2011 – Mexico; Clark & 
Whitford, 2011; Cohen, 2001 – US; Colburn, 1992 – US; Dahlby & Ferede, 2016 – Canada; 
Deller & Maher, 2005, 2006 – US; Denzau & Grier, 1984 – US; De Widt, 2016 – England & 
Germany; Dewortor & Chui, 2019 – African countries; Dickson & Yu, 2000 – Canada; Dollery 
& Worthington, 1995a, 1995b – Australia; Downes, 2000 – US; Lim, Lee & Kim, 2017 – 
Korea; Masiero & Santarossa, 2019 – Italy; Panao, 2020 – Philippines; Silva & Sumarto, 2015 
– Indonesia; Vegh & Vuletin, 2016 – Argentina and Brazil).  
In the South America, Acosta (2010) shows new estimates in the presence of spatial 
dependence, when local spending is not independent from its neighbor jurisdictions’ behavior. 
By Argentinean county-level data (Buenos Aires), the study showed that while the “flypaper 
effect still holds true in the presence of spillover effects or mimic behavior across jurisdictions, 
it could be overestimated in the presence of spatial interdependence. 
In Brazil, there are also many studies about flypaper. Cossio (2006) identified stronger 
flypaper effect in municipalities with larger geographic areas. It is consistent with a budget-
maximizing bureaucracy explanation of the flypaper effect, considering larger municipalities’ 
residents would not easily move to municipalities that might spend less on public services and 
offer lower taxes. 
Sakurai (2013) searched a panel of Brazilian municipalities from 1989 and 2005 and 
found that grants have an asymmetric impact on public expenditure and this effect generates a 
recomposing between current expenses and investments. Moreover, the results indicate that 
municipal public spending are more sensitive to increases in government transfers than 
increases in local income, which means flypaper effect. Vegh and Vuletin (2016) searched 
Argentinean provinces and Brazilian states and identified the presence of flypaper effect. 
Ferreira, Serrano e Revelli (2019b) searched 476 Brazilian municipalities from 2005 to 
2012 and concluding that the flypaper effect exists in Brazilian municipalities and is intensified 
by the alignment of the representatives. Additionally, evidences of higher flypaper effect were 
found in municipalities with low tax autonomy. 
Sepúlveda (2017) provides an explanation for the flypaper effect which is simply 
because public expenditures are cheaper when financed with intergovernmental transfers. A 
lump-sum increase in income can lead to three effects on optimal government decisions. The 
first one is the net substitution effect, which represents a change in public expenditures due to 
the induced change in the tax base and the MCF. The second is the private-income affect, a 
change in public expenditures due to greater taxpayers’ income. The last is the public-income 
effect, a change in public expenditures due to additional public funds available to purchase 
public goods. Considering intergovernmental transfers do not directly alter taxpayer’s decisions 
about the tax base, they lead only to a public-income effect. 
Brazil is a continental country, composed by the Union, 26 states, the Federal District 
and 5,568 municipalities. Regarding to transfers, the Federal Government distributes resources 
to the states and the municipalities, while the states also distribute resources to the 
municipalities, with an active competence to collect certain taxes. It is a simple system (Lloyd-
Sherlock, 2006), although the outcomes are complex to analyze effectiveness, as well as to 
verify the existence and respective reasons of occurrence of the flypaper effect. 
There are several types of transfers in Brazil, matching and nonmatching. The flypaper 
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is verified when it results from nonmatching grants, as is the case of FPM (Mattos, Politi & 
Yamaguchi, 2017). Nonmatching grants could be susceptible to resource allocation maneuvers, 
mainly due to electoral alignment (Baker, Payne, & Smart, 1999; Kneebone & McKenzie, 2001; 
Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2004), but as the formula is fixed, based on population and income per 
capita, this weakness should be minimized. 
Furthermore, the percentages of FPE the states receive is defined every year by the 
Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), based on Population size and Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP): 
Table  22: FPE Percentages 
n State FPE Coefficient (%) n State FPE Coefficient (%) 
1 Acre 3.9531% 15 Paraíba 4.3835% 
2 Alagoas 4.9123% 16 Paraná 6.3233% 
3 Amapá 4.7290% 17 Pernambuco 4.4624% 
4 Amazonas 3.9873% 18 Piauí 2.5740% 
5 Bahia 8.4142% 19 Rio de Janeiro 1.2666% 
6 Ceará 6.2473% 20 Rio Grande do Norte 3.7659% 
7 Federal District 0.6585% 21 Rio Grande do Sul 2.9820% 
8 Espírito Santo 1.9027% 22 Rondônia 3.4816% 
9 Goiás 3.4509% 23 Roraima 1.2587% 
10 Maranhão 6.8519% 24 Santa Catarina 1.2241% 
11 Mato Grosso 5.1361% 25 São Paulo 3.6762% 
12 Mato Grosso do Sul 1.5119% 26 Sergipe 0.8346% 
13 Minas Gerais 2.0727% 27 Tocantins 3.4123% 
14 Pará 6.5267% Total      100% 
Source: authors. The FPE coefficients the states receive are defined every year by the Federal Court of Accounts 
(TCU). This table presents the coefficients to 2021. Based on the Normative Decision 184/2020 – TCU – Appendix 
I FPE – Individual Participation Coefficients – Year 2021. Available on: http://portal.tcu.gov.br/transferencias-
constitucionais-e-legais/coeficientes-fpe-e-fpm/. 
Considering this situation and the difficulty of building a MCF proxy, it is possible to 
calculate the amount each state receives from grants and how much do they earn by local taxes. 
The result (called by us as Autonomous Index) fits as a MCF proxy because it represents exactly 
how much autonomous is the state in relation to the Federal level. It shows how much the 
municipality can survive only by itself, taxing and earning funds by its own. Thus, it is one of 
the ways to know the municipality’s independency. 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
The sample consists of a panel of 27 states from 1985 to 2010 and 5,568 municipalities 
from 1985 to 2010. An additional analysis was done to states data excluding the Federal 
District, because it represents a hybrid entity accumulating state and municipality functions. 
Current expenditure and grants data were obtained from Finbra’s Finance System, while GDP 
and population data were obtained from the IBGE database. The monetary variables were 
deflated based on the Appendix 6. 
The period from 1985 to 2010 was tested because all the states variables were available, 
including the controls variables. Although there were some available data until 2016, it was 
preferable to use the data from 1985 to 2010 because all the controls were available, which is 
more reliable and stable considering the deflated applied to the data. 
There are some similarities between Argentina and Brazil, because while Argentina is 
divided in 23 states or provinces and a Federal District (Buenos Aires City) and the province of 
Buenos Aires accounts for one third of total population and half of the GDP of the country 
(Acosta, 2010). On the other side, Brazil has 26 states and a Federal District and it accounts for 
1.43% of total population (IBGE, 2019) and 3.8% of the GDP of the country (IBGE, 2017). 
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The period from 2000 to 2018 was tested because all the municipalities’ variables were 
available. However, there are some available data until 2020, it was preferable to use the data 
from 2000 to 2018 because all the complete data were available, which is more reliable and 
stable considering the deflated applied to the data. 
This is the largest panel in the Brazilian literature presented in the Appendix 7 and one 
of the reasons previous works did not expand data is the reliable and consistent of data, which 
is widely discussed in the topic 4.3.5 Data Limitations. 
4.3.2 Variables 
Several previous works have studied the determinants of local public expenditures 
(Dahlby & Ferede, 2016). Concerning the states’ data, current expenditure is used here as the 
dependent variable, and state GDP as a proxy for the private income variable. The nonmatching 
and unconditional (lump sum) grant that we use is the federal grants State Participation Fund 
(FPE). Therefore, some authors have used grant proxies with more components as Cossio 
(2002) and Mendes (2005) and in general other studies consider FPM, IOF, ICMS and IPVA 
(Cossio, 2002). All these kinds of transfers are available during this long period, but the FPE 
is, besides being an unconditional and nonmatching (lump sum) grant. 
Regarding municipalities, long period data are not available. We use here current 
expenditure as the dependent variable, and municipality GDP as a proxy for the private income 
variable. The nonmatching and unconditional (lump sum) grant that we use is the federal grants 
Municipal Participation Fund (FPM). Some authors have used grant proxies with more 
components as Cossio (2002) and Mendes (2005) and in general other studies consider FPM, 
IOF, ICMS and IPVA (Cossio, 2002). Similarly to the state data, the FPM is the only 
unconditional and nonmatching (lump sum) municipal grant that is available from 2000 to 2018. 
4.3.3 Controls 
The following variables were used as controls in the expenditure determination 
equation: Gini index, Theil index, citizen’s income, water bodies and illiteracy rate. 
Initially, we performed a detailed analysis of the classification of nonmatching 
unconditional (lump sum) grants in Brazil and considered only grants in congruence to the 
theory of flypaper effect, with is the FPE. There are evidences that states with political 
alignment receive more grants and have greater effect flypaper (Sakurai & Menezes Filho, 
2011), however, it was not done in the state level. 
The database is from 1985 to 2010 because the control variables are available only until 
2010 (gender, youth, elderly), since they are frequently discontinued in Brazil, and this was the 
longest observable time series of these variables. The data availability of these control variables 
was questioned in the Federal Government Transparency Portal, but it was informed the data 
and research were actually discontinued and there is no prospect of further updates. Another 
limitation refers to state GDP data, which are available only two years after the end of the year 
it refers to (IBGE, 2017). 
The municipal tests have fewer control variables (see Table 23, models 9 to 14) and 
fewer controls were used than the states because the variables are not continuous. Several 
variables are measured only in the year in which the Census is carried out (for example 2000 
and 2010), but it was not carried out in 2020 or 2021 due to budgetary issues added to the 
limitations imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic crisis10. 
4.3.4 State Econometric Model 
The first econometric model was applied to the states and municipalities, with the 
 
1010 According to IBGE, the Census did not happen in 2020 and maybe cannot happen in 2021. More details are 
presented in the topic 4.3.6 Data Limitations. Source: https://www.ibge.gov.br 
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difference that control variables are available only in state data, because municipalities’ control 
variables do not exist with an annual periodicity. The model considers: 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                     (11) 
 
where Expit is the current expenditure of the state or municipality I in the year t, Grantit 
is the nonmatching and unconditional (lump sum) transfers of the state or municipality I in the 
year t. In the present study, the state tests consider Grantit as the federal transfer to the states 
called FPE, considering it is constitutional and clearly exogenous as the federal transfer to the 
states, according to Cossio (2002) and Mendes et al. (2008).  
On the other side, the municipality tests consider Grantit as the federal transfer to the 
municipalities called FPM, considering it is constitutional and clearly exogenous as the federal 
transfer to the municipalities, according to Cossio (2002) and Mendes et al. (2008). GDPit is 
the Gross Domestic Product of the municipality I in the year t, and Controls are dummies of 
capitals, of inequality (Gini and Theil indexes), citizen’s income, water bodies and illiteracy 
rate, while ϵit are the residuos (States: I = 27 states and t = 1985 to 2010 and Municipalities: I 
= 5,568 municipalities and t = 2000 to 2018). 
In the state data, an index of tax autonomy was used to test if financial constraints can 
be responsible for the flypaper effect. This index represents how much autonomous the states 
are in collecting their own taxes (Akai & Sakata, 2002; Correia et al., 2014; Dahlby & Ferede, 
2016; Habibi et al., 2003; Martinez-Vazquez & Timofeev, 2009; Psycharis, Zoi & Iliopoulou, 





                                              (12) 
 
Where Proper Tax Revenueit represents the sum of the Current Tax Revenues and 
Contributions Revenues items, which includes all the five taxes that the STF stated, which are: 
taxes, fees, improvement contribution, compulsory loan, and contributions in general. Total 
Revenueit is the sum of Current Revenues and Investment Revenues. 
After calculating the index, equation (13) was estimated, which includes interactions of 
MCF and Grants: 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 × 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   (13) 
 
where Expit is the current expenditure of the state I in the year t, Grantit is the 
nonmatching and unconditional (lump sum) transfers of the state I in the year t. In the present 
study, it is the federal transfer to the states called FPE, considering it is constitutional and clearly 
exogenous as a federal transfer to the states, according to Cossio (2002) and Mendes et al. 
(2008); GDPit is the Gross Domestic Product of the state I in the year t, and Controlsit are Gini 
index, Theil index, citizen’s income, water bodies and illiteracy rate; 𝜖𝑖𝑡 are the residuos; (I = 
27 states and t = 1985 to 2010). 
The model allows the stimulative effects of grants on government spending to depend 
on the MCF. The most important coefficient is β3, because it represents if the stimulative effect 
of grants on public spending increases with the MCF as predicted by Dahlby and Ferede (2016), 
we expect β3 > 0. 
The expected result is a positive and significant coefficient of the interaction variable 
between MCF and Grant (β3) (Dahlby & Ferede, 2016). Also, the monetary variables (Exp, 
GDP, and Grant) were considered as per capita, deflated by the General Market Price Index – 
Internal Availability (IGP-DI), as with the previous analysis (Cossio, 2002; Ferreira, Serrano 
& Revelli, 2019b; Mattos, Cardim & Politi, 2018; Mendes, 2005). 
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The data have a small cross-section (27 states), but a large time series of 26 years. Some 
tests do not make sense in short panels (Gujarati, 2009; Hayashi, 2000) as cointegration, 
normality (Williams et al., 2018), serial correlation (Bhargava et al., 1982) and 
multicollinearity (Goldberger, 1991). In consequence, they were not done in the present study. 
Regarding to collinearity, Cossio and Carvalho (2001) warned that ICMS state grants of ICMS 
in their model may have generated collinearity, since the collection of ICMS is determined by 
the state GDP. However, they argued that the importance of this type of transference is low in 
relation to the total grants. Another problem can be the high correlation between expenditure, 
GDP and grant variables. Future studies can deepen the theme and verify the interrelationship 
between these variables. Finally, regarding heteroscedasticity, it was not even possible to 
calculate according to the extent of the panel. Therefore, the econometric assumptions were 
followed and adopted based on the previous literature and according to the panel length. 
According to Mattos, Cardim and Politi (2018), there is another way to calculate the 
MCF, which is presented in the following model: 
 
𝑀𝐶𝐹_𝑑𝑖𝑡 =  
𝜕 (Proper Tax Revenue𝑖𝑡)
𝜕 (Total Revenue𝑖𝑡)
     (14) 
 
Which is similar to the equation (12), but the new MCF_d is calculated by the derivation 
of Proper Tax Revenue to the Total Revenues. Thus, the residuals (ϵit) of the equation below 
are considered the new MCF_d: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒_𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                     (15) 
 
After calculating the MCF_d, equation (16) was estimated, which includes interactions 
of MCF_d and Grants, similar to equation (13): 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐶𝐹_𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐶𝐹_𝑑𝑖𝑡 × 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (16) 
 
Considering the different forms to calculate the MCF (Dahlby, 2008), this procedure 
helps to guarantee the robustness of the study. 
 
4.3.5 Municipality Econometric Model 
Initially, the econometric model described in equation (13) must be carried out with the 
states and municipalities data, adapting the corresponding variables (FPM for municipalities 
and FPE for states) and the control variables available, which is available only for states. In 
addition, at the municipal level, a time series model 19 years was proposed (from 2000 to 2018) 
enables to calculate 5,568 regressions, according to the following equation: 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                 (17) 
 
where Expt is the municipality current expenditure in the year t, Grantt is the 
nonmatching and unconditional (lump sum) transfers of the municipality in the year t, GDPit is 
the Gross Domestic Product in the year t and ϵit are the residuos (t = 2000 to 2018). 
Under those circumstances, the flypaper effect index was generated. The elasticities of 
Grantt in relation to the variable GDPt, adopting as a premise the statistical significance of the 
β1 and β2 coefficients. Therefore, the total of 5,568 regressions were performed to obtain the 
elasticity of each of the Brazilian municipalities. 
 
59 

















               (18) 
 
The coefficients β1 and β2 that were not statistically significant were considered equal 
to zero. The elasticity can be positive, null or negative, because the impact of the variation of 
the GDPt and Grantt variables on the Expt variable can be either positive or negative. Finally, 
the index was normalized, according to the equation below, to reduce the range between the 
maximum and minimum values of the index for each of the municipalities: 
 
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 =
Flypaper Index𝑖−𝑚𝑖𝑛 (Flypaper Index)
(𝑚𝑎𝑥(Flypaper Index)−𝑚𝑖𝑛 (Flypaper Index))
  (19) 
 
where Flypaper Indext is the result of equation 18 of the municipality I, max is the 
maximum flypaper index value, and min is the minimum flypaper index value. 
4.3.6 Data Limitations 
The present study has some limitations. The first is the time series horizon, as IBGE 
only has municipal GDP data available from before 2018, even though the research was 
completed in 2021. This situation happens because IBGE works with an interval of 3 years for 
municipal data collection, as explained by the IBGE in response to the information request in 
the transparency portal (Appendix 8). In addition, the last census happened in 2010 and did not 
happen again in 2020 budgetary reasons and maybe will not happen in 2021. Therefore, the 
interpolation to update the population and GDP indicators of the municipalities is hampered 
due to these facts. 
Another limitation is the absence of control variables because these data in Brazil is not 
continuous, and some databases are unreliable. Some examples of lack of data continuity are 
data from Datasus, the IFDM index carried out by Firjan, socioeconomic variables such as 
sewer rate, family’s income, and illiteracy. The census is only made every 10 years bring out 
this problems. 
The unreliable databases are also a relevant research limitation. An example is the 
Datasus database, which has a metric for masonry houses. In some years this number increases, 
in others it is zero, while also decreasing to the same municipality. No reason was identified for 
decreasing this variable, unless a disaster strikes the municipality, destroying all brick houses. 
When questioned through the Federal Government Transparency Portal, the Ministry of Health, 
responsible for the database and for the survey, answered the complaints are precedent and the 
abrupt variable variation has no justification, which may happen by database information error 
and typing error. The variable brick house was searched in the municipality Japeri – RJ, that do 
not have data for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007 and from 2002 to 2004 the variable decreased. 
The query performed is available in Appendix 9. 
Another example of unreliable data is the databases Siconfi and Fibra. As they are based 
on self-declaration by states and municipalities, there are several information problems. This 
fact is also addressed in the National Public Sector Balance (BSPN), in which the explanatory 
notes alert that several states and municipalities have inconsistent data or simply did not send 
the information to the National Treasury. Otherwise, the National Treasury decided not to 
include those municipalities into the consolidation. Research by Ferreira, Serrano and Revelli 
(2019a) showed that since 2000 any BSPN has covered 100% of Brazilian states and 
municipalities. Albeit Brazil has 5,568 municipalities, only 5,046 were included in the National 
Balance of 2020 (Brasil, 2021). 
Some intrinsic characteristics of the variables end up limiting the data as well. In the 
case of the FPE and FPM coefficients, as they use population database, some municipalities 
have filed for justice to maintain the previous number of people in the database. Therefore, even 
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if it is not real, the number remains because justice determined it. In 2021, a total of 17 
municipalities had legal approval: Ipixuna – AM, São Gonçalo do Amarante – RN, Benjamin 
Constant – AM, Guajará – AM, Lábrea – AM, Tabatinga – AM, Urucurituba – AM, Ipixuna – 
AM, Jutaí – AM, Parintins – AM, Barcelos – AM, Caapiranga – AM, Santo Antônio do Içá – 
AM, Uarini – AM, Barreiros – PE, Teresina – PI and Boa Vista – RR. 
These limitations affect the present research, which could not deepen more the analysis 
and conclusions regarding the reasons of the flypaper effect. Therefore, it was decided to obtain 
fewer correct results than more doubtful or wrong results, which can lead to compromising 
inferences, especially for public policies and government transfers. 
4.4 Empirical Results 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model are shown in Appendix 10. The 
results show the Federal District contributes to higher the mean and average of the monetary 
variables, mainly because it accumulates state and municipality functions. It is possible to 
observe also that the Gini index increases when the Federal District is added to the sample, 
indicating the inequality increasing, which is true, because the Federal District has high Gini 
indexes. 
The municipality panel data tests were performed using fixed effects, based on Hausman 
test (χ2(16) = 375.78***). The results of equations (11), (13), (16) and (17) are presented by the 
following table, distinguished by state and municipality results. The flypaper is present in both 
states and municipalities, as the Grant coefficient is statistically significant and higher than the 
GDP coefficient in models (1), (5) and (9).  
The flypaper is higher in municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants, contrary to 
the expected results, the smallest municipalities have the greatest flypaper effect as they do not 
have their own income and are highly dependent on federal grants. One of the reasons for this 
finding is the way the FPM is calculated and distributed, which is directly proportional to 
population and inversely proportional to income per capita. 
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Years No No No No No No No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Obs 672 672 672 672 698 698 698 698 105,783 100,224 9,442 84,816 11,514 100,260 
States/Mun. 26 26 26 26 27 27 27 27 5,568 5,568 476 4,428 666 5,568 
R² 0.660 0.748 0.551 0.751 0.688 0.886 0.926 0.930 0.202 0.194 0.048 0.308 0.628 0.606 
F test/Wald  654.94*** 785.28*** 561.64*** 817.66*** 195.61*** 503.08*** 516.45*** 611.56***       
Source: authors. FE: Fixed Effects. Obs: Observations. (1): Pool, F(2, 695) and equation 17. (2): Wald χ2(7) and equation 11. (3): Wald χ2(4) and equation 13. (4): Wald χ2(9) 
and equation 13. (5): Pool, F(2, 695) and equation 17. (6): Wald χ2(7) and equation 11. (7): Wald χ2(4) and equation 13. (8): Wald χ2(9) and equation 13. (8): equation 17. (14): 
Panel data – fixed effects and equation 11. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. N States = from 1985 to 2010. N Municipalities = from 2000 to 2018. ***p< .01; **p< 
.05; *p< .1. 
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4.4.1 State Results 
In the same way of Dahlby and Ferede (2016), the results show the stimulative effect of 
grants on public spending increases with the MCF and β3 > 0 is positive and significant in all 
the models the MCF variables are included (2, 3, 5, 6), as expected initially. Hence, it can be 
concluded that the stimulative effect of grants on public spending increases with the MCF. The 
above results of β1 > 0 do not indicate the effects of grants on government expenditures due to 
the presence of the interaction term. 
Related to equation (16), to verify another way of estimating the MCF, the results are 
presented below: 
Table  24: Identified flypaper effect constitutional grants (robust) with MCF_d 
 Without Federal District With Federal District 



































































     
Dummy Years No No No No 
States fixed effect No No No No 
Year fixed effect No No No No 
Obs 670 670 696 696 
States 26 26 27 27 
R² 0.506 0.738 0.895 0.901 
Source: authors. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. N = from 1985 to 2010. 
***p< .01; **p< .05; *p< .1. 
The results are aligned to Dahlby and Ferede (2016), considering the results show β3 > 
0 is positive and significant in models 7 and 8, while they are not strong significant in models 
9 (at 5%) and 10 (at 10%). Any of the coefficients were less than 0, which support the results 
are aligned to the expectations. However, considering they were not so higher than zero, the 
results show the many ways to calculate and estimate MCF (Dahlby, 2008; Auriol & Warlters, 
2012) can lead to different results. The MCF proxy as index of tax autonomy (equation 12) 
show results totally aligned to the results of Dahlby and Ferede (2016).  
Although, the MCF proxy as the derivation of Proper Tax Revenue to the Total 
Revenues (equation 14) show results aligned to Dahlby and Ferede (2016), but not so strong, 
because the coefficient is closer to zero, and not higher than zero. Finally, it can be concluded 
that the stimulative effect of grants on public spending increases with the MCF. 
4.4.2 Municipality Results 
The results show evidence of the flypaper effect in Brazilian municipalities (see Table 
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23, models 9 to 14), validating previous studies (Araújo & Siqueira, 2016; Cruz & Silva, 2020; 
Diniz et al., 2017; Ferreira, Serrano & Revelli, 2019b; Freitas, Pereira, Lúcio & Gomes, 2019; 
Gadelha et al., 2017; Mattos, Cardim & Politi, 2018; Pansani, Serrano & Ferreira, 2020; 
Parmagnani & Rocha, 2013; Salomão Neto, 2020; Vegh & Vuletin, 2016). 
At the national level, the distribution of the Flypaper Index (equations 18 and 19) on the 
map is represented below: 
Figure 4: Flypaper Effect Index Map 
 
Source: authors, by the Sofware Stata. 
 
Interpreting the distribution of the flypaper index on the map, the dark spots represent 
the higher indexes, in other words, the greater the impact on current expenditures due to an 
increase in government transfers rather than an increase in the municipality’s income. The map 
may be confusing at a first look, as the dark spots partly represent the concentration of 
municipalities in these areas. However, when analyzing the generated index data, it is clear the 
darker areas admittedly have the highest flypaper indexes. 







1º São Paulo – SP 1.00 5,554º Amapá – AP 0.01 
2º Duque de Caxias – RJ 0.90 5,555º Alto do Rodrigues – RN 0.01 
3º Araporã – MG 0.75 5,556º Santo Antônio do Leverger – MT 0.01 
4º Porto Real – RJ 0.52 5,557º Santa Helena – PR 0.01 
5º Betim – MG 0.45 5,558º Campina Grande – PB  0.01 
6º São Gonçalo do Rio Abaixo – MG 0.31 5,559º Cascavel – PR  0.00 
7º Osasco – SP 0.29 5,560º Gurupi – TO  0.00 
8º Cairu – BA 0.27 5,561º Ananindeua – PA 0.00 
9º Itatiaiuçu – MG 0.26 5,562º Serranópolis – GO  0.00 
10º São José da Barra – MG 0.23 5,563º Campo Grande – MS  0.00 
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Source: authors. Not all the 5,568 municipalities had the flypaper index calculated for lack of data for the entire 
time series from 2000 to 2018. 
The improvement in the analysis of the time series is to scale and verify which 
municipalities are outliers from the perspective of the flypaper effect. Analyzing the largest 
municipality in Brazil, São Paulo, the increase of R$1.00 in the municipality’s income (GDP) 
practically does not generate an increase in expenditure, as the coefficient is close to zero, while 
the increase in the same amount of transfers has a representative impact on expenditure. 
Therefore, São Paulo is the city with the biggest flypaper effect in Brazil. 
Most of the following municipalities are not capitals (there are 27 state capitals in 
Brazil), with Belo Horizonte appearing only in the 26th position. The other municipalities in the 
table are in the Southeast region (Duque de Caxias – RJ, Araporã – MG, Porto Real – RJ, Betim 
– MG, São Gonçalo do Rio Below – MG, Osasco – SP, Itatiaiuçu – MG and São José da Barra 
– MG), with the exception of Cairu – BA located in the Northeast. The variables analyzed were 
per capita and deflated. Overall, it is necessary to individually analyze each one of the 
municipalities. 
In addition to this individual analysis, we clustered municipalities by state and by region 
to enhance the analysis of the flypaper effect: 
Table  26: Municipal Flypaper Index by Region and State 

















Rio Grande do Norte 0.13 
Sergipe 0.16 
Central-West 0.66 
Federal District 0.00 
Goiás 0.14 
Mato Grosso 0.38 
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.34 
Southeast 1.00 
Espírito Santo 0.22 
Minas Gerais 0.27 
Rio de Janeiro 1.00 
São Paulo 0.34 
South 0.61 
Paraná 0.20 
Santa Catarina 0.25 
Rio Grande do Sul 0.26 
Source: authors. 
Clustering the municipalities by state and region enable to certify the cluster of 
municipalities in the Southeast region are the municipalities with the greatest flypaper effect. 
This result is perfectly consistent with Figure 4, which shows dense dark spots in the southeast 
region. It is noteworthy that the analysis presented here is not of regions or states, but of 
municipalities, which can be grouped by regions or by state. 
One reason that can justify or intensify the occurrence of the flypaper effect in Brazilian 
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municipalities is the way in which the FPM coefficients are calculated. The income per capita 
predicted in equation 7 is a measure at the state level, not at the municipality level, mainly 
because this data is not timely available at the municipal level (3-year interval, as explained in 
the topic 4.3.6). Therefore, all municipalities in a given state are considered to have the same 
income per capita, and in reality, there are municipalities with different realities within the 
same state. 
Although we confirmed evidence of the flypaper effect in Brazil, as observed in the 
results, its verification is not unanimous (Appendix 7). Consequently, it is important to deepen 
the study of the phenomenon in order to improve intergovernmental transfers and reduce social 
and regional inequalities, one of the fundamental objectives established in the Federal 
Constitution of 1988. 
As presented by Ferreira, Serrano and Revelli (2019b), the calculation of the FPM is 
directly proportional to the population and inversely proportional to income per capita. In 
addition, one of the FPM objectives is reducing regional inequalities. Several studies under this 
theme identified several troubles into the FPM formula (Ferreira, Serrano, & Souza Neto, 2020; 
Mendes, 2011; Rocha, 2011). 
Furthermore, the first observation that the time series allowed us to verify in this 
research was the relationship between transfers and income. According to the survey data, there 
is evidence that these assumptions (directly proportional to population and inversely 
proportional to income per capita) are not actually met. 
Therefore, the constitutional function of the FPM to reduce regional inequalities is 
probably not achieving the objective in some municipalities. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The research about flypaper effect shows the empirical anomaly that intergovernmental 
grants tend to be transformed by recipient authorities into public expenditures at a considerably 
higher rate than local private resources. The marginal cost of public funds (MCF) is one of the 
reasons flypaper effect exists, as many authors found relation between them. Dahlby and Ferede 
(2016), for example, show that the stimulating effect of grants on public spending increases 
with the MCF. 
The objective of this research is to detect the existence and investigate the causes of the 
flypaper effect in the Brazilian states, by two proxies of MCF. The first is an autonomous index 
used as a proxy of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF), because it represents how much 
the municipality can survive by itself, representing the municipality’s independency to federal 
grants. Second, the MCF was calculated by the derivation of Proper Tax Revenue to the Total 
Revenues. 
Panel data evidence from 27 Brazilian states from 1985 to 2010 and 5,568 Brazilian 
municipalities from 2000 to 2018 indicates the existence of a large flypaper effect, with an 
estimated impact of grants on public expenditures. The results show that the stimulative effect 
of grants on public spending increases with the MCF in both proxies, but it was stronger in the 
autonomous index proxy, in convergence to results of Dahlby and Ferede (2016) to Canadian 
provincial data. 
By an extensive and long database, it was found that the flypaper effect is present in 
both states and municipalities, regardless of the form of analysis, whether pooled or panel data. 
Municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants had a greater flypaper effect occurrence when 
compared to smaller municipalities. The flypaper index highlighted the group of municipalities 
in the Southeast region with the greatest flypaper effect, followed by Center-west and South 
regions. At the same time, there is evidence that the constitutional function of the FPM to reduce 
regional inequalities is not being achieved in some municipalities. 
According to the survey data, there is evidence that these assumptions (directly 
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proportional to population and inversely proportional to income per capita) are not actually 
met. The detailed analysis of the flypaper index can deepen the analysis of the municipalities. 
Future studies can test other proxies of MCF or other relations related to the flypaper effect and 
fiscal illusion. There are many ways to estimate the MCF, which highlight the need of studying 
the actual meaning and faithful of them. As there are many ways and also many models to 
consider MCF as a reason to the flypaper effect, other variables need to be considered, as 
population, social-economic characteristics, geographical considerations, as functions of the 
local governments to the community and to the whole country. 
It is suggested to consider the flypaper index created in this research in other databases 
and statistical analyzes to improve the understanding of the phenomenon in Brazilian states and 
municipalities. Research in these areas can help to improve the way Brazilian transfers are 
structured, especially regarding to the metrics used in the distribution formula. 
Political aspects can also be considered, especially in Brazil, with a large number of 
political representatives and a complex electoral system, as the vote count is based not only on 
the number of votes a candidate received, but also the votes for their party. Moreover, the grants 
from the federal level to state level are also complex as they consider many kinds of tax, as 
explained by Ferreira, Serrano and Revelli (2019b). With due consideration of these aspects, 
future researchers can deep this analysis in the context of the flypaper effect. 
5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The present thesis proposes to verify the existence of the flypaper effect in Brazilian 
municipalities and its reasons. Thus, research was divided into 3 studies with the general 
objective of verifying the flypaper effect in subnational entities in Brazil, in order to identify 
the reasons that cause this phenomenon. 
The first study verified the flypaper effect in 476 Brazilian municipalities with more 
than 50 thousand inhabitants from 2005 to 2012, considering new variables as transfer 
instruments. Political alignment, party alignment and coalitions between the mayor and the 
president of the republic and the state governor were considered instruments for the transfers. 
The results allow for the conclusion that the flypaper effect exists in Brazilian municipalities 
and is intensified or justified by the alignment of the representatives in the same way of 
theoretical literature (Hamilton, 1983; Inman, 2008) and previous empirical studies in Brazil 
(Rios & Costa, 2013). 
The main contribution of the study is to show that political alignment continues to be an 
important characteristic in the Brazilian fiscal federalism, even with strict formulas to distribute 
grants from the federal level to the local levels. Furthermore, the dependency level of the 
municipalities on the grants sent by the Federal and State levels continues to be high and present 
in Brazilian municipalities. 
This initial study is relevant because it brought up a current, complex scenario of fiscal 
federalism in Brazil, involving several transfers from the Union and states to municipalities. 
Therefore, there were no previous studies that presented the Brazilian reality with an extensive 
database and identified the effect at the level of local entities with such a long timeline and with 
instruments to the grant variable. The analysis through electoral alignment is relevant as it 
demonstrates that there may be an impact on transfers due to the alignment between the heads 
of government spheres (President, Governor, Mayor). 
It could be questioned how electoral alignment can act as an instrument if FPM and FPE 
coefficients and other transfers are objective and defined in legislation with precise formulae, 
instead of voluntary transfers. Initially, voluntary transfers were not considered in the subject 
because they are not considered unconditional and nonmatching transfers (lump sum). Then, 
the coefficients are established by law and annually calculated by the Federal Court of 
Accounts. However, as the calculation is based on the estimated population and income per 
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capita calculated by the IBGE, several municipalities managed to maintain in court their current 
population count in order to avoid a range fall and consequent decrease in the coefficients, 
reducing the amount of transfers11. 
The current criteria for transfer distribution also generate a group of overfunded 
municipalities (Mendes 2002), which is confirmed by Firjan (2018) survey against the increase 
in the number of municipalities in Brazil. In addition, the flypaper effect can lead to a trend of 
excessive spending, deteriorating more the fiscal situation of municipalities (Giuberti, 2005; 
Macedo & Corbari, 2009). Thus, as much as objective aspects are defined, there is a discretion 
margin in these transfers, which justifies considering political alignment as a proxy of grants. 
The second study verified the flypaper effect in 5,568 Brazilian municipalities from 
2006 to 2013, using the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the municipalities’ tax rates as 
a proxy of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). Using the IFDM index and the transfer 
variable intervals as instruments, we have been able to rule out transfer endogeneity as a 
possible cause of the flypaper effect. On the other hand, using indicators of elasticity of the tax 
base concerning the tax rate as a proxy to the MCF, the results support the Dahlby’s (2011) 
hypothesis that the distortionary nature of local taxation is responsible for the flypaper effect. 
The results point out that the tax structure and the assignment of revenue sources across 
levels of government can have significant consequences on local decision-making processes in 
fiscal matters, regarding the high sensitivity of local public spending to grants (flypaper effect), 
and that any proposal of fiscal decentralization reform should carefully consider the 
distortionary nature of the revenue sources to be assigned to local governments. 
The MCF was used by some researchers (Dahlby, 2011; Dahlby & Ferede, 2016; 
Hokonsen, 1998; Mattos, Cardim & Politi, 2018), but not from the perspective of flypaper nor 
with grants as an instrumental variable, which demonstrates the pioneering nature of this thesis. 
The results point out that the tax structure and the assignment of revenue sources across levels 
of government can have significant consequences on local decision-making processes in fiscal 
matters, regarding the high sensitivity of local public spending to grants known as the flypaper 
effect, and that any proposal of fiscal decentralization reform should carefully consider the 
distortionary nature of the revenue sources to be assigned to local governments. 
Finally, the third one verified the flypaper effect in 27 Brazilian states from 1985 to 
2010 and 5,568 Brazilian municipalities from 2000 to 2018, considering two different ways to 
calculate the MCF. The first proxy was an autonomous index as a proxy of the MCF, because 
it represents how much the municipality can survive by itself, representing the municipality’s 
independency to federal grants. Second, the MCF was calculated by the derivation of Proper 
Tax Revenue to the Total Revenues. The results show that the stimulative effect of grants on 
public spending increases with the MCF in both proxies, but it was stronger in the autonomous 
index proxy, in convergence to results of Dahlby and Ferede (2016) to Canadian provincial 
data. 
An extensive and long database allowed us to conclude the flypaper effect is present in 
both states and municipalities, regardless of the form of analysis, whether pooled or panel data. 
Municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants had a greater flypaper effect when compared 
to smaller municipalities. The flypaper index showed the municipalities in the Southeast region 
have the greatest flypaper effect incidence, followed by Center-west and South regions. At the 
 
11 Euclides da Cunha – BA (Action nº 1000719-43.2018.4.01.3306 - Vara Federal da Subseção Judiciária de Paulo Afonso – 
BA; Jutaí – AM (Action nº s/nº); Uarini – AM (Action nº s/nº); Barreiros – PE (Action nº 0800382-56.2013.4.05.8300, 3ª Vara 
Federal da Seção Judiciária de Pernambuco); Santo Antônio do Içá – AM (Action nº 0017396-03.2015.4.01.3200, 3ª Vara 
Federal da Seção Judiciária do Estado do Amazonas); Santa Isabel do Rio Negro – AM (Action nº 1000064-98.2018.4.01.3200, 
1ª Vara Federal Cível da Seção Judiciária do Estado do Amazonas); Teresina – PI (Action Suspensão de Liminar 461/DF, 
Supremo Tribunal Federal); Boa Vista – RR (Action nº 0028811-48.2013.4.01.0000/RR – SLAT, Tribunal Regional Federal 
da 1ª Região). 
68 
same time, there is evidence that the constitutional function of the FPM to reduce regional 
inequalities was not achieved in some municipalities. 
The three studies are connected because they have in common the analysis of the 
flypaper phenomenon, the first two being at the municipal level and the third at the state and 
municipal level. The thesis sought an innovative treatment, trying to identify the occurrence of 
the flypaper effect in Brazilian states and municipalities, considering some analyzed 
municipalities were created in the last 5 years and, therefore, were not previously studied by 
other authors. 
The political alignment continues to be an important characteristic in Brazilian fiscal 
federalism, even with strict formulas to distribute grants from the federal level to the local 
levels. This evidence is intensified because the dependency level of the municipalities on the 
grants sent by the Federal and State levels continues to be high and present in Brazilian 
municipalities. 
Another aspect observed is related to tax autonomy, since evidence of higher flypaper 
effect in municipalities with low tax autonomy were found. This result can help the legislator 
to establish tax guidelines, because being aware of its reality, tax autonomy and other factors 
can become criteria for sharing transfers. Finally, it was also observed the perception that the 
MCF acts as a flypaper effect booster both in the municipalities (second study) and in the states 
(third study), according to the two proxies tested. 
Thus, the general objective of this study was to identify the reasons leading to the 
flypaper effect. Additionally, it was verified whether the effects were properly fulfilled and 
reduced the gap of the object of study through empirical tests and discussion based on the 
specialized literature. In conclusion, the flypaper effect, which is considered a type of fiscal 
illusion, was empirically confirmed in the three chapters, demonstrating the impacts of 
intergovernmental transfers in Brazil and their main causes and consequences. 
It is necessary to rethink the grant distribution system in Brazil, which was detailed done 
by Mendes et al. (2008). According to the authors, the first thing is to reduce the total amount 
transferred by the FPM grant, because unconditional transfers, even under the best distribution 
criteria, induce the flypaper effect and adversely impact accountability, fiscal responsibility and 
efficient management. An alternative could be piggybacking in state and federal taxes, along 
with discount agreements for state and federal taxes of amounts already paid to the 
municipality. This cooperative action would stimulate consumers to claim receipts, creating an 
automatic inspection, increasing local revenue and reducing the need for unconditional and non-
matching grants. 
The results shed light on the indispensability of 5,568 municipalities, followed by 
mandatory expenditures necessary to maintain the city hall and city council. The anomaly may 
not only be found in the formula to distributing grants, but also in the federative structure and 
the huge number of municipalities, which has grown exponentially since the 1990s (Fernandes 
& Araújo 2015; Gomes & Mac Dowell, 2000; Tomio, 2002). Future studies can verify, for 
example, whether it is necessary 2,446 municipalities with up to 10,000 inhabitants (IBGE, 
2020), considering the advantages and disadvantages of merging municipalities (Blesse & 
Baskaran, 2013; Egger, Kothenburger & Loumeau, 2017; Suzuki & Ha, 2018). 
The calculation methodology needs attention, currently based on the population and 
income per capita of the municipalities (which is the income per capita of the state in which 
the municipality is located). There are scientific studies on the subject (Ferreira, Serrano & 
Souza Neto, 2019; Vieira et al., 2019; Monasterio, 2014; Gasparini & Miranda, 2006; Payeras 
& Hoffmann, 2009; Hoffmann, Silveira & Payeras, 2006; Gasparini & Melo, 2003; Payeras & 
Cunha, 2004), but changing requires a legislative proposal to alter the Federal Constitution of 
1988 and the laws which establish these distribution criteria, such as Complementary Law 
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62/1989. These kinds of laws are the most difficult to alter, because the because of their 
legislative rites and the necessary special quorums required by the hierarchy of norms. 
One of the weaknesses of the study is their data sources, as they are not frequently 
updated. Although the thesis was finished in 2021, the most current data from the municipalities 
are from before 2018, due to the data availability. The IBGE publishes outdated data at the 
municipal level due to the cost of generating such information and the difficulties to treat them. 
Some variables are calculated only in the census years, which is carried out every 10 years. The 
population and income per capita calculations performed by IBGE are estimates through the 
National Houshold Sample Survey (PNAD). In consequence, these limitations make balanced 
panel data research unfeasible. 
Another shortcoming refers to the quality of data, especially for small municipalities. 
The Finbra and Siconfi systems are not audited and present several conflicting information that 
need improvement. Thus, these research limitations did not compromise this study, but need to 
be addressed to improve data quality and statistical analysis. A research agenda can help to 
certify the quality of the data, and later to deepen statistical techniques, to test new variables, 
to investigate the existence of endogeneity, to explore the use of instrumental variables and to 
compare the conclusions with other countries and also within Brazilian regions and states. 
Future research can analyze cases of discrepancy between municipalities, considering 
the transfer distribution criteria are based only on population and income per capita. The 
amount distributed cannot fully fulfill its function of reducing regional inequalities established 
in the Federal Constitution of 1988. In this way, researchers on the subject may consider more 
recent data from other sources of information, as well as social variables related to the flypaper 
effect, such as the Gini Index and the Human Development Index. Model tests by region can 
enrich the analysis and lead to more detailed conclusions of the phenomenon. 
Finally, it is also possible to perform tests on other systems and databases in the public 
sector and expand the analysis of them. The Siafi can also be the object of scientific research, 
considering it is responsible for most of the federal public sector transactions and has not yet 
been thoroughly analyzed in the academic sphere. Finally, audits by courts of accounts can be 
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Appendix 1: Municipalities without IFDM index at least one year (unbalanced panel) 
n IBGE Mun. UF n IBGE Mun. UF 
1 1101104 Itapuã do Oeste RO 153 2203230 Currais PI 
2 1101476 Primavera de Rondônia RO 154 2203354 Dirceu Arcoverde PI 
3 1200013 Acrelândia AC 155 2203750 Fartura do Piauí PI 
4 1200054 Assis Brasil AC 156 2204550 Guaribas PI 
5 1200328 Jordão AC 157 2205250 Jardim do Mulato PI 
6 1200393 Porto Walter AC 158 2205300 Jerumenha PI 
7 1200435 Santa Rosa do Purus AC 159 2205581 Lagoa do Piauí PI 
8 1200609 Tarauacá AC 160 2205904 Manoel Emídio PI 
9 1200807 Porto Acre AC 161 2206308 Miguel Leão PI 
10 1300029 Alvarães AM 162 2206720 Nazária PI 
11 1300086 Anamã AM 163 2206803 
Nossa Senhora dos 
Remédios PI 
12 1300631 Beruri AM 164 2206951 Novo Santo Antônio PI 
13 1300904 Canutama AM 165 2207553 Paquetá PI 
14 1301605 Fonte Boa AM 166 2207777 Patos do Piauí PI 
15 1302108 Japurá AM 167 2207934 Pedro Laurentino PI 
16 1302306 Jutaí AM 168 2208106 Pimenteiras PI 
17 1303700 Santo Antônio do Içá AM 169 2208908 Ribeiro Gonçalves PI 
18 1303908 São Paulo de Olivença AM 170 2209104 Santa Cruz do Piauí PI 
19 1304005 Silves AM 171 2209203 Santa Filomena PI 
20 1304260 Uarini AM 172 2209450 
Santo Antônio dos 
Milagres PI 
21 1400027 Amajari RR 173 2209708 São Francisco do Piauí PI 
22 1400175 Cantá RR 174 2209955 São João da Varjota PI 
23 1400209 Caracaraí RR 175 2209971 São João do Arraial PI 
24 1400233 Caroebe RR 176 2210359 São Lourenço do Piauí PI 
25 1400282 Iracema RR 177 2210391 São Miguel do Fidalgo PI 
26 1400308 Mucajaí RR 178 2210623 Sebastião Barros PI 
27 1400407 Normandia RR 179 2210904 Socorro do Piauí PI 
28 1400456 Pacaraima RR 180 2211209 Uruçuí PI 
29 1400472 Rorainópolis RR 181 2211357 Várzea Branca PI 
30 1400506 São João da Baliza RR 182 2404309 
Governador Dix-Sept 
Rosado RN 
31 1400605 São Luiz RR 183 2410009 Pilões RN 
32 1400704 Uiramutã RR 184 2411056 Tibau RN 
33 1500701 Anajás PA 185 2412559 São Miguel do gostoso RN 
34 1500909 Augusto Corrêa PA 186 2501302 Aroeiras PB 
35 1501253 Bannach PA 187 2509404 Mogeiro PB 
36 1501451 Belterra PA 188 2510006 Nazarezinho PB 
37 1501907 Bujaru PA 189 2510600 Ouro Velho PB 
38 1501956 Cachoeira do Piriá PA 190 2513000 Salgadinho PB 
39 1502772 Curionópolis PA 191 2513505 Santana de Mangueira PB 
40 1502806 Curralinho PA 192 2514602 São José do Bonfim PB 
41 1503200 Igarapé-Açu PA 193 2515203 
São Sebastião do 
Umbuzeiro PB 
42 1504604 Mocajuba PA 194 2516805 Triunfo PB 
43 1504752 Mojuí dos Campos PA 195 2603926 Carnaubeira da Penha PE 
44 1504950 Nova Esperança do Piriá PA 196 2614402 Solidão PE 
45 1505403 Ourém PA 197 2701506 Campo Grande AL 
46 1505494 Palestina do Pará PA 198 2701605 Canapi AL 
47 1505650 Placas PA 199 2703304 Inhapi AL 
48 1505908 Porto de Moz PA 200 2703601 Japaratinga AL 
49 1506401 Santa Cruz do Arari PA 201 2704104 Lagoa da Canoa AL 
50 1507466 São João da Ponta PA 202 2705309 Minador do Negrão AL 




São Sebastião da Boa 
Vista PA 204 2706802 Piaçabuçu AL 
53 1508357 Vitória do Xingu PA 205 2708204 São Brás AL 
54 1600055 Serra do Navio AP 206 2709202 Traipu AL 
55 1600154 
Pedra Branca do 
Amaparí AP 207 2802601 Gracho Cardoso SE 
56 1600238 Ferreira Gomes AP 208 2804201 Monte Alegre de Sergipe SE 
57 1600253 Itaubal AP 209 2900207 Abaré BA 
58 1600808 Vitória do Jari AP 210 2901502 Anguera BA 
59 1703073 Barra do Ouro TO 211 2901809 Antônio Gonçalves BA 
60 1703826 Cachoeirinha TO 212 2903706 Boa Nova BA 
61 1704600 Chapada de Areia TO 213 2905305 Cafarnaum BA 
62 1709807 Ipueiras TO 214 2906899 Caraíbas BA 
63 1710706 Itaguatins TO 215 2908705 Condeúba BA 
64 1712157 Lavandeira TO 216 2909208 Coronel João Sá BA 
65 1715705 Palmeirante TO 217 2910776 Feira da Mata BA 
66 1716703 Colméia TO 218 2912509 Ibipitanga BA 
67 1717206 Piraquê TO 219 2913408 Igaporã BA 
68 1718451 Pugmil TO 220 2915353 Itaguaçu da Bahia BA 
69 1718709 Rio dos Bois TO 221 2917003 Itiúba BA 
70 2100105 Afonso Cunha MA 222 2918506 Jussara BA 
71 2100154 Água Doce do Maranhão MA 223 2920304 Malhada de Pedras BA 
72 2100402 Altamira do Maranhão MA 224 2922854 Nova Redenção BA 
73 2100477 Alto Alegre do Pindaré MA 225 2924207 Pedro Alexandre BA 
74 2100501 Alto Parnaíba MA 226 2924504 Pindaí BA 
75 2100600 Amarante do Maranhão MA 227 2924702 Piripá BA 
76 2100808 Anapurus MA 228 2925600 Presidente Dutra BA 
77 2100873 Araguanã MA 229 2926509 Ribeira do Amparo BA 
78 2101301 Bacuri MA 230 2930758 Sítio do Mato BA 
79 2101350 Bacurituba MA 231 2932457 Umburanas BA 
80 2101731 Belágua MA 232 2933455 Wanderley BA 
81 2101772 Bela Vista do Maranhão MA 233 3106408 Belo Vale MG 
82 2101905 Bequimão MA 234 3117009 Comercinho MG 
83 2102002 Bom Jardim MA 235 3118700 Coqueiral MG 
84 2102150 Brejo de Areia MA 236 3120409 Cristiano Otoni MG 
85 2102309 Buriti Bravo MA 237 3123304 Dores do Turvo MG 
86 2102374 Cachoeira Grande MA 238 3124906 Eugenópolis MG 
87 2102408 Cajapió MA 239 3125309 Faria Lemos MG 
88 2102507 Cajari MA 240 3127305 Galiléia MG 
89 2103109 Cedral MA 241 3128709 Guaxupé MG 
90 2103125 Central do Maranhão MA 242 3130556 Imbé de Minas MG 
91 2103158 Centro do Guilherme MA 243 3139300 Manga MG 
92 2103257 Cidelândia MA 244 3145802 Onça de Pitangui MG 
93 2103752 Davinópolis MA 245 3157278 
Santa Bárbara do Monte 
Verde MG 
94 2103802 Dom Pedro MA 246 3158953 Santana do Paraíso MG 
95 2104099 Formosa da Serra Negra MA 247 3164209 São Romão MG 
96 2104206 Fortuna MA 248 3170305 Umburatiba MG 
97 2104503 Governador Archer MA 249 3170529 Urucuia MG 
98 2104628 Governador Luiz Rocha MA 250 3171105 Veríssimo MG 
99 2104651 
Governador Newton 
Bello MA 251 3171709 Virgínia MG 
100 2104677 Governador Nunes Freire MA 252 3505609 Barrinha SP 
101 2104701 Graça Aranha MA 253 3508306 Cabrália Paulista SP 
102 2105005 Humberto de Campos MA 254 3525805 Júlio Mesquita SP 
103 2105153 Igarapé do Meio MA 255 3533205 Nova Independência SP 
104 2105203 Igarapé Grande MA 256 3553302 Tambaú SP 
105 2105609 Joselândia MA 257 3557204 Chavantes SP 
106 2105658 Junco do Maranhão MA 258 4100905 Amaporã PR 
107 2105807 Lago do Junco MA 259 4101309 Antônio Olinto PR 
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108 2105906 Lago Verde MA 260 4108452 Foz do Jordão PR 
109 2105963 
Lagoa Grande do 
Maranhão MA 261 4109500 Guaraqueçaba PR 
110 2106201 Luís Domingues MA 262 4119103 Piên PR 
111 2106326 Maracaçumé MA 263 4126009 
São Sebastião da 
Amoreira PR 
112 2106631 Matões do Norte MA 264 4126272 Saudade do Iguaçu PR 
113 2106706 Mirador MA 265 4200754 Alto Bela Vista SC 
114 2106904 Monção MA 266 4203105 Caibi SC 
115 2107100 Morros MA 267 4205506 Fraiburgo SC 
116 2107308 Nova Iorque MA 268 4210050 Macieira SC 
117 2107357 
Nova Olinda do 
Maranhão MA 269 4211652 Novo Horizonte SC 
118 2108058 Paulino Neves MA 270 4212650 Pescaria Brava SC 
119 2108108 Paulo Ramos MA 271 4220000 Rincão SC 
120 2108256 Pedro do Rosário MA 272 4301057 Arroio do Sal RS 
121 2108405 Peri Mirim MA 273 4304622 Capão Bonito do Sul RS 
122 2108801 Pirapemas MA 274 4304655 Capão do Cipó RS 
123 2109270 Presidente Sarney MA 275 4304697 Capitão RS 
124 2109403 Primeira Cruz MA 276 4308300 Fontoura Xavier RS 
125 2109759 
Santa Filomena do 
Maranhão MA 277 4312609 Muçum RS 
126 2110039 Santa Luzia do Paruá MA 278 4314175 Pedras Altas RS 
127 2110203 Santa Rita MA 279 4314548 Pinto Bandeira RS 
128 2110401 
São Benedito do Rio 
Preto MA 280 4316303 Roque Gonzales RS 
129 2110807 São Félix de Balsas MA 281 4317251 Santa Tereza RS 
130 2111003 São João Batista MA 282 4318200 São Francisco de Paula RS 
131 2111029 São João do Carú MA 283 4319505 São Sebastião do Caí RS 
132 2111052 São João do Paraíso MA 284 4320354 Sentinela do Sul RS 
133 2111532 
São Pedro da Água 
Branca MA 285 4322152 Tunas RS 
134 2111631 
São Raimundo do Doca 
Bezerra MA 286 4322558 Vanini RS 
135 2111672 São Roberto MA 287 5006275 Paraíso das Águas MS 
136 2111706 São Vicente Ferrer MA 288 5105176 Juruena MT 
137 2111789 Serrano do Maranhão MA 289 5106000 Nortelândia MT 
138 2111904 Sucupira do Norte MA 290 5106851 Porto Estrela MT 
139 2112001 Tasso Fragoso MA 291 5107578 Rondolândia MT 
140 2112100 Timbiras MA 292 5108352 Vale de São Domingos MT 
141 2112274 Tufilândia MA 293 5200159 Adelândia GO 
142 2112308 Tuntum MA 294 5201454 Aparecida do Rio Doce GO 
143 2112605 Urbano Santos MA 295 5201603 Araçu GO 
144 2201150 Baixa Grande do Ribeiro PI 296 5204201 Cachoeira de Goiás GO 
145 2201309 Barreiras do Piauí PI 297 5209457 Guarinos GO 
146 2201705 Bertolínia PI 298 5212303 Leopoldo de Bulhões GO 
147 2201929 Bonfim do Piauí PI 299 5219506 Santa Rosa de Goiás GO 
148 2201945 Boqueirão do Piauí PI 300 5220280 São Patrício GO 
149 2202174 Campo Largo do Piauí PI 301 5220702 Sítio d'Abadia GO 
150 2202455 
Capitão Gervásio 
Oliveira PI 302 5221080 Teresina de Goiás GO 
151 2202851 Coronel José Dias PI 303 5221452 Trombas GO 
152 2203008 Cristalândia do Piauí PI     
Source: authors. ID: It is an identification number defined by the IBGE. UF: Unit Federation or States, which are 
27 (AC: Acre, AL: Alagoas, AM: Amazonas, AP: Amapá, BA: Bahia, CE: Ceará, DF: Federal District, ES: 
Espírito Santo, GO: Goiás, MA: Maranhão, MG: Minas Gerais, MS: Mato Grosso do Sul, MT: Mato Grosso, PA: 
Pará, PB: Paraíba, PE: Pernambuco, PI: Piauí, PR: Paraná, RJ: Rio de Janeiro, RN: Rio Grande do Norte, RO: 




Appendix 2: Percentage of each kind of Grant from 2006 to 2013 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
FPM percent 44,560 0.627 0.201 0.000 1.000 
ITR percent 44,560 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.512 
IOF percent 44,560 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.511 
ICMS percent 44,560 0.331 0.177 0.000 0.965 
IPVA percent 44,560 0.030 0.035 0.000 0.423 
IPIEx percent 44,560 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.340 
Source: authors. Considering the lack of data available, it is an 
unbalanced panel because some municipalities did not present data in 
some years. The municipalities that do not have data of FPM are 
presented in Appendix 5. Obs: observations. Std.Dev.: Standard 




Appendix 3: IFDM Components 
Employment/Income Education Health 
Formal jobs generation Primary school enrollment Proportion of prenatal 
consultation 
Formalization rate Primary school leaver Death due to not defined cause 
Income generation Age-series distortion on primary 
school 
Child mortality 
Real aggregate wages on formal 
jobs 
Undergraduate teachers in primary 
school 
Hospitalizations (ISAB) 
Gini index Average daily hour-class in primary 
school 
 
 IDEB index result  
Source: authors. IDEB: Basic Education Development Index (Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica - 
IDEB, in portuguese). ISAB: Internments suitable for Primary Healthcare. 
 
Appendix 4: Pearson correlation instrument variable IFDM from 2006 to 2013 
 Exp GDP Grant IFDM 
Exp 1    
GDP 0.350 1   
Grant 0.449 -0.004 1  
IFDM 0.109 0.430 -0.201 1 
Source: authors 
 
Appendix 5: Municipalities with the 10 worst and best IFDM index in 2013 
id Mun. State IFDM Pop Exp GDP Grant 
1304237 Tonantins AM 0.10 18162 660.857 2003.59 180.778 
1501105 Bagre PA 0.12 26666 0 1935.83 134.487 
5200852 Americano do Brasil GO 0.14 5813 725.828 4409.46 300.967 
2614303 Moreilândia PE 0.14 11246 853.748 2209.39 235.316 
2913002 Ibitiara BA 0.14 16647 1735.88 1658.57 200.43 
1505809 Portel PA 0.14 56094 616.055 2974.01 100.465 
2404309 Governador Dix-Sept Rosado RN 0.15 12934 716.951 7533.7 196.863 
2203271 Curral Novo do Piauí PI 0.15 5027 693.488 1630.32 306.787 
2612109 Salgadinho PE 0.16 10076 475.131 1594.22 196.98 
2211704 Wall Ferraz PI 0.16 4355 673.316 1807.62 354.126 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----         
4108403 Francisco Beltrão PR 0.85 84437 532.751 8949.39 103.057 
2312908 Sobral CE 0.85 197663 753.783 6318.09 109.828 
2304285 Eusébio CE 0.85 49455 1039.13 15301.18 131.941 
5107925 Sorriso MT 0.86 75104 746.594 17903.38 81.5299 
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1502152 Canaã dos Carajás PA 0.86 31062 1761.93 40961.66 115.454 
5107909 Sinop MT 0.87 123634 598.732 10627.09 70.1632 
3140001 Mariana MG 0.87 57639 1550.03 41907.08 120.939 
4211306 Navegantes SC 0.89 68337 721.939 14491.98 95.2235 
3131901 Itabirito MG 0.90 48614 1257.6 30252.04 130.355 
5008305 Três Lagoas MS 0.90 109633 931.631 21636.68 93.5315 
Source: authors 
 










State Data Municipality Data 
Deflation Index IGP_DI Multiplicator 
1985  3,417,402,846.02  - - 
1986  1,194,970,774.62  - - 
1987     409,207,452.50  - - 
1988       62,191,009.50  - - 
1989         3,964,141.28  - - 
1990           157,532.03  - - 
1991             36,403.64  - - 
1992               3,892.72  - - 
1993                  162.96  - - 
1994                     7.23  - - 
1995                     3.63  - - 
1996                     3.06  - - 
1997                     2.65  - - 
1998                     2.43  - - 
1999                     2.28  - - 
2000                     2.14  193.97 17.056 
2001                     2.03  214.14 15.450 
2002                     1.85  270.69 12.222 
2003                     1.56  291.46 11.351 
2004                     1.48  326.83 10.122 
2005                     1.35  330.84 1 
2006                     1.37  343.38 0.9635 
2007                     1.26  370.49 0.8930 
2008                     1.09  404.19 0.8185 
2009                     1.03  398.41 0.8304 
2010                     1.00  443.43 0.7461 
2011 - 465.59 0.7106 
2012 - 503.28 0.6574 
2013 - 531.06 0.6230 
2014 - 551.15 0.6003 
2015 - 610.13 0.5422 
2016 - 653.95 0.5059 
2017 - 651.21 0.5080 
2018 - 697.45 0.4743 
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Appendix 7: Flypaper Effect researches in Brazil 
n Author Sample Methodology 
Dependent 
Variable 




26 brazilian states and 
capitals in years 1970, 
1975, 1980, 1985 and 
1990. 
Concluded that increasing 
intergovernmental transfers or reducing the 
weight of tax revenues provokes the 
expansion of public expenditures and the 
reduction of the fiscal effort of tax 
collection. 
Potential States tax 
income 
National Tax charge; National income; State 






3,500 municipalities in 
1996 




Expenditure with neighboring municipalities;  
Total per capita income; Proportion of 
transfers in total income;  Urbanization index; 





4,300 municipalities in 
1991 
It was analyzed the use of 
intergovernmental transfers as a financing 
mechanism for lower levels of government 
and identified the presence of the flypaper 
effect in the finances of Brazilian 




Price of public goods (or tax price); Total 
income of the median voter; 
Intergovernmental Constitutional Transfers;  
Participation of income from 
intergovernmental transfers on the total 
income of the median voter; Population; 
Demographic density; Degree of urbanization; 
Proportion of population under 14; Proportion 
of population over 65; Proportion of 






4,974 municipalities in 
1996 
It was identified: 1) the transfers are more 
subject to the capture than the tax revenue; 
2) the elasticity of the capture in relation to 
transfers based on the derivation principle 
(ICMS) is less than in relation to transfers 
based on distribution formulas (FPM); 
conclusions consistent with the theoretical 
fiscal illusion and bargaining power. The 
capture is also higher in the poorest 
municipalities and those most benefited by 







Tax Revenue; ICMS transfers; FPM transfers; 
Dummy of municipalities that received 
royalties; Living Conditions Index (LCI); 
Population; Number of councilmen; GDP; 







26 brazilian states 
agrouped by their 
It was verified the presence of fiscal 
illusion and flypaper effect, although the 
main objective of the study was the relation 
Government Size 
Self-financing capacity; Expenditure’s 
decentralization; Vertical imbalance; Transfers 





1998 to 2001 
between the size of the government with 
fiscal decentralization. In addition, it was 
found a positive relation of the participation 
of the transfers in the total revenues of the 
municipality with the size of the 
government (vertical imbalance). 
Teachers per student; Garbage collection rate; 





111 municipalities with 
more than 100 
thousand inhabitants  
from 1998 to 2006 
Intergovernmental transfers influence 
negatively the fiscal performance of the 
beneficiary municipalities, as a result of the 
low fiscal effort to generate own revenues 
and/or by the current public spending 
expansion of the received entities. 
Municipal debt 
Debt lag; Capital structure; Liquidity; 






5,119 municipalities in 
2007 





Tax collection per 
capita 
 
Tax collection per capita; Transfers; Income; 
Demographic density; Proportion of votes 
received in the 2004 election; Dummy mayor, 











(linear model) and 
2996 municipalities 
(log model) in 2004. 
Concluded that unconditional grants affect 
negatively the efficiency in tax collection 
as opposed to consumer’s income, leading 
to a reinterpretation of the flypaper effect. 
Local governments in Brazil should seek 
additional revenues in their own resources. 
This does not mean though to implement 
some new taxes, but to exploit more 











Panel data of Brazilian 
municipalities from 
1995 to 2006 
Vector autoregressive models (VAR) with 
panel data composed by information on 
own revenue, current expenditure and 
current transfers 
tested by Granger causality. 
- 






VAR-panel of 5,544 
municipalities in 2010. 
The work estimates a VAR-panel using 
data and a sequence of hypotheses 
investigated through the statistics of the 
overidentification test.  
- 






Panel data of 27 
Brazilian states from 
2000 to 2008 
It was verified that the conditional and 
unconditional grants present expansive 
effect on the Brazilian states public 
Expenditure 
Conditional transfers; Unconditional transfers; 







expenditures and the transfers analyzed did 
not present an expansive effect and neither 





municipalities in 2000 
A threshold model that, through groups, 
with samples of three sets of municipalities, 
for each of the two variables used as 
threshold: wages and political strength. 
Almost all municipalities of Ceará state the 
flypaper effect exists and results from 




Price of the public good or tax price; Total 
income of the median voter; Income from 
intergovernmental transfers over the total 
income of the median voter; Illiteracy; 
Demographic density; Population above 65 
years; Life expectancy of the inhabitants; 
Distance from the capital; Threshold; Number 
of coalition city councilors and total number of 
city council members; Percentage families that 
earn up to 2 minimum wages. 
Yes 
13 Costa (2013) 
5,293 municipalities 
from 1999 to 2009 
It was used Auto Regressive Vectors 
(PVAR) and quantile equations for panel 
data and verified a negative relation 
between transfers and fiscal effort of the 
Brazilian municipalities was verified, but 









from 1989 to 2005 
It was found that government transfers 
cause an asymmetric impact on local public 
expenditure and municipal public spending 
is more sensitive to increases in transfers 








Total income; Government transfers; Dummy 
revenue fall; Proportion of young people; 








from 2002 to 2008 
It was initially estimated a panel model 
with fixed effects, using linear and 
logarithmic specification. The regressions 
were estimated using robust inference, 
being controlled by municipalities clusters 
of the same microregion. It was identified a 
tendency of flypaper effect increasing and 
consequent fungibility effect decreasing, as 
higher is the health expenditure level in the 
municipalities for all the linear models of 
quantile regressions employed, indicating 
that the results are robust. 
Health 
expenditures 
GDP; PAB Transfers; Other transfers; FPM; 
Royalties; Other current transfers; Population; 
Proportion of young people; Proportion of 
elderly; Proportion of women; Families served 
by the program; Houses with water; Houses 
with garbage collection; Houses with sewage; 
Houses with water at home; Houses with 









from 2000 to 2009 
It was analyzed the effects that fiscal 















from 1982 to 1988 
Extra transfers in Brazil increased local 
government spending per capita by about 
20 percent over a 4 year period with no 
evidence of crowding out own revenue or 
other revenue sources.Test flypaper effect 
was not the objective of the research, but 
the results has shown evidences of it. 
Total public 
spending per capita 
County income per capita; average years of 
schooling for individuals 25 years and older; 
poverty headcount ratio; illiterate percentage of 
people over 14 years old; infant mortality, 
enrollment of 7–14-year-olds; and percent of 
population living in urban áreas. 
Yes 
18 
Correia et al. 
(2014) 
184 municipalities of 
Ceará state from 1999 
to 2009 
It was analyzed whether the behavior of 
public expenditure in the municipalities of 
Ceará state coincurs with the practice 
defined in the literature as a flypaper effect. 
Total expenditure 








from 1999 to 2009 
Panel with tax collection variables, GDP, 
population, current transfers and 
expenditures was used to verify the 
flypaper effect. The results highlight that 
conditions do not exist to confirm the 
practice of the flypaper effect by the 
municipal public administration in Brazil. 





5,249 municipalities in 
2010 
The demand function for local public goods 
was estimated based on the model of the 
median voter. Inserting variables that 
capture the fiscal illusion, it was found that 
the expansion of local public spending in 
Brazil is partly a consequence of the fiscal 
illusion clearly manifested in the flypaper 
effect and in the absence of simplicity of 
the local tax system. 
Current 
expenditure 
Medium income; Tax share; Population; 
Transfers per capita; Fiscal simplicity; Child 
mortality; Ratio of dependency; Aging rate; 
School attendance rate; Gini Index; IDHM – 






26 Brazilian states from 
1985 to 2005 and also 
23 Argentinean 
provinces from 1963 to 
2006 
Tested and found a positive association 
between the size of the flypaper effect and 
the level of the tax rate; and the lower 
(higher) the elasticity of substitution 
between private and public spending, the 
higher (lower) the flypaper effect. It is more 
efficient, from the point of view of the local 
Government 
spending 





fiscal authority, to spend more out of 
intergovernmental transfers (which is 
distortion-free money) than from private 
income (which can only be spent after 






208 Paraíba state’s 
municipalities from 
2009 to 2011 
Building of a municipal efficiency score 
and subsequent application of the 
Generalized Least Squares (OLS) to 
measure the effects of the flypaper effect. 
Municipality 
efficiency score 
Rate of own revenues directed to basic 
education in relation to total expenditures of 
basic education; Dummy variable represented 
by the losses and gains in the division of the 





State panel data from 
2000 to 2013 and 
municipalitiy panel 
data from 2002 to 2013 
By Granger's bi-causality relationship 
between transfers and public expenditures, 
the author corroborated the existence of the 
flypaper effect. A time series greater than 
10 years was runned, which justified the 




Transfers; Tax Revenue; Expenditures; GDP; 
Population; Demographic density; Gini index; 
Houses with water; Houses with wall; Houses 
with energy; Houses with garbage collected; 





26 Brazilian states from 
2004 to 2015 
With the use of a fixed-regression model 
with panel data and the use of robust errors, 
evidence is found of the Flypaper effect and 
partly of the illusion caused by the 
complexity of revenue. 
Public Expenditure 
per capita 
Median Income; Tax share; Population; 
Intergovernmental transfers per capita; Fiscal 
Simplicity; Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; 
Visibility Index; Infant Mortality; Dependency 








in Brazil from year 
2006 to 2012 
Empirical evidence on price-effect caused 
by lump sum grants for local governments 
in Brazil between 2006 to 2010. An 
increase in R$ 1.00 in per capita 
unconditional transfers reduces the local 
price effect (MCF) around 0.07%, but this 
result is not consistently estimated across 
all subsamples. 
Marginal Cost of 
Fund 
Total FPM transfers revenues; Total service tax 
revenue; Total payroll costs for firms in service 
sector; Human Development Index; Number of 
firms in service sector; Natural logarithm of 
employees in the service sector; State grant 
from VAT (ICMS) normalized; Average 
effective tax rate (ISS revenue/ payroll costs); 
Marginal costs of public fund; Binary variable 
(=1) if municipality is in metropolitan area; 
Natural logarithm of local population; 
Populational density; Individuals from 5 to 15 









2005 to 2012 
The flypaper effect exists in Brazilian 
municipalities and is intensified by the 
alignment of the representatives in the same 
way of theoretical literature. Moreover, 
Current 
expenditure 
Grants; Gross Domestic Product; percentages of 
woman, youth, and elderly people above 60 





higher flypaper effect were found in 
municipalities with low tax autonomy. 







26 Brazilian states from 
2004 to 2015 
With the use of a fixed-regression model 
with panel data and the use of robust errors, 
evidence is found of the Flypaper effect and 
partly of the illusion caused by the 
complexity of revenue. 
Public Expenditure 
per capita 
Median Income; Tax share; Population; 
Intergovernmental transfers per capita; Fiscal 
Simplicity; Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; 
Visibility Index; Infant Mortality; Dependency 







municipality from 2005 
to 2019 
The evidence points to a series of structural 
problems, such as the excessive 
dependence on transferred revenues 
causing tax illusion, the increase in public 
spending showing the flypaper effect, in 
addition to the capture of public resources 
by interest groups organized in the 
municipality. 






with up 30,000 
inhabitants from 2002 
to 2012 
The analysis of FPM effects on budget 
expenditure, by the function or area of 
administration, shows increases in 
education and urbanization expenditures, 
indicating that public goods in these 
functions are complementary between 
bordering jurisdictions. The flypaper effect 
in local economies can be partially 
explained by bordering municipalities’ 




Population, Budget spending, Health care, 
Education, Urbanism, Sanitation, Housing, 
Budget revenue, Tax revenue. 
Yes 
Source: author. *FE: Confirmed evidences of Flypaper effect. 
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Appendix 8: IBGE Query (in portuguese) 
Dados do Pedido 
Tipo de manifestação Acesso à Informação 
Número 03005.173660/2020-17 
Esfera Federal 
Órgão destinatário IBGE – Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística  
Serviço - 
Órgão de interesse - 
AssuntoAcesso à informação 
Subassunto 
Tag - 
Data de cadastro 30/10/2020 
Prazo de atendimento 23/11/2020 
Situação Concluída 
Registrado por Lucas Oliveira Gomes Ferreira 
Modo de resposta Pelo sistema (com avisos por email) 
Canal de entrada Internet 
Prezados, fiz um pedido (protocolo 03950003556201844) e o IBGE respondeu falando que as informações do 
pib municipal tem uma defasagem de dois anos. Porém, já estamos em novembro praticamente de 2020 e até o 
momento não foi disponibilizado o pib de 2018. Qual o motivo? Quando será divulgado? 
 
Dados da Resposta 
Prezado Sr. Lucas, 
 O IBGE disponibiliza no sítio https://www.ibge.gov.br/calendario-estudos-e-pesquisas-estruturais-e-
especiais o calendário com as previsões de divulgação de seus estudos e pesquisas estruturais e especiais em 
2020. 
 Recomendamos que observe que a data de divulgação para o Produto Interno Bruto dos Municípios 
– 2018 está prevista para o mês de dezembro de 2020. Esta data tem se mantido tanto na previsão anterior 
quanto na atual da referida divulgação. 
 Solicitamos que acompanhe, no link acima, as previsões da divulgação do Produto Interno Bruto dos 




Appendix 9: Datasus Query (in portuguese) 
Dados do Pedido 
Protocolo 25820007125201875 
Solicitante Lucas Oliveira Gomes Ferreira 
Data de Abertura  08/11/2018 11:47 
Orgão Superior Destinatário MS – Ministério da Saúde 
Orgão Vinculado Destinatário 
Prazo de Atendimento  10/12/2018 
Situação Respondido 
Status da Situação Acesso Concedido (Resposta solicitada inserida no e-SIC) 
Forma de Recebimento da Resposta Pelo sistema (com avisos por email) 
Resumo Problemas base Datasus 
Detalhamento 
Prezados, 
Ao acessar dados do datasus pelo link a seguir e colocando os parâmetros Linha - Município, Coluna - Não 
ativa, Conteúdo - Tip.Casa Tijolo, observei 2 problemas: 
1- alguns municípios (330227 - Japeri - RJ, por exemplo), não aparecem dados em alguns anos (Japeri não 
aparece nos anos de 2005, 2006 e 2007, por exemplo).  
2- O mesmo caso do município Japeri - RJ, em 2002 ele tinha 4974 Tip.Casa Tijolo, em 2003 ele tinha 4491, 
em 2004 ele tinha 951, os 3 anos seguintes ele não aparece, em 2008 ele reaparece com 3330 Tip.Casa Tijolo 
e em 2009 passa para 5281. Como pode ter diminuído o número de casas com tijolo? Há alguma explicação 
para isso? Observei que acontece com outros municípios também e que vários não estão na base de dados de 
alguns anos, que é o problema da minha primeira questão apresentada. Segue o link que extraí as informações. 
http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/deftohtm.exe?siab/cnv/SIABCbr.def 
 
Dados da Resposta 
Data de Resposta 10/12/2018 12:34 
Tipo de Resposta Acesso Concedido 
Classificação do Tipo de Resposta Resposta solicitada inserida no e-SIC 
Resposta 
Prezado senhor 
Em atenção à vossa demanda, junto ao serviço de informação ao cidadão SIC/MS, na qual informa inexistência 
e divergências de dados em pesquisas realizadas no link: 
http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/deftohtm.exe?Siab/cnv/siabcbr.def, passamos os seguintes esclarecimentos: 
Os dados disseminados pelo tabnet na consulta em referência são oriundos de um antigo Sistema de Atenção 
Básica - SIAB, o qual foi substituído pelo E-SUSAB/SISAB. Desde de dezembro de 2016, as informações ali 
contidas não são mais alteradas no tabnet, apenas refletem o que está gravado nas bases que o tabulador 
consulta. Procedemos diligência de consulta às bases do SIAB, que são tabuladas pelo tabnet e constatamos 
que, procedem as reclamações, isto é, não existem os dados de Japeri e há divergências de informações 
conforme os filtros e seleções utilizados. Em relação ao primeiro questionamento, constatou-se por meio do 
histórico do Departamento de Atenção Básica - DAB que, nos anos de 2005, 2006 e 2007, o município de 
Japeri/Rj não possuía implantado Equipe de Saúde da Família (ESF) e agentes comunitários de saúde (ACS), 
não sendo possível envio de produção das equipes. Por esse motivo, não aparecem os dados do município nos 
referidos anos. O segundo questionamento mostra redução dos dados nos anos entre 2002 e 2004 e aumento 
do valor em 2008 para a variável tipo casa tijolo. Esta variável não era de preenchimento obrigatório no 
sistema. Na época, era orientada a atualização dos dados ao final de cada ano. O preenchimento obrigatório 
da variável somente ocorreu a partir do ano de 2008. É importante ressaltar que os dados são alimentados 
diretamente pelos municípios, dessa forma, podendo ocorrer também erro na informação e erro na digitação. 
Para que seja verificado a acurácia do dado, o demandante deverá entrar em contato com o município em 
questão e verificar o registro da informação na ficha a (ficha para cadastramento das famílias) e o dado 
digitado no sistema local. 
Responsável pela Resposta Departamento de Atenção Básica e Departamento de Informática do SUS 




Appendix 10: Descriptive Statistics 
 Without Federal District With Federal District Municipalities 
Variables Mean Avg Std.Dv Obs Mean Avg Std.Dv Obs Mean Avg Std.Dv Obs 
Exp 1.491 1.593 .802 698 1.536 1.752 1.213 672 1087.24 964.613 1159.66 105,783 
GDP 9.855 11.560 5.490 702 10.150 12.939 8.869 672 9001.463 6457.19 10415.62 105,830 
Grant 0.269  0.496 0.651 698 0.260 0.483 0.643 672 419.541 323.118 315.446 105,830 
MCF 0.461 0.447 0.209 697 0.458 0.445 0.210 671     
MCF*Grant 0.117 0.144 0.126 697 0.108 0.141 0.125 671     
MCF_d -25.640 -2.86e+09 9.25e+09 699 22.864 -2.81e+09 9.09e+09 673     
MCF_d *Grant -1.11e+09 -4.90e+08 2.27e+09 696 -1.06e+09 -4.58e+08 2.22e+09 670     
Controls             
Gini 0.556 0.552 0.065 701 0.559 0.554 0.065 675     
Theil 0.636 0.647 0.150 701 0.643 0.649 0.148 675     
Citizen’s income 618.40 648.64 260.94 701 630.45 679.16 306.209 675     
Water  0.802 0.753 0.204 701 0.815 0.761 0.204 675     
Illiteracy 0.133 0.165 0.104 702 0.130 0.161 0.104 676     
Source: authors. All monetary variables are per capita and deflated to 2010 (States) and to 2005 (Municipalities) by the General Market Price Index 
– Internal Availability (IGP-DI). 
